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Park Chung Hee (presidential term: 1961-1979) is, arguably, the most significant
leader in the Korean Peninsula’s modern history. His governance has many trademark
elements that have been thoroughly analyzed. These include his economic plans and
violent dealings against his political opposition. One often overlooked variable, however,
is the significant traces of early Korean nationalism (1890s-1930s) that defined his
regime. Park employed these ideas, although controversial, to completely change a nation
that was teetering on the brink of destruction into what is now, one of the most wellknown republics in the world – economically, technologically, and culturally. It is
important, therefore, to investigate how early nationalism affected and shaped Park’s
tenure, and more importantly, how it still affects South Korea today.
There are two main nationalist ideologies that affected Park’s rule. First are the
teachings of early nineteenth century Korean nationalists, most prominently Sin Chaeho
and Choe Namson. These philosophies gave Park the foundations to base his eventual
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regime upon. Specifically, Sin and Choe’s take on the Tan’gun creation myth promoted
that the Korean people are entitled to a prosperous and homogenized land. This was also
one element of their minjok tenet – minjok loosely translating to “the Korean people.” It
is an ethnonationalist philosophy implying that all Koreans and the lands from where
they originated are bound together by blood. Second, Park took those theories and mixed
them with a Social Darwinist, Neo-Confucian ideology, one modeled after what he
learned from his brief Imperial Japanese military career; this is otherwise known as
bushido. When fused together, these elements created a unique institution that was
evident throughout every aspect of a Park-era South Korea.
It was not until the 1980s onwards that an affluent South Korean citizenry sought
a more advanced republican-like polity. From this time on they out grew their need for
Park-styled autocracy and nationalism. Through intense and daily mass protests, many of
which ended in bloodshed, South Koreans infused old minjok nationalist themes with
dissent; this union was called minjung. Minjung loosely translates to “mass people”,
however during the protests the term was solidified under the definition of “the will of
the [Korean] masses.” Therefore, minjung is now synonymous with South Korean-styled
democracy. As a result, the end of the decade finally saw the last relic of Park’s
governance. His successor, Chun Doo-hwan, was ousted as South Korea ascended into
the pantheon of highly developed democracies.
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Introduction
South Korea’s third president, former general, and strongman Park Chung Hee
(1917-1979) is one of the most controversial figures in Korean history. Common
opinions of the former president (term: 1961-1979) range from veneration to critical
scorn with little to no middle ground. The former general was no stranger to controversy
since his forceful takeover (coup d’état) of the presidency in 1961. Park’s frequent use of
brutal totalitarian measures, such as discarding due process of law and frequent torture of
alleged dissenters, garnered him an infamous reputation. To add further antipathy, in
2016 his daughter and former president, Park Geun-hye, was impeached on corruption
charges. Ultimately, a significant portion of modern Korean historians and younger
generations aptly label the elder Park a power-hungry “dictator” who instilled a “reign of
terror.”1
Park’s fiscal accomplishments, however, receive praise by older generations and
international spectators, especially in the developing world. Before Park’s coup, South
Korea came out of a civil war (1950-1953) in terrible shape economically, physically,
and psychologically. Its position was so bleak that most global powers, including the US,
labeled the South as “a hopeless case of poverty, social anomie, and political instability
that was destined to lose in the inter-Korea competition to become the sole legitimate
government of the entire Korean peoples.”2 Indeed, this is not an easy reputation to
overcome.

1
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From “Land of the Morning Calm” to States in
Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 471.
2
Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik, “The Taming and Tamed by the United States,” in The Park
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 60.
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The situation domestically was so dire that Park enacted swift, decisive, and
efficient reforms – through side-stepping democratic procedures and habeus corpus rights
– that resulted in international admiration. Within a generation, Park’s governance
brought a war-torn and destitute Korea into global prosperity and prestige; and, therefore,
it may be palpable to see why developing and emerging markets, such as BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China) countries, are attracted to Park’s autocratic, yet rapid,
“developmental state” system.3
Sentiments about Park’s legacy are bipolar, and both Korean and international
scholars have extensively examined the matter. Park’s leadership, economic programs,
and contemporary sociopolitical perceptions are popular subjects for many historians,
political scientists, and economists. The alleviation of poverty, the skillful navigation of
Cold War politics, and the creation of a technocratic culture are trademarks of the Park
Era. However, a less covered, yet equally important subject, centers around South Korean
nationalism.
Park’s governance capitalized on five centuries worth of Korean nationalist
culture. This deep tradition – learned during a brief World War II Japanese military
career – consequently influenced a young Park and cemented his world view. The Park
Era created a new nationalist culture that played a major role in his presidency. Even
during his last years and after death, one mired in waning prestige, this type of
nationalism shaped his legacy while deeply affecting his successors. Ultimately, modern

3
Jong-Sung You, “Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access Order: The Case
of South Korea,” in In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development,
ed., Barry R. Weingast, Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Steven B. Webb (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), PDF e-book, 294.
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South Korean nationalist and patriotic sentiments still influence Park’s legacy, good and
bad, both domestically and abroad.
As for the setting and chronology, the thesis takes elements from Ancient Korea
(Gojoseon) all the way until the present. The beginning of the timeline commences
during the Gojoseon era (unknown-108 BCE). There is no specific date for the origins of
Gojoseon; however, mythological tales place it as far back as 2333 BCE. After
Gojoseon, the peninsula split into Three Kingdoms – Goguryeo (37B CE-668 CE),
Baekje (18 BCE-660 CE), and Silla (57 BCE -935 CE).4
The Silla Kingdom eventually conquered the other kingdoms and united them
under one banner: The Unified Silla (668-935 CE). Unified Silla held a majority of the
peninsula for a while, but Goguryeo refugees resettled in the north and they later set the
foundations for the Balhae Kingdom (698-926 CE) and the Later Goguryeo Kingdom
(901-918CE). The Later Goguryeo would become Goryeo.5
After numerous border skirmishes, corrupt in-court politics, and northern nomadic
invasions, the kingdoms fell, and a new entity emerged from the ashes, the Goryeo
Dynasty (918-1392 CE).6 This era is known for constant battles against KhitanManchurian and steppe tribes, and, as such, the battles culminated when Yuan Mongols
annexed Goryeo (1270-1356 CE).7
In 1356, Goryeo gained back their rule as Mongol authority weakened; this was
short lived (1356-1392 CE), however, as Goryeo finally exhausted themselves from

Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 32-42.
Ibid., 91.
6
Ibid., 122
7
Ibid., 165.
4
5
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centuries of never-ending wars. Between 1388 and 1392 CE, a disgruntled general, Yi
Seong-gye, and his troops rebelled against Goryeo elites and eventually usurped the
throne to become Korea’s last and longest-lived dynasty: The Joseon Dynasty.8
The Joseon era lasted for five centuries (1392-1897 CE) and is known as Korea’s
“renaissance” due to a meticulous bureaucracy and domestic technological innovations.
This era is famously known for King Sejong the Great – the founder of the modern
Korean alphabet, hangul – and the Imjin Wars of 1592 (The Japanese Invasion Wars of
1592).
Due to numerous wars, the eighteenth and nineteenth century saw an increasingly
isolated Korea mirroring that of their Qing neighbors. Japanese neighbors to the south,
however, modernized at an unprecedented pace under the rule of Emperor Meiji (18671912). Unbeknownst to Korea and Qing China, Meiji Japan and the Great Western
Powers spelled the doom of East Asia’s dynastic orders.9
The Fall of Joseon (1897) occurred due to numerous peasant revolts, aristocratic
corruption, and a severely outdated socioeconomic structure.10 Instantaneously, a shortlived Korean Empire (1897-1910) was founded with the intent to modernize. This did not
occur as Imperial Japan (1868-1945) set up their hegemony in the Pacific. Consequently,
Korea was colonized and annexed by Japan; and aptly, this era is known as Colonial
Korea (1910-1945).11 During this period, more importantly, Park Chung Hee was born
(1917-1979).

Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 186.
Ibid., 321.
10
Ibid., 306.
11
Ibid., 305, 348-356.
8
9

5
The end of World War II (1945) split Korea into two military government states,
a Soviet-Chinese coalition backed North Korea, and an American-UN coalition backed
South Korea. In 1946, Park came back to Korea after a short stint in the Imperial
Japanese Army (1945-1946). The Koreas engaged in a bloody civil war (1950-1953) that
ended in a stalemate (1953 Korean Armistice Agreement). Park quickly rose ranks during
the Korean War and, now a general, enacted a coup on May 16, 1961.12
Park, now the executive and president of South Korea, held presidential elections
in 1963, 1967, and 1971, winning each one; however, 1971 was a close contest.
Consequently, Park suspended democratic procedures in 1972 by enacting the Yushin
constitution. Park ruled for another seven years, and, in 1979, he was assassinated. His
successor was military general Chun Doo-hwan, and like Park, enacted a coup in 1980 to
gain leadership.13
In 1988, President Chun was ousted due to numerous urban protests and pressure
from the international world. From 1988 to the present, the Sixth Republic of Korea was
founded. This republic was the first to hold direct elections in the last sixteen years ago.
South Koreans have since directly elected seven presidents since Park’s death and Chun’s
ousting.14 For a better representation, Figures I and II are presented as a visual timeline
and chronology of Park’s nationalism.

Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 407-420.
Ibid., 422-425, 446-450.
14
Ibid., 519-525.
12
13

6
Figure I. Chronology of thesis from 2300BCE to present. Timeline created by author. Not drawn to scale.

7
Figure II. Main and branching timelines. Timeline created by author.
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The thesis is structured accordingly: an introduction, six chapters, and a
conclusion; it is organized chronologically from 1910 to 2016. Chapter One is a literature
review titled “Nationalism Before and During Park’s Tenure (1910-1979).” It starts
before World War II and gives a brief history on nationalist origins. This era is important
because it explains how five centuries of Joseon culture (1392-1897) influenced the
founding fathers of the modern Korean states.15 Furthermore, the chapter establishes the
individuals and institutions that shaped Park’s nationalist agendas and the sociological
aspects that went into his reforms. Accordingly, Chapter Two analyzes and summarizes
the materials in the first chapter.
Chapter Three is a literature review titled “Nationalism After Park’s Death (19801988).” It focuses on the effects that Park-styled nationalism had on his successors;
particularly, on Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency (term: 1980-1987). Chun’s tenure is
important, not only because of the similarities with Park’s government, but the
consequences it had in birthing “New Nationalism” for a younger generation.16 Chapter
Four follows up with an analysis.
Chapter Five is the final literature review titled “Park’s Legacy and Nationalism
Today (1989 Onwards).” This chapter provides the framework for “New Nationalism.”
Specifically, it details how old nationalism conflicts with modern nationalism and in turn
shapes twenty-first century Koreans. Chapter Six, thus, is the final analysis with research

Korean academics place great significance on the Joseon Era. This era was noted for its
numerous and meticulously written historical records. In public education curriculum, much of Korean
history – from Korea’s legendary creation (2333 BCE’s creation myth) to the late nineteenth century – is
derived from the many works of prominent Joseon scholars, such as the literati-scholar group Sarim. See
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 191.
16
John Lie and Myoungkyu Park, “South Korea in 2005: Economic Dynamism, Generational
Conflict, and Social Transformations,” Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 61.
15
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ending with the 2016 impeachment of Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, and
the protests surrounding her.
The research is composed with a mix of secondary and primary sources.
Secondary sources include monographs, academic journals, newspaper articles, and
textbooks – mostly in English but Korean sources are used as well. Primary materials
include portions taken from South Korea’s constitution; speeches and letters from the
Presidential Archives; and interviews from prominent opposition leaders and
eyewitnesses. Visual aids are also provided and come in the form of graphs and charts
with data extracted from polls and surveys; maps and images, both self-replicated and
taken from sources; and self-made chronology timelines.
With help from colleagues, I include translations for data labels, transcript and
speech passages, and excerpts from Korean-only monographs.17 Depending on the
source’s translation methods, English Romanization interchangeably uses current Korea
Revised Romanization (RRK) and older McCune Reischauer (MCR) systems.18

17
Special thanks to my colleagues Kwak Myung-gi and Choi Gu-hyung for assistance with
research conducted in Korean, translations, and proofreading.
18
McCune Reischauer (MCR) was the first Korean Romanization system. It was implemented
in 1937 by missionaries, historians, and translators George M. McCune and Edwin O. Reischauer. Due to
the Korean language’s highly syllabic nature, the MCR system is noted for using apostrophes – hyphens
in some cases – to denote syllables and phonetic markers. For example, 한글 is spelled “han’gŭl” and 박정
희 is spelled “Pak (Bak) Chŏng’hŭi.” However, the South Korean government, in conjunction with the
National Academy of the Korean Language and the Ministry of Tourism, recently adopted Revised
Romanization of Korea (Gugeoui romaja pyogibeop, or RRK) in 2000. RRK loses MCR’s syllabic and
phonetic markers, using spaces instead – hyphens in some cases – when translated. While not as
phonetically accurate as MCR, the adoption is meant to simplify the learning of the Korean and English
languages and to help promote easily accessible reading for visitors. For example, 평양 in MCR is spelled
“P’yŏngyang (or P’yŏng’yang and P’yŏng-yang),” but in RRK it is simply “Pyongyang.” Additionally,
“Pak (Bak) Chŏng’hŭi” is “Park Chung Hee” in RRK.

10
Name ordering follows the Chinese-influenced hanja writing order; accordingly,
family names are first followed by given name.19 However, in footnotes, names are in
American English order with family name last. For example, Kim Jinwung is Jinwung
Kim in footnotes. The exceptions to this are the names of well-known Korean leaders,
such as Park Chung Hee, Kim Il-sung, and Kim Dae-jung. As such, they are always
referred to by family name first.
Additionally, some Chinese Romanization is present, and research uses the two
most prominent systems, Wade-Giles and Pinyin. Wade-Giles is widely used in Taiwan
(Republic of China) while Pinyin is employed in China (People’s Republic of China).
Likewise, some Romanized words are interchangeably used in accordance to the source’s
method; and in addition, Mandarin and Cantonese spellings are interchangeable
depending on the source.20

Hanja was Korea’s first writing system and was taken from the Chinese script. While there is
no specific date of origin, Chinese writing was introduced to the peninsula during the third century CE.
The Hangul alphabet then replaced hanja script in the fifteenth century. See Jinwung Kim, A History of
Korea, 63.
20
For example, Chiang Kai-shek (Pinyin: Chiang Chieh-shih) and Kuomintang (Pinyin: Kuomin Tang) are Cantonese Wade-Giles Romanizations while Mao Zedong (WG: Mao Tse-tung) and Deng
Xiaoping (WG: Teng Hsiao-p’ing) are Romanized in Mandarin Pinyin.
19
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Chapter I:
Literature Review – Nationalism Before and During Park’s Tenure (1910-1979)

12
Korean nationalism is a complex subject with origins dating back thousands of
years. This literature review begins in the early 1900s and introduces an analysis on
Korea’s ancient folklore origins and the pivotal Tan’gun creation story. From there, the
two pivotal forefathers of Korean nationalism, Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson, are
examined as well. The timeline shifts to the birth of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
onto Park’s life during the 1940s to the late 1960s. This section analyzes the ROK’s first
president, Rhee Syngman, and the philosophical aspects behinds Park’s agenda. Finally,
the literature provides a brief explanation of South Korea’s economy – urban and rural –
and the military ventures behind Park’s Korea.

The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship
Roger L. Janelli researches the origins of Korean folklore and how it became a
piece of modern nationalist history.1 Janelli suggests that Colonial Korea (1910-1945)
underwent a reassessment and reorientation of Korean folklore under Japanese Imperial
reign. He also notes the similarities that Korean scholarship has with its Japanese
counterparts. Janelli apprises that “Korean intellectuals obtained their introduction to
modern scholarship through the Japanese.”2 The Japanese, even though they rewrote
history through their perspectives, influenced Korean scholars with the framework to
create their version of twentieth-century nationalism.
However, there are challenges to those viewpoints and Janelli uses a 1978
anthology, Han'guk minsok haksa (The History of Korean Folklore), to show a counter-

Roger L. Janelli is an East Asian languages and culture professor at Indiana University.
Roger L. Janelli, “The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship,” Journal of American
Folklore 99, no. 391 (Winter 1986): 25.
1
2
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perspective on Japanese origins. According to Han’guk, Korean folklore scholarship had
its beginnings before the colonial era. Specifically, indigenous origins emerged during
the seventeenth century when Joseon-Ming scholars ventured into the realms of
mythology.3
Janelli’s thesis centers around the different pedigrees used to influence modern
day nationalism. He uses four prominent Korean nationalists – Choe Namson, Yi Nunghwa, Son Chin-tae, and Song Sok-ha – as his case studies.4 Janelli emphasizes how their
Eastern and Western educations influenced twentieth-century Korean scholarship. Simply
put, Janelli’s Korean variables are derived from Eastern and Western academic sources.
Furthermore, Janelli details the actions of Choe and Yi. He notes that Korea’s centurieslong tributary status with China greatly affected them.5 On a whole, Korean academia
looked upon the tributary relationship positively. “It gave [Koreans] a sense of place. . . a
place lower than that of China but higher than that of Japan.”6 This stance, however, was
critically questioned during the Japanese Imperial Era (1868-1945).7
Specifically, the way Japan – a lower status tributary state – upended a centuriesold institution and became the dominant force in the region was a paradox to early
nationalists. Due to this, most Korean academic institutions – from elementary to higher
education campuses – were forced to study and assimilate into Japanese cultural
institutions. This included Japanese history, mythologies, and language.8

3

Janelli, 25.
In accordance with East Asian name ordering, family names (last name) are first followed by
given names (first name).
5
Janelli, “Origins of Korean Folklore,” 27.
6
Ibid.
7
Chizuko T. Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered Around Korea: Ch'oe Namson's View of
History,” Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 4 (November 1990): 794.
8
Janelli, “Origins of Korean Folklore,” 34.
4
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Additionally, Japanese traditional worldviews, such as Shinto shaman folklore,
are also another important factor. However, Choe and Yi turned these institutions around
and used them to start a new nationalist movement, later known as Munhwa undong (also
known as the Cultural Movement and Cultural Nationalism). Instead of rallying around
Japanese shamanistic folklore, Choe – later expanded by Yi – chose the Tan’gun tale as
the archetype legend to rally behind. Janelli also suggests that Tan’gun was a perfect
choice because of the similar shamanistic Shinto themes.9 In essence, both spiritual
teachings emphasized that gods created people to serve in their land, thus tying the
heavens, the people, and earth into one.
This had a profound effect not only for Choe and Yi but also on future folklore
scholars, Son Chin-tae and Song Sok-ha. Although both scholars expanded on Korean
folktales, Son and Song incorporated Western thought – through the teachings of earlyBritish anthropologist Edward B. Tylor – to solidify Tan’gun as part of the Korean ethnic
identity. Also, keep in mind that early anthropological frameworks were heavily centered
on Social Darwinism. In short, Son and Song infused cultural homogeneity onto Korean
folklore with the intention of separating the Korean race – one that was more ancient and
purer – from their Japanese overlords.10
The article concludes in 1961, an era that marked the new political and academic
alliance between the newly-made Republic of Korea and the United States. The union
helped foster American anthropological methods – in particular, heavy public promotion
of folklore through theater, books, and television – into a fusion of Japanese and British

9

Janelli, 34.
Ibid., 37.

10
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intellectualism.11 Janelli ties this to the impact it had on Park Chung Hee’s rule.
Explicitly, Park perceived outside threats, or any remnant of Chinese and Japanese
culture, as destroying millennia’s worth of Korean traditions. In turn, Park heavily
encouraged public academia to focus on Tan’gun and other traditional stories, and hence,
pushed similar nationalist agendas that Choe and early nationalists championed.12

The Tan’gun Story
According to the Samguk Yusa, the story of Tan’gun (Dan’gun) is told as a fable.
The Heavenly King Hwan’in had a son, Hwan’ung. Hwan’ung wished to live among his
father’s earthly people. Hwan’in saw the ambition in his son’s eyes and granted him his
wish. Hwan’ung was then bestowed fertile land in the Myohang Mountains (located in
North Korea); three heavenly treasures used to empower him with societal gifts – such as
agriculture, art, and law; and three-thousand loyal followers.13
After years of happiness and wise governance, Hwan’ung was surprised to find a
“she-bear” and “tigress” living alone in a cave together, both diligently praying to his
father. Out of curiosity, he heard their pleas to become humans so that they may live in
his kingdom under the benevolent rule of Hwan’in The Heavenly Father. Hwan’ung,
however, chose to grant only one of them their wish and only if they could pass his test.
The test included eating mugworts and garlics – considered holy foods in that
region – for a hundred days straight. Both beasts ate the sacred foods but shortly after the
tigress gave up and retired back into the cave. However, the she-bear continued to eat the

11

Janelli, 42.
Ibid., 43.
13
Samguk Yusa, “Book One: Wonder I (the Founding of the Kingdoms),” trans, Tae-Hung Ha
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1972), PDF e-book, 32.
12
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foods for twenty-one straight days even after she technically passed the test. Moved by
this, Hwan’ung granted her wish and she became a woman; she was now known as
Ung’nyeo.14
Even living under Hwan’ung’s prosperous kingdom and among fellow humans,
Ung’nyeo was still lonely and yearned to raise a child. The woman prayed to the Heavens
again in hopes of becoming blessed with a baby. Hwan’ung, saddened by her sorrow and
loneliness, heard her prayers and married her. The woman then bore his son and named
him Tan’gun.15
In 2333 BCE, when Tan’gun came of age he was bestowed lands – under the
guidance of Hwan’in and Hwan’ung – that extended over the peninsula and into the
Manchurian regions. These lands would eventually become Gojoseon (2333-108 BCE).
Tan’gun then ruled wisely, just like his father, for 1500 years until King Wu of the Chou
Dynasty placed Kija on the throne (1122 BCE).16
By then Tan’gun was satisfied with the society he and his father built; this
civilization would later become the Korean people. With his purpose fulfilled, Tan’gun
moved to Asadal – a region located around the North Korean-Manchurian border – so
that he may ascend onto the Heavens and be with his father and grandfather.

Nationalism According to Choe Namson
Choe Namson (1890-1957) was a leading Korean scholar and independence
activist. Choe is credited with establishing, along with Sin Chaeho (1880-1936), modern

Samguk Yusa, 32.
Ibid., 33.
16
Ibid.
14
15
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Korean nationalism. In this context, modern nationalism emerged during Korea’s
Japanese colonial era (1910-1945) and continues to be built upon through
reinterpretations of Choe and Sin’s teachings.17 Professor Chizuko T. Allen’s details
these two prominent Korean scholars and their influence on nationalism. Allen’s article
mostly emphasizes Choe’s works, and thus, structures it to reflect factors that influenced
Choe’s political stances.18
Allen describes the aspects that Chinese scholar and reformist Liang Qichao
(1873-1929) had on a young Choe. Liang’s pro-Social Darwinist stances played a large
role in Choe’s works. Liang argued that “white and yellow races” had the potential to be
“world-historical people”; in other words, cultures who have the capacity to expand
outward from their origin country can leave an impact on world history. In contrast, the
“lesser historical people” were the opposite, as in cultures having little to no impact on
world history. This is the reason stronger cultures subjugate weaker ones.19
Choe espoused views similar to Liang’s thesis. In a 1917 issue of the Korean
newspaper Taehan maeil sinbo, Choe wrote that “The modern age is the age of power in
which the powerful survive while the weak perish . . . It is a competition of intelligence,
physical fitness, material, economic, and organizational power.”20 This viewpoint is
important because it highlights the emergence of Choe-inspired nationalism; more
importantly, this new Korean nationalism was based on ethnic, cultural, and historical

17
18

Allen, “Northeast Asia,” 788.
Chizuko T. Allen is an Asian-Pacific American professor at the University of Hawaii at

Manoa
19
20

Allen, “Northeast Asia,” 789.
Ibid.
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supremacy. Put differently, ethnicity and ancient culture were primary variables that
helped shape Park’s nationalist agendas.
Choe’s views were tested and radically altered during the 1910 Imperial Japanese
annexation. Along the standards of Liang and Choe’s early works, Koreans were now on
the lower end of the Social Darwinist spectrum. They were the “lesser historical people”
while the Imperial Japanese were “world-historical people.” To combat this demotion,
Choe looked to the ancient past for answers.
Social Darwinism implies that colonial Koreans were considered a weaker
culture, therefore, Choe chose to study the earliest documents on Korean society to find
his answers. He used the thirteenth century Korean-Chinese anthology Samguk yusa as
the foundation for his new thesis; hence, Choe’s argument relied on the strength of
Korean antiquity. He used the creation tale of Tan’gun – orally passed down since 2300
BCE – to posit that ancient Korean culture (Gojoseon culture) is much older and robust
than the culture of their Japanese counterparts.21
In other words, Japan was currently in a higher “world-historical position” than
Korea due to their imperial dominance over the region. Historically, however, Japan’s
status pales in comparison to the longevity shown through the Tan’gun tale. Korean
culture, therefore, has a more permanent position in world history and is in a higher
“historical position” than Japan.22
Furthermore, Allen analyzes Choe’s evolution by comparing him to other Asian
nationalist movements. Similar parallels from certain Southern Chinese and Manchurian
cultures have Tan’gun-like symbolism. Allen argues that Korean nationalism, and to a

21
22

Allen, 794.
Ibid.

19
lesser extent the region surrounding it, was a byproduct of the era’s Social Darwinist
movement. Likewise, this was Choe’s and future Korean nationalists’ response to
imperialism. They sought to place Korea – culturally and historically – above Japanese
and Chinese counterparts by emphasizing and building upon their ancient history.23

Nationalism According to Sin Chaeho
East Asian scholar Andre Schmid highlights an often overlooked, yet crucial,
philosophy derived from Sin Chaeho.24 As another leading nationalist, Sin’s teachings
have similar themes – emphasis on strong historical culture – as Choe Namson’s.
However, some principles are wholly distinct from other nationalists’ ideas. Specifically,
Sin linked race and nation as one; therefore, he was an opponent of state patriotism as
these entities come and go. Instead, Sin promoted that a people’s shared race, culture, and
language were the most important elements in Korea’s search for autonomy. Most
importantly, he added a physical element to his philosophy. Similar to Zionist ideas about
Israel, Sin was a strong advocate for ethnicity and land.25
Sin implied that Koreans were now tied to the land that their ancestry lived on.
This philosophy was known as minjok, one that easily complemented Choe’s teachings.
While folklore was Choe’s primary philosophical vehicle, the peninsula and the past
lands of Ancient Korea were Sin’s driving force. A physical element to nationalism was
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now present and magnified by Choe’s spiritual folklore. Akin to the Daoist notion of Yin
and Yang, Sin was Choe’s “yin” and vice versa.26
Schmid underscores that geography was Sin’s key motif. The conventional
narrative on what constituted Korean land was cemented during the Joseon era (13921897). Joseon academia implied that most of Korean history is relegated only to the
peninsula.27 However, seventeenth century Korean historian Yi Ik – an unorthodox
Joseon historian who challenged Sinocentric teachings – also influenced Sin.28 Through
this effect, Sin endorsed, as put by Schmid, a “Manchurian Connection.” Sin argued that
Korean history, specifically the Gojoseon (circa 2000 BCE – 108 BCE), Buyeo Kingdom
(circa 200 BCE – 494 CE), and Goguryeo (37BCE – 668 CE) eras, had strong
connections to Manchuria.
The importance of Sin’s minjok philosophy is the claim of extending the Korean
nation outside the peninsula. An intended effect was that this new credence – now written
under a new historical anthology called the Toksa Sillon – amplified Choe’s Tan’gun
folklore. In that tale, Tan’gun reigned exclusively over the lands of Manchuria and the
peninsula. This was Sin’s ethno-geographical teachings, and they were meant to promote
Korean uniqueness and demote Sinitic influences. In contrast, the Ming-Joseon inspired
Kija Joseon legend is a prime example of a Sinitically influenced tale that relegates
Korean shamanistic origins.29
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The conclusion focuses on the many reinterpretations of Sin’s teaching.
Numerous scholars, future nationalists, and political leaders based their principles on
Sin’s agendas, and none were more evident than a young Park. According to Schmid,
Park’s regime “was eager to enlist a nationalist history for its own political purpose,” so
that he could legitimize his forceful takeover of the government.30
By doing so, Park’s academic administration dismissed the Manchurian aspects
associated with minjok. Instead, Park reinterpreted the teachings of Toksa Sillon to focus
more on the Three Kingdoms of Baekchae, Goguryo, and Silla. Park specifically
emphasized a victorious Silla Kingdom uniting the other two kingdoms into its realm.
This was politically convenient for Park as his regime was birthed in the former Silla
regions of Korea.31

Map 1.1. From left to right, a map of the Three Kingdoms and of modern-day South Korea. The
right map has a marker placed on Gumi-si, the birthplace of Park Chung Hee.Source: (left)
Wikimedia Commons; and (right) Google Maps.
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The Importance of Korean Uniqueness
Janelli pointed out the importance that cultural homogeneity played for early
nationalists, James B. Palais’s research expands on Janelli’s “unique” aspects.32 Palais’s
thesis centers on defining and labelling the importance of Korean “uniqueness.”33
“Uniqueness” in this context means the cultural and historical pride that was stripped
away during the colonial era.34
Palais notes that during Colonial Korea the Japanese government “forced [Korean
academia] to accept the dogma of Japanese historical scholarship.” The intended purpose
was to promote Japanese cultural superiority while portraying the Joseon Dynasty (13921910) as “backwards and stagnate.”35 The Joseon Age is important because South
Koreans hold this era as a cultural, academic, and technological zenith.36 Joseon Korea
saw a myriad of advancements in agriculture, commerce, and naval logistics that,
according to modern South Korean historians, instilled “developments towards
capitalism.”37
The majority of Palais’s article postulates how nationalist themes, pioneered by
leading intellectuals such as Choe Namson and Sin Chaeho, are a detriment in
distinguishing Korean culture from the rest of the world. The reason being that South
Korean’s over adulation of the Joseon era – especially, the capitalism-inspired logistics
and trade innovations – mirrors the histories of many Western nations. Furthermore, the
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tendency to shun Chinese influences also weakens the credibility of modern Korean
scholars. It is a well-known fact that the Sinosphere contributed immensely in the Asian
continent’s societal advancement, and therefore, should not be easily regulated.38
Instead, Palais suggests that Korean historiography should focus and expand on
the unique events occurred throughout its storied history. He concludes by listing
exclusive events within the peninsula’s long past.39 Two prominent examples are the
stability of the yangban and aristocratic system.40 Specifically, he stresses how a distinct
elite class held immense influence for a long and mostly uninterrupted span.
Subsequently, this leads to the second example: the longevity of Korean dynasties.
Korean dynastic eras were longer, more stable, and relatively more peaceful when
compared to their Chinese and Japanese counterparts.41 Therefore, based on those
grounds alone, gives Korean historians enough material to make a worthy case for global
distinction.

The Nationalist Aspects of Cheondogyo and Donghak
Kirsten Bell focuses on the often-overlooked spiritual and religious movements
inspired by nationalism. Bell examines a specific religious movement called Cheondogyo
and its relationship with modern Korean nationalism. Cheondogyo is a religion based on
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Donghak; these religions are an anti-foreigner neo-Confucian movement founded by
Joseon activist Choe Je-u (1824-1864).42 Cheondogyo’s main principle emphasizes that
to attain spiritual enlightenment, human equality for all classes must be achieved.
Cheondogyo began in 1860 and gained a plethora of followers during Korea’s
colonial era. The religion was appealing to the masses partly because it condemned
economic abuses and corruption within the government.43 Also known as the “Donghak
Peasant Revolt of 1894,” this movement was the culmination of decades of the yangban’s
abuses against the peasantry. The rapid adoption of Cheondogyo by sangmin –
impoverished commoners – was a byproduct of this revolution.
The importance of the revolution came in 1910 during Japanese occupation. Many
of the former Donghak rebels transformed Cheondogyo into an ideological symbol of
“indigenous nationalism.” Cheondogyo and Donghak eventually became unique
historical events that stood for rebellion against Japanese, Chinese, and Western
influences.44 Succinctly put, the Donghak movements created Cheondogyo and in turn
transformed it into a symbol of rebellion against foreign subjugation.
The post-colonial era (1945-1960s) saw the return of Cheondogyo and Donghak;
both North and South Korean states shaped the ideology to better suit each political
agenda. For South Korea, the April Revolution of 1960 was a turning point.45 The April
Revolution had symbolic ties to the religious movement and played a hand in President
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Rhee Syngman’s ousting in the same year. A year later in 1961, Park Chung Hee, through
a military coup, took the reins of the government.
Park’s first task was to modernize and stabilize South Korea. He shaped Donghak
to help garner support for his developmental campaigns. Park combined the religion’s
“indigenous” aspects with his brand of “democratic, nationalistic, and modern political
ideologies.”46 This led to a campaign to “revitalize” Korean culture. The revitalization
created one of Park’s core policies, Minjokjeok minjujuui, or “nationalist democracy,”
that began after Park’s final consolidation during the 1963 presidential election.47
Bell concludes that modern Koreans associate Donghak with – quoting Park from
a 1970 speech – the “Koreanization of democracy” and the advancement of “principles
not directly imported from any Western democracy.”48 Otherwise put, Park’s campaign
for absolute power was not only vindicated through questionable elections but by also
tying indigenous philosophies with notions that foreign elements – this includes Westernstyled democracy – are suspect and alien to Korean culture.49

Monuments and Modernization: Park Chung Hee’s Remaking of Yi Sunsin
Korean scholar Park Saeyoung critiques Park Chung Hee’s philosophical
conceptions, patriotic view, and nationalist agendas.50 Although those concepts are
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orthodox in political rhetoric, Park Saeyoung analyzes a nuanced variable that played a
role in early nationalism: symbolizing historical monuments.51 The monument in
examination is of Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545-1598), also known as Hyeonchungsa, located
in Asan, South Chungcheong (Chungcheongnam-do) Province.
For context, Admiral Yi is considered one of the two greatest Korean historical
figures, the other being King Sejong (1397-1450) the inventor of the Korean alphabet
(hangul). Yi became an admiral during the Imjin War against Japanese invaders (15921598). He is noted for his humble beginnings, having no formal naval education, and
decisively defending the Korean coast from a vastly superior Japanese navy, all without
losing a single battle in the process.52
In 1962 President Park was obsessed with remodeling and venerating
Hyeonchungsa. As part of his modernization campaigns, he sought to make the small and
humble monument into a “mass spectacle.”53 Park combined a new symbolic meaning to
Yi’s monument – the strenuous task of modernization achieved through arduous work.
Park noted that “[We] have such a great ancestor as [Yi Sunsin]. We have to work hard to
follow his example.”54 Thereby, tying the will of Admiral Yi to the people.
Park Saeyoung posits that Park’s obsession with Yi was situated within the
troubled relationship the admiral had with Joseon and yangban elites.55 Influenced by Sin
Chaeho, Park sought to find the root causes of Korea’s failure during the humiliating
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colonial era. Sin attributed that the failures were due to a corrupt, weak, and “effeminate”
yangban.56 Coincidentally, they were the very same elites that punished and demoted
Admiral Yi due to in-court fighting. These stances, therefore, were heavily promoted by
Park.57
Furthermore, Saeyoung notes that Yi’s veneration was politically beneficial for
the new Park regime as he aligned himself with the Admiral’s unwavering patriotism.
More importantly, Park analogized a type of messiah-complex with Yi and himself. In
Park Chung Hee’s view, Admiral Yi single-handedly saved Joseon Korea from total
defeat. Unsurprisingly, the strongman conveniently left out information about crucial
Chinese Ming reinforcements. In the end, Park emulated Yi by presenting himself as a
redeemer to a beaten-down South Korea. Plainly put, Park was an “architect of national”
and economic restoration; otherwise known as a “developmental dictator” to foreign
analysts.58
Saeyoung concludes by suggesting that “Park’s act of [creating a modern, national
hero] was also a process of creating the image of a static singular and inferior Joseon
past.”59 Notably, the monument modernization campaigns harken back to Sin Chaeho’s
minjok philosophy. Sin sought to demote Sinitic influences in Korean folklore, via the
promotion of Tangun, while Park sought to ignore Ming contributions during the Imjin
War. While these are two exclusively separate historical events, they both fall within
similar anti-Sinitic themes.60
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Map 1.2. Location of Hyeonchungsa. The site is in Asan, Chungcheongnam Province (Chungnam). Source:
Google Maps.

Figure 1.1. Temples and shrines located within the Hyeonchungsa site. Please note that the top right photo is a replica
of Admiral Yi’s Geobukseon (“spiked-turtle warship”). Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of Culture website.
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Yushin Constitution, the New Political Economy, and the Kim Dae-Jung Affair
Korean professor Han Sungjoo emphasizes that Park Chung Hee’s main goal was
to transform Korea from a “political democracy” into an “administrative democracy.”61
Han’s article, published in 1974, examines the events that led to one of South Korea’s
most politically volatile eras.62 “Administrative democracy” means after a presidential
election, the executive should consolidate legislative and judicial powers – in so doing,
going against the constitution – in order to streamline needed economic reforms.63 Park’s
reelection in 1971 affirmed these stances, and thus, a new constitution was immediately
drafted and put into effect.
The new charter was ratified in 1972 and named the Constitution for
Revitalization Reforms (Yushin honpop), or more commonly known as Yushin. The
constitution abolished presidential terms and gave all government powers – economic,
military, judicial, and legislative – to the executive.64 The consolidation helped Park
enact economic reforms that resulted in astronomical GDP growth, about 10 percent
annual average growth since 1973. One of the main policies that assisted in the boom was
the reliance on low-interest Japanese and American loans.65 This resulted in an
international perspective that Korea was an economic success story – a once destitute and
war-ravaged nation emerging from the ashes as a capitalist phoenix. Domestically,
however, the Yushin era violently antagonized any form of dissent and opposition in
order to achieve national affluency.66
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For example, and during the high-growth years, the “Kim Dae-Jung Affair”
erupted after the 1971 presidential election. Opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung lost to Park
in a hotly-contested election – the Park camp was accused of vote tampering by many
protestors.67 Shortly thereafter, Park suspended the constitution, enacted Yushin, and Kim
– fearing for his life – went into self-imposed exile. Immediately, Kim underwent an
international tour to inform, lecture, and decry the “military dictatorship and tyranny” of
Park’s regime.68
As a result, mass student demonstrations erupted in a struggle to “restore
democracy.”69 Influential religious leaders later joined the protests, thereby embodying
historical collaboration such as the Donghak movement.70 In combination with Kim’s
international tour, Park’s government received global scorn and embarrassment. The
negative responses from South Korea’s two closest economic partners – America and
Japan – threatened to halt sorely needed investment capital, thus endangering Park’s
Yushin economic reforms.71
In retaliation, Park ordered the Korean CIA to kidnap Kim from his Tokyo hotel
and return him to Seoul under treason charges. The abduction was successful; however,
Japan’s Tanaka Cabinet was infuriated on grounds of sovereign encroachment.
Consequently, Tanaka temporarily withheld $1.3 billion of Japanese investment.72
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Eventually, the Park government lessened Kim’s punishment to house arrest, thereby
appeasing economic partners.
Nevertheless, the damage was already done both socially and politically.73 As an
unintended consequence, the Korean public noticed the strong fiscal dependency rooted
in Japanese diplomatic relations. Above all, the scandal educed comparisons with
Imperial Japan’s colonial domination; specifically, Park ordering encroachment on
foreign lands, clandestine kidnappings, and life-threatening suppression. Therefore,
Park’s image as a defender from external forces – in the vain of Admiral Yi – was forever
tarnished.
Han concludes with a somber analysis on the consequences of Yushin and the
“Kim Scandal.” Even with all the scandals, Han posits that since the 1970s marked an era
of exceptional economic growth, “[the Park government] will be able to ride out the
current wave of protests,” and perhaps save his image for years to come.74

Figure 1.2. From left to right, 1971 campaign photos of Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae
Jung. Please note how Park’s poster has no Chinese characters (hanja) while Kim’s
poster has hanja above his hangul name (김대중). Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Clientelism and Similarities with the Japanese Economy
Park’s agenda and Korean conglomerates are deeply connected and reliant on one
another. This connection also brought political and socioeconomic contentions that are
prevalent today. Korean scholar Nam Chang-hee published an article shortly after the
1992 presidential election describing these issues firsthand.75 For context, the winner of
the 1992 election was anti-corporatist candidate Kim Young-sam – one of Park Chung
Hee’s strongest and oldest opposition members. Nam focuses on one of President Kim’s
main political tenets, anti-corporatism, and briefly details the history that led to the
dominance of Korean mega-corporations – better known as chaebol.76
Nam starts by defining the keyword to his article, “clientelism.” Clientelism, also
known as “the patron-client model,” is defined as favorable exchanges between a weaker
and a stronger entity at the expense of the community. In Nam’s case, the state is a
“domineering patron,” chaebol is the “obedient client,” and the “community” are
taxpayers and future generations.77 It is also noteworthy that this is a “symbiotic
relationship” according to economist Chong Ku-hyon.78 Meaning, domineering and
obedient positions may change back and forth at any time.
Nam gives a brief history of South Korea’s political instability soon after the 1953
Armistice Agreement. He notes that compared to the North, the South had an arduous
task of legitimizing itself. It had to cast itself as a better alternative than the North and the
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“hated Japanese” colonists.79 Public illegitimacy arose due to President Rhee Syngman’s
leniency towards “traitors.” They were usually collaborators and business elites who had
ties to the Japanese and benefitted from colonial institutions. Rhee argued that learning
from their expertise could help stabilize Korea politically and economically. 80
Accordingly, Korean nationalists and the Rhee Administration clashed, thereby
weakening his rule and leading to the forceful takeover by General Park.
Before the coup, Park was a former Japanese Manchukuo (Manchuria) military
officer educated through Imperial establishments. Likewise, Park was an admirer of Meiji
reforms (1868-1912) – noted for rapidly modernizing Japan’s feudal society into a Great
Power – and strongly supported “clientelistic industrial expansion” in conjunction with a
strong “ultranationalistic samurai-military” ethic.
Otherwise put, Park supported a Meiji-style zaibatsu system – family-owned
mega-corporations with strong state backing – mixed with bushido – a samurai ethic that
emphasizes warrior strength over the weak. Moreover, Park accentuated the need for a
paternal “Confucian style harmony” between military, businesses, and labor.81 In turn,
Park’s fervent ideologies mixed with newly-acquired Yushin powers birthed the chaebol
system. This birth cemented that “hated Japanese colonial institutions” were now heavily
engrained into South Korea’s market economy and labor force.82
The dominance of chaebol was a strong factor for South Korea’s astonishing
twenty-five-year economic boom from 1972 up until the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
One chaebol practice that helped ensure guaranteed growth was the exploitation of heavy
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state-controlled ventures. This was also coupled with limitless funding through stateowned commercial banks. For example, massive and profitable infrastructure projects,
such as dams and freeways, were sometimes exclusively given to instantaneously statecreated chaebol, such as Pohang Steel. In turn, chaebol outsourced labor – both menial
and specialized – to smaller firms for pennies-on-the-dollar.83 They then reinvested the
remaining funds into lucrative, yet risky, capital ventures such as high-interest loaning,
thereby becoming financial institutions themselves.
These practices allowed most chaebol to severely undermine market wages intent
on manufacturing high-priced goods at low-cost capital. In hindsight, this business model
sounds immoral and perilous for consumers and laborers; however, during the economic
boom, all players were rewarded. As chaebol grew in wealth, unemployment lowered,
incumbent politicians grew in influence, and above all – and once inaccessible to the
average Korean – an overabundance of consumer goods clothed, fed, and created leisure
time on a massive scale.84
In effect, chaebol corporations grew into monopolies that held unchecked powers
over laborers and smaller firms. Since this was a “symbiotic relationship,” ruling party
members had access to chaebol capital in the pursuit to fund their agendas. None was
more pervasive than Park’s successor Chun Doo-hwan (1931- ). Chun publicly sought
chaebol resources to aid political allies and his economic policies.85 Examples of
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prominent chaebol who paid yearly allowances to Chun included Samsung, LG, and
Hyundai.86
Nam concludes on the changes that the Korean economy is currently undergoing;
specifically, he refers to Kim Young-sam’s 1992 presidential campaign and the
generation that elected him. Kim’s election is noted for weakening chaebol power –
inclusive of “clientelism” – due to a more educated and politically active population.
Nam posits that President Kim instilled much needed public confidence for Koreans to
move to a more fair and prosperous market economy.87

Figure 1.3. Syngman Rhee’s official presidential
portrait. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 1.4. Chun Doo-hwan’s official presidential
portrait. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Syngman Rhee: The Importance of South Korea’s First President
Keyes Beech published a newspaper article in 1960 shortly after Rhee Syngman’s
presidential abdication on April 26.88 Beech wrote about the experiences of several
student protesters, Baek Won-bai and Kim Byung-cheul, who supported ousting Rhee’s
regime. However, before Beech describes Rhee’s downfall, he explains the circumstances
that led to Rhee’s former supporters abandoning him. First, Beech emphasizes the
importance of American and UN aid propping up Rhee’s failed presidency. Akin to a
political experiment, America’s primary goal was to invest $2 billion in economic aid in
the hopes of morphing an impoverished nation into a free-market “showcase of
democracy.”89
Even with massive monetary aid, the newborn Republic of Korea was anything
but an initial success. Instead it was more of a “one-party dictatorship which enforced the
tyranny of the majority.”90 Accusations of Rhee’s administration pocketing much of the
international aid were numerous.91 All this culminated in 1956 after a close presidential
election; Rhee won 56 percent of the vote against Cho Bong-am, an ex-communist, who
was hanged after Rhee’s inauguration. Furthermore, Rhee foresaw the great risk of losing
the upcoming 1960 presidential election, and in mysterious circumstances, his electoral
opponents died, thus causing him to run unopposed.92
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Fast-forward to Kim and Baek, these were two out of many young protesters who
were infuriated over Rhee’s transgressions. While Kim and Baek protested despotism,
Beech notes the similarities that both students had with a young Rhee. From 1896 to
1904, the onset of Korea’s colonial age, then-student Rhee protested – and later was
imprisoned on charges of sedition – against Imperial Japanese and Russian influences.93
These early ideologies later evolved into anti-communist stances, therefore suggesting
that a younger Rhee shared some pro-democratic characteristics with that of his
protesters.
Additionally, Beech explains how these protests culminated in March 1960 when
government authorities killed student activists in the port town of Masan. Soon after,
nationwide protests erupted with Seoul being at the heart of it all. Known as the April 19
Revolution, protestors stormed the Blue House – equivalent to the US White House –
with Rhee barely escaping. Rhee’s hand-picked successor Vice President Lee Ki-poong,
known as the last remnant of the dictatorial regime, was equally ousted. Lee’s family,
assisted by his son Lee Kang-seok, committed suicide days later.94
The conclusion deals with Rhee’s exile in Hawaii and the risky predicament that
the US put itself in by supporting a universally despised dictator. In other words, at the
height of the Cold War Rhee’s dictatorship caused a discomfort in a politically unstable
part of Asia, thereby hurting democratic legitimacy within the continent.95 However, US
officials did comment that “[Americans] could also feel much better. . . that the Rhee
regime was no longer on their conscience. . . [and] feel satisfaction over the fact that the
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revolt against Rhee's dictatorship was not Communist-led but undertaken by those who
wanted ‘democracy like in America.’”96 Therefore, in hindsight, the ousting of Rhee was
also a relief for American officials.

The Pros and Cons of Korean Ethnic Nationalism
Yin Seow Jing details the impacts, both positive and negative, that ethnic
nationalism has on contemporary South Korea.97 Yin starts by reiterating the historical
context behind the movement. She recounts Tan’gun origins and how it gave “South
Koreans a national identity” and justification for “ethnic homogeneity.”98 She also adds
colonialism as a primary factor that inadvertently awakened Korean national pride. In her
own words, “Japan, through her conquest of rule of Korea, caused the awakening and
sustaining of Korean nationalism.”99
Midway through the article, Yin breaks down the positive and negative effects
that “ethnic homogeneity” had on modernization. The pros came through the rapid
development of industry and commerce, thus leading to the massive alleviation of
poverty. She attributes this success, in part, to the universally agreed upon goal of
poverty alleviation through any means necessary. In other words, because prominent
leaders, such as then-general Park Chung Hee, strongly pushed for Korean “cultural [and
economic] superiority,” Koreans, in turn, were inspired to push their great nation into
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international prominence.100 The cost of affluency, however, came through the iron-fisted
and brutal rule of the Park and Chun Doo-hwan regimes.
The most notable aspect though was the effect it had on ethnic relations. The end
of the article highlights the importance of a “common bloodline” that transcended
socioeconomic classes. It gave Koreans a profound sense of pride and “exceptionalism”
after decades of humiliating subjugation.101 Conversely, an accidental consequence was
that it would “distance [Koreans] from others,” and that they would feel “a sense of duty
to facilitate only their own people.”102 Thereby, the article’s conclusion is on a negative
note warning how ethnic nationalism can disguise xenophobia as a societal norm.

A Disguised Consequence, Part I: Park’s Currency Reform
Australian Professor Kim Hyung-A posits that South Korea’s transformation
under Park “was not a static but a dynamic set of institutional arrangements that
continuously transformed during the years of the junta.”103 Professor Kim, therefore,
focuses on the complex and unorthodox state-building that occurred during General
Park’s junta (1961-1963).104 Specifically, Park’s reforms did not modernize the country
instantaneously, but rather, there was an intricate step-by-step process. Furthermore, she
explains the major reforms that contributed to these successes. Within those steps, of
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course, came unintended consequences, and one – scapegoating Chinese culture – that
coincided with Park’s ethnic nationalism.
Kim lays out the two most prominent institutions credited for spearheading
economic reforms, the Park-created Supreme Council of National Reconstruction
(SCNR) and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Under them were
subordinate departments tasked with implementing policies within their respective
jurisdiction. These institutions were the Ministries of Commerce & Industry (MCI),
Finance (MOF), Home Affairs (MHA), and the Economic Planning Board (EPB).105 The
main agents of immediate politico-economic change, however, were the EPB, MOF, and
KCIA.
One of Park’s major reforms was restructuring the all-but-worthless Korean
currency, the Korean hwan.106 To accomplish this, the KCIA and MOF collaborated with
US President Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk in
an effort to reintroduce a new US-pegged currency – the Korean won (KRW). This was
intended to raise capital investment through new American, then later Japanese, backed
loans. The reform failed initially as Korean officials miscalculated the distrust the
average citizen had with banks. Thereby, the new currency exchanges were nonexistent
as citizens sought to avoid most financial institutions.107
Even though this was a miscalculation, KCIA and MOF officials – through
census-taking measures – found out that most of the public hoarded massive amounts of
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cash in personal household stashes.108 All the more suspect was the notable size of the
ethnic Chinese population living on Korean soil.109 The amount of wealth and cash
Korean-born Chinese held during a destitute era caught Park’s attention. This new
revelation later shaped Park’s modernization policies, while concurrently sparking an
anti-Chinese campaign.

Figure 1.5. From left to right, 1950s hwan and current-day won currencies. Please note the difference in icon
representation. The hwan bills are plastered with Rhee Syngman photos while the won has no traces of presidential
icons. For reference, the 1,000 (Yi Hwang), 5,000 (Yi I), and 50,000 (Shin Saimdang) bills are all Joseon-era
yangban (Confucian literati and artists). The exception is the 10,000 won bill portraying King Sejong the Great.
Source: Bank of Korea archives.

A Disguised Consequence, Part II: Park’s Anti-Chinese Campaign
Chapter Two in Nadia Y. Kim’s monograph mentions an indirect, albeit brief,
outcome from Korean ethnic nationalism.110 Specifically, Kim describes Park Chung
Hee’s use of a pure Korean ideology to advance socioeconomic goals.111 Kim begins the
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chapter with a brief history on Sin Chaeho and how he symbolized Tan’gun as a
“homogenized bloodline” all Koreans shared. She also suggests that the modern
utilization of this myth may have been influenced by Imperial Japanese propaganda, one
centered on a pure and dominant Asian race.112 This analogy is vital because Park used
the tale as a symbol of Korean unity.
Culmination occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when the tale was revived as
one of Park’s tenets. In addition, Kim relates research from other Korean scholars to help
link Tan’gun as a way to legitimize Park’s authoritarian rule. Most notably, Park used the
idea of a homogenized and hardworking ancestry to instill a common goal among a lowmorale constituency. Subsequently, the support gathered was used to push xenophobic
policies subtly disguised as protectionism.
Such examples were introduced after the MOF and KCIA failed at their task of
currency reform.113 As noted, even though this was a premature failure, Park’s junta
noticed the rising affluence in Korea’s small, yet prominent, Chinese community. Park’s
government was afraid of the notion that a very small group of prosperous foreign
inhabitants could have the ability to garner considerable influence. Likewise, the fear of
foreign elites – akin to former Imperial Japanese elites – living amongst Korean natives
did not sit well with Park’s nationalist agendas because it threatened to unravel his
minjok-inspired platforms.114
Subsequently, this assumption birthed Park’s most discriminatory policies. In
conjunction with the MOF, EPB, and KCIA, Park ordered the confiscation of supposed
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hoarded cash. While this affected Korean citizens as well, the policy was meant to
damage the finances of the Chinese community in order to coerce emigration out of
Korea.115 Furthermore, these policies were created to diminish the Chinese influence –
cultural and financial – that Park purportedly warned his Korean brethren of.
As a result, more anti-Chinese policies aimed to diminish these Sinitic influences
were implemented. For example, Park pressured schools to discontinue teaching hanja –
a Chinese script used as the main writing system before hangul.116 This climaxed in 1971
when Park officially banned hanja. A decree known as Hangul Jeon-yong, roughly
translated to the “Hangul-Only Policy,” coupled with very strict Chinese immigration
laws completed Park’s ethnonationalist campaigns.117

History of Korean Confucianism
Chung Chai-sik and Kim Jinwung explains the effects that Confucian traditions
had in a modernizing Korea.118 Chung’s thesis sets out to answer how Confucianism
evolved to “assume responsibility for maintaining the [Korean] collective identity,” and
what the limits were in “articulating political and social programs” towards the goal of
“creating a modern nation-state.”119 Simply put, both author’s give some context on the
Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik, “The Taming and Tamed by the United States,” in The
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 76.
116
Hangul was invented in 1446 CE. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 189.
117
Il-pyo Hong, Kukhoe Sog-ui Inmunhag, [Humanities in the National Assembly] (Seoul, South
Korea: Joheun Ttang [Good Land Publishers]), 2014, EPUB e-book, 69.
118
Chai-sik Chung is a Korean-American sociologist and theologist at Boston University; and
Jinwung Kim is a Professor of Korean History at Kyungpook National University in Daegu, South
Korea.
119
Confucianism is a Chinese social philosophy based on the teachings of the scholar Confucius
(551-479 BCE). A major theme is the “natural order of things,” thus, the philosophy is filial, or
paternalistic, in origin. A secular example is that rank determines social standing and duties. The higher a
person is in the ladder the more respect, and therefore more power, is granted. See Patricia Buckley
115

44
history of Korea’s Neo-Confucian ideologies, whereas Chung relates this to modern
Korean nationalism.120
Chung gives a succinct history – similarly, complementing Kim’s composition –
of Confucianism and its dispersion from China to the peninsula.121 The high culture and
technologically advanced society, from Tang China (618-907 CE) to the Song (960-1279
CE) Dynasties, diffused onto the Kingdom of Goryeo (918-1392 CE).122 More
importantly, high culture, through Chinese literary classics, spread among Goryeo literati
elites.123 In effect, Confucian morals and etiquette guided academic and royal statutes.
Confucianism in Korea quickly became an elite philosophical order and was heavily
propagated to sangmin and cheonmin, respectively known as the common and lowest
classes.124 As such, these classes were expected to fall in line with Confucian-inspired
decrees.125
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Turning towards the dawn of the Joseon era (1392-1897CE), Korean
Confucianism became an official state tenet – known as the Neo-Confucian sect Ch’engchu – used to guide the new society.126 However, during the sixteenth century the
disillusioned and maltreated lower classes gradually stepped away from the out-of-touch
Ch’eng-chu philosophy. Likewise, most of the rural masses discovered other NeoConfucian offshoots that aligned more with their everyday situations.
The most prominent of these ideologies was silhak. Silhak is a seventeenthcentury Neo-Confucian doctrine – influenced by Song scholar Zhu Xi’s (1130 CE – 1200
CE) teachings – that deemphasized spiritual elements promoted by yangban scholars. In
response, silhak scholars focused on a more practical and “physical” approach.127
Essentially, silhak encouraged equality through social, legal, and technological reform.
Reforms included equal land distribution, taxation, and the study and exchange of
agricultural sciences – usually from Chinese and Western sources.128
Chung’s thesis highlights that the most significant aspect of silhak was the
deviation from centuries-old Chinese classics – teachings that were impractical to the
uneducated masses.129 Eventually, silhak evolved to become an aboriginal aspect of
Korean culture that was born from the masses as a response to yangban stubbornness and
unsympathetic rule.
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The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part I: The Foundations
Han Seung-Mi examines the hidden ideals within the New Community Movement
(NCM). Known in Korean as Saemaul undong (1970-1980), the NCM was Park Chung
Hee’s second-most defining economic policy after the chaebol system.130 Han’s thesis
focuses on Park and the NCM’s “anti-elitist and populist ideals” and how they manifested
into a native form of “state populism.”131 Her research delves into characteristics that
made the NCM popular with rural communities; these communities were the bedrock of
Park’s support. Additionally, she explains the successes, failures, ironies, and legacies
left behind.
Han starts by giving a concise history behind NCM motifs. From 1945 to the
early 1960s, a politically impotent South Korea failed to pass effective land and industry
reforms. Most of the population were still agrarian, and unemployment – from the poor to
the highly-skilled – was chronically high. The ruling Democratic Party (Minjoo Dang) –
the opposition party of the recently-ousted President Rhee – enacted an Economic
Development Plan in 1960.
The plan was modeled after India and prioritized “comparative advantage” in
agricultural development; however, this was short lived and in May 16, 1961, General
Park enacted his infamous military coup.132 Instead of following the Indian model, Park
changed it to the “Japanese model,” one that prioritized commodity inflation – in this
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case, the state artificially inflated the value of rice. Instantaneously, rice farming
communities began to accumulate wealth.133
Likewise, the NCM was incredibly popular with the agrarian public. Seeing this
as an opportunity to push countryside economic and propaganda reforms, Park
implemented “Japanese-style mental training.”134 “Mental training” emphasized
“Weberian” work ethics modeled by economist Ninoyama Ginjiro.135 In other words, the
“culture of poverty” and economic failures were attributed to “laziness, despair, and
intemperance.”136 As a cure, a strong executive leader, like a father, was needed to guide
society towards a collective, ardent, and successful work ethic.
Park accomplished this by enacting five-year plans intended to modernize the
countryside. Modernization included paved roads, telecommunications, public schooling,
and the adoption of modern farming methods. Anecdotes even came to play as Park
officials considered the replacement of thatched-roofing – considered synonymous with
poverty – with tiled-roofing as a measure of success. In so doing, villages and towns that
successfully completed the efforts were rewarded and overcompensated with extra aid;
therefore, incentives to quickly modernize became a community’s main priority.137
The NCM was such an initial success that it placed the government in an ironic
predicament. During this era, urban lifestyle was considered a characteristic of the elites;
cities held all the top university and civic jobs.138 Consequently, as the rural communities
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developed so did their logistics. Newly-build highways connected many isolated towns
with corresponding metropolises. In turn, the rising rural middle-classes migrated in
droves to urban hotspots in the pursuit of educational opportunities for their children.
Simply put, elite services were now in the grasp of once-impoverished farming families.
This inadvertent effect, therefore, was just one variable that worked against Park’s
campaign; and this partly contributed to the NCM’s downfall shortly after his death.139

Figure 1.6. Pictured above are typical farming communities before the advent of the NCM. Please note the building
style of the houses. Park officials considered thatched roofing synonymous with poverty. Source: Gyeonggi Province
Saemaul Undong Museum.

Figure 1.7. Left, unpaved town roads before reforms. Right, Park Chung Hee (pictured in the very center front) along
with technocrats surveying an NCM village. Source: Seoul Saemaul Undong Museum.
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The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part II: The Relationship to Nationalism
It is important to stress that the NCM was not only an economic policy but an
initiative cloaked in nationalist sentiments. Han labels the NCM as part of a campaign to
push heavy urban and rural modernization. The intent was to subtly showcase support for
state populism: in other words, display patriotism.140 This ideology helped the NCM
achieve its broad popularity among two different generations, the elderly and the youth.
Heavy modernization was attributed to the “passionate youth” who led forth the
strenuous labor while the elder generations led the administrative planning. This was,
simply put, a community affair that emanated bipan seryok, an aura of “antigovernmental (anti-centralized) force.”141
Initially, this proved to be a perfect match as many rural communities rapidly
developed. According to Korean economists and historians, the NCM and rural
modernization was one major variable for South Korea’s economic miracle, better known
as the “Miracle on the Han River.”142 However, these plans could not succeed on sheer
work ethics alone. The NCM, along with its chaebol counterpart, greatly benefitted from
American economic aid and Japanese factory investments.143
More importantly and in-line with Park’s Neo-Confucian-inspired ideologies, the
government gave local jurisdiction to communities. Village leaders distributed
developmental resources while the youth fervently backed their leadership. Furthermore,
Park’s promulgation of his minjok-inspired work ethics seemed to go in tandem with this
labor structure. Put another way, the NCM created, intentionally or not, a new
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socioeconomic hierarchy – one conveniently based on a sequential order of power – that
began with the highest authority, President Park.
Park then trickled-down power to lesser entities, in this case rural communities.
These areas were led by elders who relayed tasks to younger laborers; explicitly, new
minjok ethics were entrenched with Confucianism. This was now the official “national
ethos” that Park’s Korea heavily relied on, akin to a top-down authoritarian power
structure.144

The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part III: Confucian Ironies
The initial aftermath of the NCM clashed with Park’s moral ideologies. To give
context, during the 1950s many farmers and influential village leaders sold their land –
after a series of natural disasters – to the state’s newly-made Land Reform committee. In
the pursuit of better opportunities, many of them migrated to the cities.145 It is worth
noting that not all village leaders, usually elderly in age and somewhat well-off, migrated
to the cities. Some stayed behind in their locality to become NCM bureaucrats.146
Shortly after the 1961 coup, Park noticed this trend and took advantage of it by
restructuring Land Reform policies.147 The intent was to expedite the buyout of land,

Referring to Ebrey’s definition, Confucianism on a local scale has village elders guiding the
communities.
145
Seung-Mi Han, “The New Community Movement,” 80.
146
Ibid.
147
Jong-Sung You from the In the Shadow of Violence monograph notes that land reform
policies were instated before and after the Korean War (1948-1956) and during Rhee’s presidency.
Reforms were under the guidance of American SCAP officials. Officials redistributed stolen lands from
former Japanese elites and indiscriminately allocated them back to Korean workers regardless of
socioeconomics and agrarian experience. You notes that these land were extremely unproductive due to
postwar destruction and inexperienced landowners. See Jong-Sung You, “The Case for South Korea,”
298.
144

51
usually from desperate poverty-stricken landowners, at a fraction of the market-cost. In
urgent need to get the NCM off the ground, the state immediately gave out – usually at
interest-free contractual agreements – newly-bought land to ambitious “fresh faces.”148
These “fresh faces” consisted of experienced, often young, agrarian tradesmen
and farmers; likewise, this resulted in the movement’s successful start. Through statebacked initiatives – inflated rice prices and extra subsidies for higher annual yields –
young landowners enthusiastically toiled in the fields; it was only a matter of time before
they benefitted. 149 Eventually, and at little to no startup cost, a new rustic generation of
laborers accrued a fine amount of wealth.150
Due to the new prosperity and dependency on successful young laborers, Han
posits that the NCM’s policies were an ironic ideology that clashed with Park’s “state
populism.” She better defines this disparity as an “egalitarian ethos [colliding] with
breathless mechanism of national mobilization.”151 In other words, the NCM was
intended to raise the rural socioeconomic standards to levels set by their urban
counterparts. Ironically, socioeconomic advancement successfully occurred for the
younger generation while older generations – many of whom were now city-dwellers –
were mired in poverty.
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Consequently, the countryside’s millennium-old Confucian order, or “natural
order of things” was severely upended.152 While there are other incremental variables that
played into this upheaval, Han posits a striking concept. Village elders – Park’s chosen
NCM administrators – unknowingly had their powers severely undermined by wealthy
young farmers.153 Plainly speaking, age was now only a number, the filial era quickly
passed, and young nouveau-riche ruled the towns. The class reversal did not eliminate all
Confucian aspects, however. Patriarchal elements were still prevalent, and rural elites
were usually young men while the poverty-stricken were elderly, women, and the
disabled.
Nevertheless, the gerontocratic system that ruled the peninsula for a thousand
years gave way to entrepreneurship. This meant that the average Korean youth had a way
to climb the social ladder through meritocracy and hard work – a path difficult to pursue
at an elderly age. This trend was not exclusive to the countryside either. In the booming
cities across the nation, a new generation was gaining prominence through chaebolguided entrepreneurship. Small-to-medium sized businesses flourished while public
investment was high.154 Seismic societal shifts were here to stay, even if it did collide
with the old Confucian order.
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South Korea’s Role in the Vietnam War, Part I: Park’s Reasons
American and Western involvement in the Vietnam War (1955-1975) is a
contentious issue; however, Kim Se Jin’s article, written during the peak of the war
(1970), details the positive impact that it had on a fledgling Republic of Korea (ROK).155
Kim’s posits that the Vietnam War’s effects were mostly positive for South Koreans. The
war bolstered an already burgeoning economy and garnered international prestige for
ROK soldiers and hardworking Korean expatriates.156
The background to South Korea’s involvement began in 1965 when President
Lyndon B. Johnson rapidly built up American presence in Southeast Asia.157 America
had a challenging time convincing other allies to commit to major armed supporting
roles. However, the US found a close ally in the still-infant ROK, and more importantly,
a confidant in President Park Chung-Hee.158 Consequently, an all too eager Park sent
47,000 troops, from 1965 to 1973, to the narrow Southeast Asian nation; in doing so, the
ROK was the largest contingent of non-American forces sent.159
Kim, and drawing parallels to Kim Jinwung’s analysis, gives three main reasons
that Park was keen to aid America. First, Park’s pro-American military occupation of the
ROK complemented his anti-communist stance. In context, before US-UN Korean War
intervention, North Korea easily overpowered the South. Undoubtedly, the northern
communist military was still vastly superior – in terms of training, funding, and
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technology – to the ROK. Park knew of this embarrassing state and needed full US
protection along the 38th Parallel (DMZ) border.160
The second reason was to modernize the severely antiquated, undermanned, and
underfunded ROK military. Because the country dedicated all its resources to
modernizing industry, infrastructure, and commerce, military expenditures were minute.
Park knew the ROK’s strong commitment to the war entitled them unprecedented
amounts of American military advisors, technology, and funding.161 Otherwise speaking,
reforming the military into modern-day standards was too expensive for Park’s
government, so letting another government, the US, eagerly do the task was the perfect
solution. Moreover, Park knew a strengthened military guaranteed security for his radical
reforms.
Lastly, and more notably, Park knew the enormous economic benefits in
transitioning Korea into a war-production economy.162 An abundance of zero-interest
American loans were easily acquired as a result, and thus, played an important variable in
Korea’s economic boom. On a micro-economic level, newly-raised wages – for soldiers
and expatriate civilians willing to work in a wartime environment – combined with a
frugal mindset, allowed future accumulation of substantial savings for most Korean
households.163
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As an effect, Korea’s middle-class surge was partly based on the rural origins of
many conscripted soldiers. The average soldier’s salary, usually the whole annual wage,
was remitted back to their farming communities. This scenario, dubbed the “Vietnam
Income,” coupled with the 1970s Saemaul Undong reforms, only amplified the value of
transferred savings.164 Additionally, this also played a slight variable in legitimizing the
newly-circulated Korean won because international exchanges were more prevalent from
the financial activities of many overseas Korean workers.165

South Korea’s Role in the Vietnam War, Part I: The Consequences
First and foremost, all of Park’s visions, militarily and economically, were at their
peak during the Vietnam War. The war was a success for South Korea on all fronts; the
economy and per capita income flourished at an astronomical rate; and, at the same time,
Park’s military rapidly modernized into a formidable fighting force. As Kim notes, “both
in terms of immediate and long-term effects, the Vietnam War represents the watershed
of [South Korean] growth.”166 Concurrently, and behind the scenes, Park’s political
influence grew both domestically and internationally.
Domestically, Park’s opposition eerily predicted that the rapid militarization and
involvement “might transform South Korea into a garrison state in which the
predominant position of the military could result in the permanent entrenchment of the
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military-oriented government of Chung-hee Park.”167 However, the opposition’s voice
fell on deaf ears as the National Assembly was dominated by Park’s political party, the
Minjoo gonghwadang, known as the Democratic Republican Party (DRP).168 Likewise,
the war played a variable in consolidating the DRP’s decade-long legislative dominance
while also cementing Park’s future electoral rubberstamps.169
Internationally, Korean-American relations were closer than ever. Gone were the
days when Americans viewed them as “just a burdensome military protectorate.”170
When it came to Asian-Pacific affairs, Park’s ROK were now “friends, allies, and
partners of free Asia.” To make matters better, the ROK were equal negotiating partners,
in trade and military affairs, alongside the Japanese and Taiwanese.171 South Korea,
furthermore, was now a powerhouse in Asia as was evident in 1966 when Seoul hosted
the now-defunct Asian Pacific Conference (ASPAC).172 That leading role would later
help the ROK build economic alliances around the continent, and, in turn, set the small
peninsula up to become an exporting behemoth.173
Most notably, Park – once thought of as an illegitimate strongman – was now one
of Asia’s iconic twentieth century leaders.174 Simultaneously, Park’s successful
consolidation at home and America’s attention solely focused on Vietnam allowed him
unchecked power. As such, the world “tried not to get in the way of Park in South Korean
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domestic politics.”175 In other words, the international community was mostly unaware,
apathetic, or perhaps willfully ignorant towards Korean politics.
It is also worth noting that Korea’s Vietnamese endeavors, while mostly positive,
had some negative effects as well. Alongside thousands of casualties, inflation and the
annual cost of living – around 12 to 13 percent – shot up substantially.176 Secondly, North
and South Korean relations soured as diplomacy took a backseat to military
competitiveness. Finally, Park’s power-hungry addiction to military-might eventually
played a role in his death.177

The Peak of the Park Era
The fall and death of Park Chung Hee (assassinated in October 26, 1979) is a
controversial topic in Korean academia; nonetheless, it is a well-covered and debated
subject. Topics such as why the regime fell, why a close confidant assassinated Park, and
the volatile aftermath are all part of the lore that makes this one of the most infamous
events in modern South Korean history. The monographs The Park Chung Hee Era and A
History of Korea complement each other by giving an exhaustive take on this
unpredictable time.178
In October 17, 1972, Park enacted a “palace coup” by instating the infamous
Yushin Constitution. Although another seven years took place before Park’s
assassination, Yushin and the creation of the Fourth Republic (1972-1981) was the
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beginning of the end.179 This era was the peak of Park’s presidency as all opposition was
effectively silenced, and support in rural communities was at an all-time high. Combined
with the swift modernization of the armed forces and the rise of the new export-driven
economy, it seemed as if Park’s regime was invincible.180

The Fall and Death of Park Chung Hee
The end of the 1970s revealed cracks in Park’s political armor. Shortly after
Yushin, the opposition, now known as the New Democratic Party (Shin Minjoo-Dang),
slowly gained domestic and international support after Kim Dae-Jung was arrested. The
fiasco that occurred over the “Kim Dae-Jung Affair” rattled protestors around the nation.
Thousands of students, intellectuals, and urbanites – many of whom were geriatric and
poverty stricken – protested daily. Dissent and dissatisfaction only amplified as Park’s
armed forces clashed, arrested, and tortured thousands of citizens.181
On the international end, the Vietnam Conflict was over, the Watergate Scandal
concluded, and Jimmy Carter was elected US President in 1976. Without any more
diplomatic interruptions, and partly due to the commotion caused by Kim Dae-Jung, the
Carter Administration finally noticed the discord within the Korean peninsula. In turn,
Carter threatened to withdraw US military aid and infantry divisions.182 The planned
removal caused a panic not only within the Park regime but among the public as well.
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While the ROK military were magnitudes better than what they were before the Vietnam
War, they were still on the losing end against a triple entente – North Korea, China, and
the Soviet Union – of antagonists.183 Losing America’s support would leave them
vulnerable and destroy all their hard-earned gains.
Perhaps the greatest hit to Park’s national prestige was the blow the economy took
during the Oil Shocks. The first Oil Shock in 1973 shook the Korean economy, but
Park’s efforts to secure cheap loans from the IMF, Japan, and America kept the flow of
industry capital running smoothly.184 However, the 1979 Oil Shock caused a global
recession that South Korea was unable to avert. Due to Park’s image as an antidemocratic strongman, America and Japan were hesitant to publicly aid an autocratic
regime, especially after the Western interventionist fiasco in Vietnam.185
Misfortunes finally caught up with Park in October 26, 1979, also known as the
“10.26 Incident.” During a cold autumn night in Seoul, Park’s best friend and KCIA
director Kim Jae-kyu, after an intense dinner argument, shot and killed Park along with
his chief bodyguard Cha Ji-chul. From the sudden military takeover in 1961 and until
eighteen years later, the Park Era finally came to a sudden end. Nevertheless, even with
Park’s death, political tranquility was still out of reach for the East Asian Republic.
***
The Park Era was most notable for the blood spilled during his radical reforms.
Conversely, this period simultaneously laid the foundations that steered a penniless and
lawless country into an orderly economic superpower. Ultimately, Park’s political and
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economic agendas are still eternally-debated, however, there is no denying the enormous
imprints he left on Korea and modern state-building agendas. Chapter II, therefore, sets to
analyze the background and initial impressions of Park’s new, unique, and heavy-handed
state nationalism.
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Chapter II:
Analysis – Nationalism Before and During Park’s Tenure (1910-1979)
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The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were tumultuous for Korea; its economy,
social structure and political system changed dramatically. These changes were largely
due to confrontation with outside forces. Before Park Chung Hee’s birth (1917-1979),
Korea was in an era of wilderness. A millennia’s worth of Middle Kingdom influence
was coming to an end, and with that, an end to centuries-worth of cordial “tributary”
relations with China.1 The peninsula was shaken and permanently altered by the change
of status quo.2 This was no-more evident than through the actions of a newly dominant
and industrialized Japan.
Roger Janelli posits that tribute systems gave the East Asian region a stratified
order. In particular, “It gave [Koreans] a sense of place . . . a place lower than that of
China but higher than that of Japan.”3 The ascent of Imperial Japan (1868-1945),
however, upended this age-old system, and therefore, laid the foundations for not only
Korean nationalism but also the institutions that shaped Park’s agendas.
Among Westerners, the tribute system may appear as an imbalanced convention
wherein subordinates are coerced into submission; however, this was very advantageous
for Korea. As Jinwung Kim notes, Ancient China looked upon “Choson (Korea)” as a
utopia.4 From the early seventh century BCE, some Chinese kingdoms such as the Qi
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state, traded frequently with Gojoseon (Tan’gun Joseon), thereby suggesting a healthy
flourishing economy amidst Zhou China’s explosive warring era (1046-256 BCE). As
further evident, Confucius (551-479 BCE) – no stranger to violence and war – referenced
Old Joseon as a peaceful society even wishing to “lead a life there.”5 Therefore, the
“Land of the Morning Calm” did not earn that name overnight. Throughout its ancient
history Korea was known for order, stability, and peace. This is especially true
considering that the peninsula is wedged between two regional powers, China and Japan.
Even more so, these were times when China and Japan had frequent domestic
conflicts. Chinese dynasties had numerous splintering kingdoms, power-hungry
commanders, and peasant revolts; while the Japanese, since the 1100s, had societies
primarily set up to appease warlord governments and their samurai warriors.6
Contrastingly, Korean historical stability is palpable through the longevity of their
dynasties, specifically over a thousand-year rule of the combined Goryeo and Joseon
Dynasties (918-1897 CE). Finally, this longevity gave rise to another longstanding
cultural phenomenon, the yangban aristocracy, which is central to Park’s initial stances.
Yangban was a small yet extremely powerful group of elites who were a social
class one step below the highest order, royal nobility. Yangban derived its foundation
from Goryeo’s veneration of academics (literati) and bureaucrats who were usually
composed of Confucian scholars, civil servants, and royal eunuchs. During the Goryeo
Age (918-1392 CE), the aristocracy was divided into two – at this time they were not
called yangban but instead mun-ban (civil administrators and scholars) and mu-ban
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(high-ranking military officials and politicians).7 However, in the Joseon era (1392-1897
CE), both classes naturally merged into one, yangban; likewise, through centuries of
upper-class rule, yangban were entrenched in every aspect of Korean society. Simply put,
yangban were extremely powerful elites that ruled Korea for a very long time.
This chapter, therefore, sets to contextualize the importance that Japanese
imperialism and yangban culture had on early Korean nationalism. Not only did that
institution influence a millennia’s worth of peninsular culture, the impact greatly affected
Park Chung Hee’s tenure. Indeed, Park’s initial tenure was deeply impacted by a
millennia’s worth of Korean history, so his sense of nationalism was deeply influenced
by both yangban culture and Japanese imperialism, the latter culture deeply affected by
Western ideas.
General Park, therefore, managed to blend components of both systems which
allowed many Koreans to support him and many others to oppose him. Park’s Korea,
however, still needed to appear indigenous in the post-World War II era for his agendas
to survive. Furthermore, Park’s initial tenure came at a time when elites in the polity and
business – during the Rhee Syngman era – were despised by the citizenry. Therefore, it is
also important to contrast the impact that early nineteenth century nationalism, along with
millennium-old yangban culture, had on Park’s early agendas.
Ultimately, these nationalists played a role in shaping a young Park into what
some scholars call a “developmental dictator.”8 You (Yu) Jong-Sung befittingly posits
that the combination of such diverse teachings and histories ultimately culminated into a
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new “developmental system” invented by Park.9 Subsequently, the second part of this
chapter delves into the term “developmental dictator.” More specifically, what aspects of
early nationalism contributed to making this term.

Part I
Early Korean Nationalism, Part I: The Forefathers
Sin (pronounced Shin or Sheen) Chaeho (1880-1936) and Choe (pronounced Cheh
or Ch’weh) Namson (1890-1957) are considered the forefathers of both modern Koreas
and their respective state nationalism.10 But before Sin and Choe’s works, it is important
to examine the variables that affected their rhetoric and stances. Chizuko T. Allen and
Roger Janelli argue that it was a mix of Japanese scholarship and Social Darwinism that
gave the two Korean intellectuals their philosophical foundations.11
Social Darwinism had a profound impact for both nationalists as this school was
largely derived from modern Western teachings. Social Darwinism is defined as “the
more robust human societies and cultures are the farther they can progress and survive
into the future.” In other words, a “survival-of-the-fittest” society.12 Likewise, Choe and
Sin were well-versed with this branch of Western ideology; Choe, however, combined
elements from Chinese nationalist Liang Qichao (1873-1929).
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Similar to Korea’s colonial predicament, Liang sought to explain China’s loss of
prestige in what is otherwise known as the “Century of Humiliation” (1840s-1940s).
China, for the most part, was in ruin. The Qing recently fell, China fragmented into
warlord regions, the Western Powers ransacked what little state funds they had, and
Imperial Japan conquered the northeast territories.13
As a result, Liang’s teachings shaped the tenets of both the Kuomintang and
Chinese Communist Party; respectively, these are the future state-parties of the Republic
of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China.14 During the end of the nineteenth
century Liang’s version of Social Darwinism took a stranglehold over Asian scholarship,
and it is safe to say that academia in both Japan and Korea was not immune to this trend.
Korea’s colonial age was the turning point for all parties involved. Taking cues
from their Western counterparts, Imperial Japan wasted no time in promoting their
civilization as the dominant society in Asia. In turn, Japanese imperialists deemed Korean
culture primitive and forced a pro-Japanese curriculum onto all academic institutions,
from elementary school to tertiary education.15
From a foreigner’s perspective, American socialite Isabel Anderson, during a 1910s
tour of the Orient, recorded her thoughts on the shattering of the status quo:
The Japanese Governor-General, Count Terauchi, is a very strong and able
man, and under his administration many improvements have been made in
Korea. This has not always been done without friction between the natives
and their conquerors, it must be confessed, but the results are certainly
astonishing. The government has been reorganized, courts have been
established, the laws have been revised, trade conditions have been
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improved and commerce has increased. Agriculture has been encouraged
by the opening of experiment stations, railroads have been constructed
from the interior to the sea-coast, and harbors have been dredged and
lighthouses erected.16
Anderson’s thoughts on “conquerors” (the Japanese) and the conquered “natives” (the
Koreans) corresponded with what the early twentieth century world knew, Korean society
– as Liang would say – was made up lesser historical people.”17 Therefore, it was not
only in Japan’s advantage to rule and exploit the peninsula, but it was in the world’s
interest.
Korean responses were similar as well. Choe made numerous references in a 1917
issue of the Korean newspaper Taehan maeil sinbo. Specifically, he wrote that the world
is split into “world historical people” – societies that have the capacity to expand outward
from their homelands – and “lesser historical people” – societies that have little to no
impact on world history.18 This verified that leading Korean officials knew their culture
was in a low-standing position.

Figure 2.1. Photos of Sin Chaeho (left) and Choe Namson (right). Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
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Early Korean Nationalism, Part II: Minjok
Choe, Sin, and other Korean nationalists, as a way to elevate Koreans into
“historical people,” responded to Social Darwinism by creating their own version based
upon ancient historical elements. Korean, Chinese, Western, and even Japanese elements
converged into the cornerstone of this new national credence. Korean nationalism was
now known as minjok (pronounced meen-joke), roughly translated to “the people,” “the
nation,” “the land,” and “the race.”19 Minjok is an all-encompassing tenet – it can cover
religion, culture, language, art, and history – however, Sin specifically tied minjok to the
historical lands of Korea.20
Most notably, this tenet expanded beyond the modern geographic borders of the
peninsula and into the Manchurian region – otherwise known as the borders of Gojoseon.
Sin based this claim on Korea’s compelling Three Kingdoms history; particularly, the
kingdoms of Gogoryeo (37 BCE-668 CE) and Balhae (698-926 CE). These states
covered the northern peninsula and most of Manchuria at one point.21 This claim was
revolutionary for East Asian academia. It not only implied that people of the peninsula
were part of the Korean ethnicity, but that the ancient lands in what would be known as
Northeastern China were tied to Korean heritage.
Perhaps minjok’s most profound effect was the emphasis it put on an obscure
creational myth. Because Korean history is ancient and diverse, especially during the
Three Kingdoms era, it is entitled to a storied mythos. The Song China-Goryeo
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anthology, Samguk Sagi (published around 1145 CE) details different creation tales from
each kingdom. For example, Silla had their own myth, the Pak (Park) Hyeokgeose Tale.22
The most prominent of the Sagi tales, however, is Tan’gun (Dan’gun). The myth of King
Tan’gun was relegated into obscurity during the Joseon era as yangban scholars
dismissed Korea’s shamanistic past for a more Sinocentric narrative.23 Choe, nonetheless,
took fascination with the tale because the setting for Tan’gun’s kingdom was situated
along the North Korean-Manchurian border.24
Choe’s rediscovery of Tan’gun, along with Sin tying land to ethnicity, was the
one-two punch needed to fuel future nationalists. The combination gave Koreans, as
James B. Palais posits, a claim to “uniqueness” through the lens of an ancient and
powerful history.25 Minjok culture was now tied to deep antiquity that not even the
superior Japanese Empire could lay claim to. To subjugated Koreans, the Imperialist
efforts to suppress Manchurian-peninsular history, culture, and language was evidence
that their Japanese overlords felt threatened by minjok.
As Nadia Y. Kim notes, Sin, Choe, and Tan’gun created the notion of “ethnic
nationalism,” and that the imperialist’s efforts to suppress this movement may have
inadvertently fanned the flames for future Korean leaders.26 Consequently, this notion
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was later tempered and presented as political rhetoric by none other than President Park
(1963-1979). Minjok’s greatest effect, however, was not politics but instead it instilled
pride back to a country that was devastated, defeated, and humiliated for over half a
century. Suitably, a young Park took this message to heart during his brief stint in minjok
lands.

Map 2.1. From left to right, map of Gojoseon (circa 2000-108 BCE), Buyeo Kingdom (circa 200-494 CE),
Gogoryeo (37-668 CE), and Silla Kingdom (57-935 CE). Please note the circled areas are Korean-Manchurian
regions. The square area, now known as Gumi-si, is where Park Chung Hee (1917-1979) was born. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.

Park the Young Soldier
In 1894, Korean reformists fed up with yangban class structure sought to abolish
it in order to usher in the new Korean Empire (1897-1910). This, of course, was slow and
met fierce resistance until Japanese takeover in 1910. It was in the efficient and ruthless
hands of Imperialists that completed what reformists sought to do; however, this came at
the cost of land and wealth confiscation from yangban elites and peasantry alike.27
Simply put, the yangban elites were a thing of the past, and so was class structure; in its
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place was universal poverty for most Koreans.28 Likewise, this class dissolution
permanently altered the Korean sociocultural landscape.
Canadian journalist F.A. McKenzie attested to the inevitable, yet brutally
efficient, invasion. In February 1910, McKenzie saw the beginnings of Imperial
annexation on the docks of Incheon. He reported that:
Those of us who stood on the frozen shores on that cold February night,
looking at the trim and alert Japanese infantry, their figures revealed by
the glowing coal and paraffin fires on the landing stage, knew that the
old history of Korea was over and that a new era had begun.29
While this era was vicious to all Koreans, it did, however present ample opportunities for
youths willing to flex their muscles and learn the ways of Imperial bushido. Park,
therefore, would be born into an era of might and viciousness; and likewise, this ideology
permanently entrenched itself onto the soon-to-be Imperial officer.
In 1917, Park Chung Hee was born in Kameo, Colonial Korea (now known as
Gumi-si, South Korea) to a former yangban family.30 At this time, the effects of the
Korean Empire (1897-1910) had come and gone and with it came the destruction of the
old Korean social order by none other than his future Japanese idols. Park’s fervent
Imperial obsessions allowed him to self-learn Japanese language, culture, and etiquette at
an alarming rate. With those skills, Park was accepted and trained under different
Imperial institutions and academies. Most prominently, the military academy Rikugun
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Shikan Gakko in Tokyo. Included within the curriculum was a strong disdain for Joseon
elitist history, one that related to the very social order Park’s family was born into.31
To a young Park, he simply was not going to tolerate any “weak” elements, past
and future. According to Carter J. Eckert, former Joseon aristocrats and yangban
furiously resisted conscription either through sociopolitical connections, bribery, or by
abandonment.32 Undoubtedly, this played into Imperial propaganda that Joseon and
yangban elites were “weak and “effeminate.”33 Furthermore, nationalists, such as Sin
Chaeho, were well-known for their disdain of Joseon elitism as it was the very same
yangban scholars that relegated Korean-made culture – as in culture unique to Korea with
no Sino-Japanese elements – such as Tan’gun, in order to appease Ming allies.34 This
gave Imperialists, nationalists, and emasculated Koreans the sense that yangban were
corrupt, parasitic, and self-serving; which, in turn, almost resulted in the decimation of
Korean culture.
The importance of Park’s Imperial military career and the influence towards his
future nationalistic stances cannot be overstated. He served during a time when Korea
was a shell of its former self, and more importantly, during an era where Choe and Sin’s
teachings were spreading among the peninsula. While Park never met any of his
nationalist idols, the young lieutenant made many references to them, especially Sin, in
his journals. As such, it is possible to posit this as a coincidence, however, such accord
lends credence that Park knew well about early nationalists writing styles. For example,
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Park wholeheartedly referred to Korean individuals as a smaller portion “i” (lower-case
“i”) compared to the larger picture “I” or “We” (capital “I” and “We”).35 Moreover, even
though Park spent his education and military career in a foreign land, it so happened that
that part of his tenure was situated in the sacred lands – Tan’gun lands – Sin and Choe
fervently elevated.
With Park’s Korean nationalism finally taking form, the determined soldier still
needed to prove his mettle to Japanese officials, and, in 1944, Park abandoned the
“effeminate” yangban culture and finally became an officer in the Manchukuo Imperial
Army.36 This was the beginning of Park’s political agendas; so therefore, it is important
to analyze the principles that influenced his brief Japanese career.
Shogun Japan, Meiji Japan, and Imperial Japan were eras less than a century
apart, so suitably, older customs merged into contemporary culture. Nam Chang-hee
posits that the old shogun era of bushido – a samurai principle emphasizing strength over
weakness – motivated Japanese servicemen.37 Park was no exception, and as Nam
examines, Imperial education and military training prepared him for a life of rigid loyalty
and honor – similar to a samurai – at any means necessary. Additionally, this manifested
as one of Park’s favorite lines, “We can do anything if we try.”38
Park’s bushido mindset reverberated in the ideas of the nationalists he found so
intriguing. Taking a cue from Social Darwinism, Park complemented Sin Chaeho’s
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teachings of the “strong over the weak” mentality that many Imperial soldiers
passionately backed. In a February-March 1910 newspaper interview, Sin noted that:
Look around at this world! Why were the six great powers able so
triumphantly and willfully to overrun the heavens and the earth? The
answer is that their military power was strong.39
Indeed, two different men, from two different regions, with two different upbringings
were espousing similar bushido-like philosophies; this was no coincidence. Although, it
is possible to chalk this up to the Social Darwinist sentiments of the time, it is safe to
assume that during this military-heavy era “might makes right.” Furthermore, Park was
tasked with suppressing Korean-Chinese guerillas – warfare considered dishonorable by
Imperial standards – so his first armed foray was suppressing those deemed shameful by
bushido morals.40
Long before Park became a strongman, president, economic architect, and
dictator, a 1917 Taehan maeil sinbo issue – the same one with Choe’s “world historical”
remarks” – recorded Choe eerily foreshadowing Park’s political agenda:
The modern age is the age of power in which the powerful survive
while the weak perish . . . It is a competition of intelligence, physical
fitness, material, economic, and organizational power.41
Concurrently in Korea, minjok tenets like this were gaining a foothold. By the end of
Park’s Imperial endeavors, Social Darwinist efforts like minjok took nationalism by
storm. This undoubtedly influenced, along with Japanese experiences, Park’s future
policies. As Andre Schmid succinctly puts it, “[Park] was eager to enlist a nationalist
history for his own political purpose.”42
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In 1945, Park returned to Korea at the end of the Colonial Era and World War II.
With his nationalist agenda cemented, along with the technocratic guidance he received
in Imperial academies, the oncoming Korean War provided him the ample opportunity to
display his bushido might on the world stage.

Figure 2.2. Park Chung Hee dressed in an Imperial Army officer
uniform. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Park the Strongman
The Korean War (1950-1953) was a brutal conflict that had no conclusion – the
Koreas are still in an ongoing war. Just like their colonial past, the Republic of Korea
(ROK) came out of the struggle in a miserable situation. John F. Kennedy, the US
president during Park’s first years as executive, was quoted in a National Security
Council about the “hopelessness” in propping up the ROK’s government, military, and
economy.43 This begs an analysis as to why such a close ally initially looked upon South
Korea as an incumbrance; and in hindsight, the answer lay in Park’s strengthening of
American and Japanese relations.
In 1946, Park returned to the peninsula and attended Korean Military Academy in
Seoul (Yeokgeun Sagwan Hakkyo). Park’s past military expertise allowed him to raise
ranks quickly while assembling a devoted following of subordinates. In doing so, Park
frequently clashed with South Korea’s first president Rhee Syngman (1875-1965). At
one-point Rhee ordered Park’s execution for the crime of sedition; however, charges
were dropped due to insufficient evidence and military prestige.44
Nevertheless, Park’s proficiencies were needed at the outbreak of the Korean
War, and, in 1950, Park was promoted to ROK lieutenant. Park swiftly rose ranks during
the three-year conflict and came out as a brigadier general. Within that timeframe,
however, General Park befriended other bushido-minded military officials. Most
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prominently, Kim Jae-kyu – also Park’s best friend, fellow academy classmate, and
future KCIA director – and Kim Jong-pil. Taking a cue from the shogun-samurai
relationship, both individuals played a large role in helping Park consolidate power, and
they stayed loyal to his regime until Jae-kyu assassinated him in 1979.45
Between his return from Manchuria in 1946 and the end of the Korean War, the
General amassed loyal followers and the military credentials needed to oust a frail
government, whether the nation was ready or not. On May 16, 1961 (“5.16 Incident” in
Korean), General Park enacted a swift military coup in what was perceived, according to
Kim Hyung-a, as a “liberation” against “aristocrats and elites.”46
The reason behind Park’s coup has been analyzed many times; however, a
commonly agreed scapegoat lay within Rhee’s administration and his bureaucratic elites.
As seen during Park’s Manchurian stint, former Imperialist propaganda relegated Joseon
elites and yangban as corrupt and cowardly. Therefore, it was perfect timing that Park’s
regime cut the cancer where it started. As such, anyone associated with Rhee was the ill
to South Korea’s pathetic state.
For context, Rhee’s administration was mired in corruption and accusations of
pocketing foreign aid were numerous.47 Furthermore, South Korea was one of the poorest
countries in the world, a lawless “failed” country with a virtually non-existent
government and economy.48 To put it in a financial perspective, former Philippine
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President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, during a 2005 ASEAN tour, compared the destitute
past of South Korea to the Philippines’s current situation:
In 1965, when the per capita income of Philippines was $270, it was
$102 in South Korea. However, in 2005, when the per capita income of
the Philippines was $1,030, it was $ 16,500 in South Korea. I admire
President Park, who established the foundation of modernization,
beating the other East Asian countries which used to be wealthier than
South Korea.49
Thus, it was no surprise that within one year the penniless house-of-cards known as the
First and Second Republics of Korea (1948-1961) fell so fast under Rhee’s tenure.
The beginning of Park’s ascension was in the morning of May 16. Park made a
broadcast to a group of anti-elitist soldiers and protestors:
We have been waiting for the civilian government to bring back order
to the country. The Prime Minister and Ministers, however, are mired
in corruption, leading the country to the verge of collapse. We shall
rise up against the government to save the country. We can accomplish
our goals without bloodshed. Let us join in this Revolutionary Army to
save the country.50
A couple hours later, the Park regime effortlessly took control of the government without
any civilian resistance, and therefore, the General achieved a feat that most strongmen
yearn for. Surely, Park’s bushido military training prepared him for this moment.
With the deed done, the triumphant General ended the day with a public speech.
Taken from a radio transcript, Park tried to reassure the public – and an anxious Kennedy
Administration – that his actions were justified during an era of extreme Cold War
volatility:
What lies behind a coup or revolution? (Rephrasing the translation: Is
what we did a coup or revolution?) Well, for one thing, people
49
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currently can’t eat. Before all things, it is important to “fill the people’s
belly,” then they can participate in civil rights and democracy. Once
the people are “half-full,” then we can start thinking clearly about
democracy. Above all, we strive to develop a revolution that advances
the nation so that we can take a step forward [into prosperity]. If this
step fails, then it is a coup.51
Accordingly, onlookers and Koreans alike wondered whether Park’s upheaval was like
every other coup so common in that era; or, if it was a revolution not only for prosperity
but for pride, patriotism, and more importantly, democracy.

Figure 2.3. Left picture, General Park (center front) with subordinates shortly after his successful takeover. Right,
Park (very right) preparing to broadcast his speech in front of a weary public. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

***
The volatility in the Korean peninsula during the twentieth century birthed the
nationalist teachings of Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson. The two scholars, thereby,
influenced a new generation of Koreans, with none more evident than a young Korean
Japanese military officer, Lieutenant Park Chung Hee. Through a series of adept military
training, power grabs, and maneuvers, Park eventually became a general, at the same
time amassing a large group of loyal followers. Importantly, the General created a unique
form of Korean nationalism based on Sin-Choe teachings and Japanese bushido ethics.

Chung Hee Park, “Coup or Revolution?” speech, Addressing the Public After 5/16 Coup,
Seoul, May 16, 1961.
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Consequently, Park’s coup in 1961 sets the foundation for the next section. Part
II, therefore, examines the tenure of the “developmental dictator.” The section introduces
the reader to the peak of Park’s bushido society, and more importantly, the societyshattering effects it had on South Korean socioeconomics, military, politics, and late
twentieth century nationalism.

Part II
The former general enacted a coup in 1961 and consolidated his authority in one
of the most efficient power grabs in modern history. Park was a general no more, instead
he was an executive of a newly formed, corrupt, destitute, and barren republic. Park now
led a country that was a victim of brutal colonialism, a civil war, and divisive Cold War
politics. Under those circumstances, the strongman desperately sought to differentiate
himself from years of ineffective, weak, and criminal leadership. The vehicles employed
to drive such ambitions, therefore, are crucial variables used to better analyze the hidden
motives and costs for Park’s radical reforms.
Before Park could enact any wide-sweeping reforms, he first needed to get
everybody on board. With unabated poverty, lawlessness, and starvation, loyalty to the
state and to one cause was secondary to everyday survival. Furthermore, the newly
formed republic under the Rhee administration had little to no economic or psychological
cohesiveness. The only remnants left from Rhee’s tenure were anti-communist agendas
and civic corruption. In turn, public apathy and government distrust was the norm.52 To
counter such indifferences, Park looked to age-old philosophies.
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The Joseon era used Confucianism as the first official state tenet – known as
Ch’eng-chu – likewise, the new executive sought to use this for his neo-nationalist
campaigns.53 Park, however, knew this tenet was corrupted and manipulated by Joseon
officials, especially yangban elites, intent on subjugating lower-classes. Jinwung Kim
succinctly sums up yangban-led Confucianism as enriching a tiny, powerful, “parasitic,
privileged class.”54 In order to step away from a tainted Joseon past, Park looked to the
Neo-Confucian doctrines of Zhu Xi (1130-1200s CE) to guide his agenda.55
The teachings of Zhu Xi influenced the seventeenth century Korean tenet silhak.
Silhak was a more “practical” version of the old philosophy. Its main principles
emphasized social equality acquired through tangible and physical actions. For example,
silhak promoted Confucian aspects that propagated legal and technological advancements
along with land reforms; put differently, it promoted reforms that helped the working
classes. Moreover, silhak negates the “impractical” spiritual aspects that were heavily
disseminated by the old order.56 Ultimately, silhak was born because of the actions of an
apathetic and weak yangban elite.57
For the Park regime, this was the perfect basis to rally up a demoralized nation,
one that also conveniently agreed with Sin’s minjok philosophy. Simply put, silhak was
part of the land, the culture, and the people. Thus, the deviation away from Ch’eng-chu
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and towards silhak is a palpable example that rebellion against an old ineffectual elite
order – like Rhee’s administration – was meticulously planned by Park.58
The next problem, however, was propagating this to the masses while at the same
time sanitizing it of any Joseon elements. Park, therefore, had a predicament: enacting
such a plan without raising comparisons to old yangban teachings. In addition, Park
needed to instill one homogenized goal in order for his state-building agendas to come to
fruition. This was certainly no simply task, and the answer to this complexity was found
through the regime’s two most “practical” reforms: chaebol and Saemaul Undong
(pronounced jae-bowl and sae-maw-ool oon-dōng respectively).59

Park the Father, Part I
Without a doubt the most pressing issue on Park’s mind was economy. From the
beginning, Park’s administration was obsessed with poverty and prosperity. According to
a passage from his memoir, To Build a Nation, the moment after the coup Park thought:
[As soon as] I took over power as the leader of the revolutionary group
on 16 May 1961, I felt, honestly speaking, as if I had been given a
pilfered household or a bankrupt firm to manage … But I had to rise
above this pessimism to rehabilitate the household. I had to break, once
and for all, the vicious circle of poverty and economic stagnation.60
The words “pilfered household” and “bankrupt firm” were central to Park’s rationale.
This may suggest that he looked upon the new economy as a Confucian-inspired home;
and, like any good, strong, and dominate father, a loyal and respectful family was needed
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for a household to prosper. Befittingly, Park’s first reform, and perhaps his most
signature decree, was restructuring the economy to become business, corporate, and
export-friendly.
For Park, chaebol was not only a conglomerate and economic system, it was also
an institution that espoused his Neo-Confucian ideals. 61 The chaebol scheme did not,
however, arrive overnight, nor was Park the inventor. Chaebol economics goes back
farther than his time, and fittingly, the roots of chaebol are reminiscent of their Japanese
forefather, zaibatsu.
Zaibatsu translates to “financial clique” and was the economic pillar of nineteenth
century Meiji Reforms (1868-1912). These elite companies were state-guided and familyowned mega-corporations.62 They were once-prominent variables for Japan’s
instantaneous industrialization that eventually became the heart of the World War I and II
economies.63 Put in another way, zaibatsu were state-sanctioned monopolies whose labor,
revenue, and profits were all under the discretion of the executive, or emperor.64
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Park’s Japanese education allowed him to merge old zaibatsu elements with his
own brand of governance. Under the guidance of bushido ethics combined with silhak
practicality, Park adapted chaebol to better suit the needs of an expanding economy and a
restructuring Korean society. As Nam Chang-hee posits, this created an ethic that was
akin to an “ultranationalistic samurai-military.”65 Nam coins this trend as “clientelistic
industrial expansion,” somewhat mirroring that of their zaibatsu predecessor.66 Just like
zaibatsu, Park’s chaebol were under the complete guidance of the state.
The chaebol system, in its core, was a paternally guided system with “Confucian
style harmony.”67 This meant that the new corporate economy was based on hierarchy.
Park, the head of the government, was the highest entity in this pyramid-like structure. In
turn, he guided and took care of chaebol – just like a father to his children – as long as
they successfully led economic and labor reforms. Next, chaebol were responsible for the
well-being, training, and employment of the citizenry – otherwise symbolized as taking
care of their children. Therefore, it is possible to see the top-down authority within each
institution. Simply put, each entity played some sort of fatherly role model.68
Evidently, this was the Confucian aspect of the new chaebol economy: it was the
physical half of Park’s state-building efforts. The other half laid with bushido
psychology, or as Nam posits the “patron-client model.” This relationship is defined as
favorable exchanges between weaker and stronger clients.69 The “weaker client” was the
entity with less wealth and power while the “stronger” one yielded more. Likewise,
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chaebol held most of the power and had a commanding grip on the fabric of Korean
society. Park, of course, was the key exception to this.
While Park’s wealth paled in comparison to chaebol CEOs, that was irrelevant.
Park’s net worth was measured in a different iron-fisted currency, one that he had
limitless access too. Meaning, no entity or institution was higher than his authority,
chaebol wealth be damned. Chairman Park held the power of purse and authority over his
chaebol children. Whoever performed the best – measured in export output and revenue –
were rewarded accordingly with limitless state funding and deregulation.70 These
resources then trickled-down to employees as incentivized bonuses.
On the other end, whoever did not perform well, conglomerate, firm, or laborer,
were left out to rot.71 This meant that underperforming and unmarketable employees –
such as elderly, disabled, and, for a time, women – were left out of the economy.72 Akin
to Social Darwinist ethics, Park’s economy was now the “survival-of-the-fittest.”
Initially, this new economy was well received by the people. Even the most
unsuspecting workers felt the positive effects of the “patron-client model.” In a journal
entry dated on January 20, 1976, Park wrote about his encounter with an elevator
conductor:
I asked the elevator conductor about her [monthly] salary. She showed
a happy expression, saying that it was 44,000won (approx. 96USD in
1976 rates; 1USD = 484KRW) last year, but this year since January, it
has been about 77,000won (~159USD) and including the monthly
bonus, it would be, on average, 80,000won (~165USD). I thought that
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she would be much more satisfied if her pay was doubled based on the
present price index. I made up my mind to make more effort so that her
wish could come true within four or five years.73
This was music to Park’s ears because it provided anecdotal proof that – at least to him –
his Confucian-inspired economy was enriching not only the nation and conglomerates but
the most menial of workers. In accordance to the “patron-client model,” the unsuspecting
and joyous conductor benefitted from a weaker Confucian position.
This rehash of old zaibatsu and bushido ethics was so intriguing that even
outsiders, such as American Diplomat Richard A. Ericson, Jr., could not help but notice
Park’s unorthodox governance. In a 1995 interview with the Association for Diplomatic
Studies and Training (ADST), Ericson responded to a question about Park’s leadership
during his 1965-1968 tenure in Seoul:
The American press always portrayed [Park] as an autocratic little
monster . . . [however], the point with Park was that he also had this
burning intent to take Korea where he thought it should go and he had
the conviction that he and he alone was the one who could do it. And
you know, he may very well have been right.74
Along with the elevator conductor, insights like this proved to Park that bushido’s
“might-makes-right” ethics were working. Ambitious, strong, loyal – even weak –
workers were benefitting from the mighty chaebol economy, and befittingly, Park was
the mightiest of them all, rewarding or severely punishing all of his children.
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Park the Father, Part II
Park’s “might-makes-right” chaebol economy started off with a bang. Once an
agrarian nation, South Korea was evolving into an urban-centered manufacturing
behemoth. Young and old Koreans from all over the nation were flocking to cities for
lucrative factory and chaebol employment.75 Since South Korean metropolises were
booming due in part to new immigration, conversely, the countryside should be doing
worse. However, under the new system, this was far from the truth. The countryside, like
their urban counterparts, experienced tremendous growth due to Park’s second radical
reform, Samaeul Undong (1970s-1981), also known as the NCM.
During the chaebol reforms, rural growth was equitable to urban growth. From
the same ADST interview, Ericson recollects Park’s countryside experience and
highlights the former general’s motifs for his rustic agenda:
Being from rural areas himself, I think he paid more attention to that
than people might have expected. There wasn't a lot of farm unrest. The
farm income increased just as rapidly as urban.76
Furthermore, Ericson mentions Park’s philosophical and military background:
Plus, the fact that he is born a Confucian to start with. He is a rural
Korean, not a sophisticated city guy, and his life work up until that
time, after World War II, had been in the Korean army. And here is a
guy who served, fought and existed all of his life in intensely
hierarchical situations.77
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Ericson’s emphasis on Park’s Confucian and hierarchy-centered background is important.
The chaebol and labor systems relied on these very same ideals. It is therefore safe to
presume that these variables affected the NCM agenda.
Han Seung-Mi posits that the NCM campaigns were essentially “anti-elitist and
populist ideals” that became Park’s version – and therefore the rural community’s version
– of “state populism.”78 Yu Jong-Sung’s thesis corroborates Han’s argument. However,
Yu adds that failed land reform acts that occurred during post-Korean War rebuilding
(1948-1956) were a factor that affected the NCM.79
For context, the yangban order virtually owned all property, including all aspects
of agriculture, in Joseon Korea.80 Likewise, during Japanese occupation, all land was
confiscated under the Empire; however, some Imperial officials allowed certain yangban
groups – usually owners who were proficient in industry and trade – to keep their land.81
Unsurprisingly, these landowners held immense power up until the Korean War.
When post-war restructuring commenced, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers
(SCAP) officials – carried out by the Rhee regime – blindly redistributed former Imperial
stolen and yangban lands. Granted, this was regardless of whether new proprietors were
experienced and skilled with agriculture or trade. This, of course, was one variable to
South Korea’s unproductivity before Park took the reins. As such, Park knew this system
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was inadequate, so implementing the successes of chaebol “clientelism” – inclusive of all
Confucian elements – was the solution to modernize the backwaters of Korea.82
Park did exactly that, and according to prior Imperial elements, he pushed
“Japanese mental training” on an ambitious countryside eager to gain the same riches
seen in the cities.83 However, the NCM incorporated other Eastern and Western aspects
as well. These were based on the ideas of eighteenth century Japanese agrarian economist
Ninoyama Ginjiro (1787-1856) and German sociologist Max Weber.84 Park combined
Ginjiro’s emphasis on community lending, investing, and frugality – a precursor to
farming credit unions – with “Weberian mental training.”85
Plainly put, the rustic and urban chaebol systems had the same homogenized
goals, modernization and prosperity. The motifs and support behind them, however, were
completely different. Chaebol lacked the communal elements of NCM. Whereas NCM
followed Ginjiro’s teachings on collective investments, chaebol did not. For example,
urban workers, many of them employed by chaebol, were expected to “invest” their labor
and earnings through conglomerations and spending.86
According to Kang Myung-koo, one vehicle used to spur urban investments was
Western-styled consumerism.87 Since Park’s Korea was now an export-oriented market,
an overabundance of chaebol goods became available for Koreans to splurge on. In turn,
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a new urban psyche was born, “Developmentalist Mentalité.”88 This term meant that
urbanites were now following a hierarchy based on owning the latest and greatest
consumer products. Granted, this was also mixed with the Confucian hierarchy that Park
promoted. As Kang posits, the new consumer mindset eventually created a
“hypercompetitive” and “rugged individualist” attitude that is still prevalent today. 89
In rural communities, chaebol culture was less prominent. The NCM’s goal were
not centered on exporting, rather it was to rapidly turn the impoverished outskirts into
productive farmlands. Interestingly, many villages were still stuck with Joseon-styled
governance. Villages were still led by a form of oligarchy – village elders and leaders
were put into prominent positions due to family name, ancestry, and Confucian piety.90
This caused a flock of younger workers to abandon rural life in the pursuit of urban
wealth.
To combat this, the NCM enacted reforms were based on meritocracy and selfreliance. Villagers willing to toil in the fields and rapidly build new infrastructure were
rewarded by the state with limitless aid. This trait was seen by Park as “strong and selfsufficient” and was frankly unheard of in Korean history. For most of Korean history,
farmers and peasants were generally considered powerless second-class citizens. In
Goryeo and Joseon eras, they were known as sangmin, a social class roughly translated to
“commoners.”91 In the NCM era, however, Park’s rural schemes bestowed youthful
laborers with new wealth and power. Concurrently, elder village leaders – many of whom
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did not possess any practical skills for the NCM – were having their powers slowly
undermined by a newly empowered and skilled workforce.92
Oppositely, while urban areas were initially booming, the massive influx of
migrants eventually created an oversaturated and overcompetitive market. To make
matters worse, there was rarely any state welfare for hardworking city laborers. In reality,
that duty was up to their “patrons,” better known as chaebol. Likewise, results were not
as expected for a new generation of urban laborers as they were not heavily remunerated
compared to their NCM counterparts.93
That begs the question, “Did Park favor one constituency over the other?”
Perhaps. Simply put, the NCM was in the same spirit as the “patron-client model”; but in
this case, Park and the state was the “patron” and ambitious agrarian workers were highly
favored “clients.”94 Further evident of Park’s rural bias, the strongman was known to
build and venerate historical figures who were mistreated by aristocratic elites. It was
also no coincidence that these figures had a large peasantry support base.
For example, Park was obsessed with Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545-1598) who – in
spite of massive achievements – was frequently demoted and humiliated by Joseon
nobility and yangban. Propaganda related to the great admiral is evident today as
numerous shrines, such as Hyeongchungsa in Asan-si, South Korea, were built in what
was once pristine countryside.95
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Additionally, Park’s impoverished rural upbringing affected his governance. As
reiterated by Ericson’s ADST comments, “He is a rural Korean, not a sophisticated city
guy . . . I think he paid more attention to that.”96 Suffice it to say, the executive was
obsessed with rural prosperity while loathing anything resembling an inch of poverty. To
Park, national success was shown through the NCM’s efficient dismantling of thatched
roof, wooden villages – these are now called “traditional Korean villages” (hanok maeul
and min sok chon); the mass erection of new apateu (apartment) buildings in major cities;
the creation of the nation’s first freeway (Seoul-Busan Gyeongbu Expressway); and a
booming consumerist-export economy. These were all affirmations that his “mightmakes-right” campaigns were the new spirit of the young republic.97

The Cost
Unquestionably, Park’s radical reforms boosted South Korea into global
prominence. Poverty – urban and rural – was in the midst of alleviation, Korean brands
were being bought all over the world, and the South surpassed their Northern brethren as
the face for all things Korean.98 But what was more of an anomaly was how Park, leader
of a once destitute nation, raised up enough funds to pursue such sweeping economic and
nationalist agendas. Just like any developing nation, the road to prosperity and global
prominence came at a cost.
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When Park took over the government in 1961, he knew that past governing
methods under Rhee was inefficient, easily corruptible, and profitable only to a select
few.99 However, the Park regime did take notice of Rhee’s emphasis on foreign –
Japanese, American, and West German – technocrats. Rhee’s administration, however,
never had the chance to utilize such assistance because of mass protests, corruption
charges, and embezzlement.100
Sinophobia
On the surface, it is possible to assume that Park was accepting and pragmatic
towards foreign influence. Park even said in a speech:
I don’t care [what] the national origin of capital [is]. I welcome capital
from the United States, West Germany, Italy, and other European
countries. Even if it is Japanese capital, I don’t care as long as it is used
for the economic development of our country.101
As such, President Park wanted to normalize Japanese relations, enact training and
internship programs with allies – primarily the U.S., West Germany, and Japan – and
create export policies that strengthened numerous international trade treaties.102 However,
when looking deeper, Park’s agendas were tainted with overt xenophobia against Chinese
culture.
Chinese-Korean relations date back millennia, but Park’s two-decade regime and
nativist populist campaigns effectively dismantled Sino influences from Korean society.
For context, Seow Jing Yin posits that pre-Park South Korea (1946-1961) lacked any
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nationalist and cultural cohesion. It was not common for the international spectators to
consider North Korea as the true successor to the peninsula as their economy and
government was, at that time, more stable than the South.103
Consequently, Park obsessed over glorifying anti-elitist and nationalist icons,
such as Admiral Yi’s Hyeongchungsa and Tan’gun, in hopes of alleviating South Korea’s
inferiority complex. This campaign was nothing short of a success. Nadia Y. Kim
suggests that Park brought back ethnic and national pride by skillfully tying Sin Chaeho’s
Tan’gun and “homogenized bloodlines” together.104 Park, however, conveniently left out
Northeastern Manchurian influences – inclusive of Tungusic, Khitan, and Han Chinese –
that helped solidify the Tan’gun story.
Consequently, this also led to a campaign to “purify” Korean culture.105 This not
only meant removing Chinese elements from Korean history – Park even tried to abolish
hanja from Korean academic program – but this also meant stamping out a tiny Chinese
minority from the peninsula.106 After a government finance audit led by the KCIA,
officials found small but affluent Chinese communities. Just as quickly as Park stamped
out Sino-influenced curriculums, this minority group had all their assets confiscated, and
then they were deported. According to Kim Hyung-A, the anti-Sino campaigns displayed
how far Park would go, socioeconomically and ethnically, to rebuild Korea in his
image.107
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Japanese Relations and Compensation
Park’s regime immediately implemented the foreign advising ideas set forth by
Rhee. Since there was a familiarity with Imperial institutions, Park’s technocrats used
that knowledge to normalize relations with Korea’s past adversary, the Japanese. Yi
Tong-won, former Vice Chairman of the Korean Trade Association turned diplomat to
Japan, knew the vitalness of securing trade deals and low-interest loans, especially with
the world’s strongest markets economies. In a government report to Park, Yi wrote:
What is lacking in natural resources and financial instruments can be
made up through strategically timed diplomatic maneuvers. Foreign
policy can either make or break a nation. If [the military junta] can
concentrate on the strengthening of economic ties with the United
States as much as the security ties, and on the normalization of relations
with Japan, South Korea can secure large amounts of economic
assistance in a timely manner. With the resources secured through
diplomacy, I believe [the military junta] will have a chance at creating
an economic miracle.108
In return, Japan’s Hayato Ikeda and Sato Eisaku cabinets (1960-1972) eagerly
found these requests as an opportunity – as in showering Park with low-interest loans –
for informal compensations for past atrocities.109 As a gesture of good faith, the Park
administration quietly swept colonial atrocities – such as maritime border disputes
(Dokdo Conflict) and wartime sex slavery – under the rug.110 Ultimately, Park’s KoreanJapanese diplomacy opened the way for these economic alliances.111
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These stances infuriated the general population and is considered by scholars as
the start of agitation against Park’s two-decades long rule.112 Also, this began urban and
university protests – initially small at first – that would engulf Park’s successors. Park,
likewise, worried somewhat about these sentiments. On a West German tour in 1974, the
dictator produced a speech on pragmatism while sidestepping motifs for Japanese
alliances.
In the hopes of reassuring expatriate Koreans in West Germany about negative
sentiments at home, he said:
I do not know if some of the students will complain about the president
saying this, but I will definitely speak to some of our Korean students
here today . . .What is the content of the Korea-Japan talks? [Rephrase:
Why are we bothering to reconcile with Japan?] Well, what is the point
of continuing to fight? . . . Since you are students, it's because you are
worried about the future of Korea and for the future of our country.113
Furthermore, Park Tae-jun, another of Park’s technocrats and a diplomat to Japan, wrote
a public letter defending the administration:
Domestically, there are a lot of severe criticisms and oppositions saying
that the government is attempting to get political funds, or the
normalization between two countries is disgraceful. But we cannot
always beg the US for wheat flower to barely survive. Is that the way to
keep us noble? My belief is that there is no other way to build up
national modernization without money. We might have to live up with
more shames under the oppression of Japan, considerably long time, if
we miss this opportunity only thinking about the disgraceful sides
only.114
Indeed, when Tae-jun said “live up with more shames . . . considerably for a long time,”
he inadvertently foreshadowed the deep anti-Japanese animosity that still envelops Korea
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today.115 Simply put, to many Koreans – and even for Park’s strongest supporters –
Japanese normalizations, whether justified or not, sold out years of suffering and
atrocities for billions in aid.
Vietnam War
The Vietnam War was a conflict that involved massive American support,
financially and militarily; but unbeknownst to many, the second largest participant, in
terms of soldiers and civilian workers, was none other than the newly modernized ROK
military.116 The Vietnam War greatly affected Park’s early tenure as well. Specifically,
Park’s regime knew the pitiful state of the outdated armed forces. In fact, the ROK
military during the Korean War was looked upon as a “burdensome military
protectorate.” Therefore, the problem and expenses of rapid military modernization
plagued Park’s tenure.117 The solution, however, was to let another entity, the United
States, do the modernization for them with the costs including full commitment of forces
alongside American counterparts.
According to Kim Se Jin, this plan was such a success that it entitled the ROK
military to unprecedented amounts of American military advisors, technology, and
funding.118 Rapid militarization went off without a hitch, but more importantly, Park now
had a top-tier battle-tested ROK military at his disposal. This meant that domestically,
Park’s economic and political consolidation was not only complete but internationally
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South Korea’s military was a force to be reckoned with. Park showed the world just what
bushido agendas could achieve.
At home, however, the cost for this mighty buildup alarmed Park’s opposition.
His opponents predicted that rapid militarization and involvement “might transform
South Korea into a garrison state in which the predominant position of the military could
result in the permanent entrenchment of the military-oriented government of Chung-hee
Park.”119 In hindsight this was true; Park and his party’s near defeat in the 1971-1972
elections was the spark for the third and most significant cost.
Anti-democracy (Yushin)
Park’s party, the Democratic Republicans (DRP), secured a tight victory in the
1971-1972 elections against longtime opposition Kim Dae-jung and the New Democratic
Party. Nonetheless, this was the catalyst needed to scrap democratic elements from the
government. In October 1972, the Park regime passed Yushin, an authoritarian
constitution that translates to “renewal.”120 Along with a strengthened military and police
force, the dictator enacted martial law and stamped out any democratic elements from the
government. Legislative and judicial powers were now centralized into the executive
branch. Elections hereafter were rubberstamps for Park and the DRP.121
In October 17, 1972 – dubbed “Siwol Yushin” – Park gave a speech on his plans
to self-amend the constitution. The sweeping powers he passed were disguised under
North-South unification goals. In the preamble, Park was clear that his might could not
be tested:
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I am urging the unification of the Korean people in order to realize the
desire of the nation that is the peaceful unification and to prepare the
great battle for the formation of the forces of the national ethnic group
that strongly supports today's historical task, I declare to the public an
emergency action that halts the validity of some provisions of the twomonth constitution.
My first goal is to immediately dismiss the National Assembly by 19:00
on October 17, 1972. In addition, I plan to suspend all rights and
provisions of the current Constitution, such as suspension of political
parties and religious activities.122
The preamble was more than about unification. It meant Park could finally “prepare
the great battle of the national ethnic group.”123 This marked the culmination of years’
worth of bushido ethics, ethnic nationalism, and uniting the historical Tan’gun lands he
was so familiar with. The “great battle,” however, was not with North Korea or any
outside agent. In fact, the battle was to be staged at home against opposition, students,
protestors, and religious leaders.124
The worst was yet to come, and soon Park began a trend of silencing opposition
in morbid ways. To flex his power, the regime regularly jailed, tortured, and executed
dissidents. One of Park’s most infamous act was ordering KCIA officials to clandestinely
kidnap opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from his Tokyo hotel.125 In Kim’s 2000 Nobel
Prize acceptance speech, he recollects the lengths Park and his successors would go to
silence any dissent:
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Five times I faced near death at the hands of dictators, six years I spent
in prison, and forty years I lived under house arrest or in exile and
under constant surveillance.126
Because Kim faced multiple dictator-led death threats, it was evident that Yushin
normalized this trend and lived well past the Park regime, lasting until the end of the
1980s.
***
Since his youth, Park Chung Hee’s obsession over early nationalism provided him
the foundations for his eventual rule. However, this groundwork could not be made
without the distortion of Sin and Choe’s teachings. The Tan’gun story, therefore, is a
pivotal variable that provided the future strongman the framework to create his own
unique nationalist state-building program. This agenda entrenched Korea for decades
beginning in 1961 and culminating in 1972 when Yushin was enacted.
Even though all looked lost amidst a narrative of distorted Tan’gun
historiography, neo-Imperial nationalism, and Yushin’s almighty state authority, the
public nevertheless looked back to history to find a voice. Initially small, students and
religious leaders found hope in the Neo-Confucian Joseon sects, silhak – a tenet
originally used by Park – and in an obscure Joseon Neo-Confucian faction known as
donghak.127 But just as protestors were finding a voice, Park was assassinated in 1979.
Equally, Park did not see the effects that the hybrid sects brought forth. However, his
successor, Chun Do-hwan, felt the full consequences of these changes.128
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From the mid-1960s to 1972, President Park was at the peak of his tenure. Park’s
state-building and nationalist agendas were entrenched into all aspects of South Korean
society. Furthermore, bushido might and Yushin solidified those institutions for the
unforeseeable future. As such, the strongman was at the very top of the society he built in
his image; but more importantly, no one was there to challenge his authority. However, in
retrospect, just as quickly as Park took power, his reign was coming to an abrupt end.
Unbeknownst to Park and his inner circle, one night would change everything the
executive meticulously built; and immediately, his legacy and image would be put under
the test by another strongman looking to further the agenda of the developmental dictator.

Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part I: Internal Reasons
Park’s death made headlines worldwide and Keesing’s Worldwide was one media
outlet that documented the internal complications before Park’s assassination.1 The
article’s timeframe begins in August 1979 when Park “launched an offensive against the
NDP (New Democratic Party) and Christian dissidents.”2 During that time there was a
large Christian and labor rights resurgence. Numerous clergymen and religious leaders
protested alongside workers’ unions. They all opposed the extremely low wages of nonchaebol related trades – jobs that were not subsidized or owned by chaebol – while
concurrently promoting the creation of basic labor rights.3 The resurgence was also a
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thorn in Park’s side as an array of Christian denominations attracted and provided social
welfare to many disenfranchised people. Many constituents were young, elderly, and
agrarian outcasts who could not offer any practical skills for the chaebol and Saemaul
systems.4
One other prominent group were female workers who were largely employed in
textile, hospitality, and education services.5 In the textile industry, employees were paid
so poorly, sometimes pay was withheld, that they joined Christian labor movements as a
way to voice their struggles. With their support, female protestors staged numerous sit-ins
in company dormitories and police compounds to show their opposition.
Things boiled over when seven female teachers from Seoul Christian Academy
were arrested on charges of “pro-communist” activities. Leading international Christian
groups, such as the Korean Catholic Church, responded by sponsoring various
demonstrations around the nation. One notable group was the Catholic Farmers’
Movement which Park accused of “creating class consciousness” due to the support they
provided for textile laborers while they were on strike.6
The ruckus caused by diverse religious groups finally caught the ear of the NDP’s
Kim Young-sam (1927-2015), and more importantly, the international news media.7 In
September 15, 1979, the New York Times caught wind of the events and scheduled an
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interview with Kim. With a large international media platform, Kim played into the
sympathetic ears of the Carter Administration.
Kim stated that “the time has come for the U.S. to make clear a choice between a
dictatorial regime or the alienated majority who aspire to democracy.”8 Kim then
skillfully chided Carter by tying the 1978 Iranian Revolution – one that occurred under
Carter’s watch – to Korea’s situation. Kim pressured that “Iran was America’s supreme
diplomatic disaster. I want the US embassy to avoid following the same track here.”9
Carter responded immediately by hitting Park where it hurt the most, the military and the
economy. The US president threatened to take back military aid and ground troops from
the peninsula while simultaneously influencing Japan to distance themselves from Park.10
These sudden turns of events did not bode well Park’s inner circle. Park’s fury
with the mass protests, and eventually urban riots in Masan and Busan, foreshadowed the
end for two of his closest confidants, KCIA Director Kim Jae-kyu and Chief Bodyguard
Cha Ji-chul. In an act of internal betrayal, Cha slyly scapegoated Kim for his opposition
to urban military crackdowns.11 Although there are other variables that played a hand
with Park’s loss of demeanor, Kim and Cha’s deadly feud is reputed to be the primary
motive for Park’s death. Nevertheless, the events that occurred during the last months
undoubtedly pushed his inner circle to the edge of paranoia and betrayal.
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The Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part II: A First-hand Account
The Korea Joong-Ang Daily published an exposé thirty-six years after Park’s
assassination and interviewed firsthand witness Kim Jong-pil (born 1926). Being part of
Park’s entourage, Jong-pil fully recollects the night of Park’s assassination.12 The
interview began with Kim Jong-pil recalling the confrontation he had with an agitated
Kim Jae-kyu and Chief Presidential Secretary Kim Gye-won.13
Before the fateful dinner, Gye-won and Jae-kyu chatted in the Blue House
corridors about Park’s punitive ruling style. The conversation between Jae-kyu and Gyewon went as forth: “If we’re too harsh in suppressing demonstrators there will be a huge
backlash from the people. But the ruling Republican Party isn’t giving Park the right
advice.”14 Jae-kyu alluded that party officials purposely gave Park wrong advice as a
response to Cha Ji-chul’s fear-mongering tactics. Jae-kyu’s pleas went on deaf ears as
Gye-won thought Jae-kyu was facetious, partly because of the rivalry Jae-kyu had with
Cha. Jong-pil commented that “in hindsight, [maybe] Gye-won thought Jae-kyu meant to
scare Ji-chul” in order to have Ji-chul ease up on protestor clampdowns.15
However, Jong-pil also mentioned “Park’s disappointment” on Jae-kyu’s recent
actions. “President Park was mulling sacking Kim Jae-kyu,” Jong-pil said. “[It was
because] Jae-kyu had failed to control the opposition party and its chief, Kim Youngsam.”16 Jong-pil also added that because of Ji-chul’s “dirty tricks,” Jae-gyu was “under
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the illusion that he had lost credibility with Park.”17 To add more salt on the wound, Jaegyu was Park’s best friend and had been loyal to him since their academy days. It comes
to no surprise that Jae-gyu sat in depressed silence as Park scolded him about his
lackluster performance. “I should have arrested Kim Young-sam,” followed by “the
KCIA needs to be more threatening.” Reminiscing back to all the dirty work the KCIA
did for Park, especially kidnapping Kim Dae-Jung in Tokyo. Jong-pil recalled that Jaegyu left the dinner feeling slighted by Park’s ingratitude.
Jong-pil remembered the last major lines Cha said before the shootings, “None of
those fools really meant to give up their seats. I will stop them with tanks if I have to. I
don’t care if they’re lawmakers.”18 That’s when, as Jong-pil suspects, Jae-gyu left to
retrieve his Walter PPK – the gun that was used to end Park and Cha’s life.19 Finally, Jaekyu arrived back, screamed “Go to hell!” to both Park and Cha, and then shot Park to
death until his gun jammed.20 Cha then fled to the bathroom where Jae-kyu followed him;
Cha was immediately killed by him. Both Jong-pil and Gye-won avoided Jae-kyu’s wrath
by fleeing the premise before Cha was shot down.21 Shortly after, Jae-kyu was arrested
and put on trial for his execution.22
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Jong-pil concludes the interview with his own assessment. He commented that
“Cha, whose job was to protect the president at all costs, had fled to the restroom,” while
noticing the irony on how a power-hungry Cha died a coward. Jong-pil then ends on a
Shakespearean note. He reminisced that eighteen years ago he and Park saw a fortuneteller who, as Jong-pil speculates, foreshadowed the event. “The fortune-teller told me
and Park that his revolution would succeed and that his government would last about
twenty years.”23 Park left the séance happy; however, the mystic signaled Jong-pil to stay
behind and said “I couldn’t say this to Park directly, but I saw that his end will not be
good. It will come about in an ugly way.”24 Jong-pil held that prediction close to his heart
for eighteen years. In retrospect, Jong-pil knew from the start about Park’s “ugly”
demise.

The Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part III: Loss of Prestige
Domestic dissent and inner circle conflicts are the two most prominent
contributors for Park’s death. However, one outside factor suggests an unorthodox, albeit
very plausible, reason as to why Park’s last days were so volatile. Hong Sung-Gul posits
an international relations debacle – one that is usually associated with the Pyongyang
regime – that doomed the last days of Park, the buildup of nuclear arms.25
Park’s interest in nuclear “super weapons” began in 1971. That same year Oh
Won-chul, Park’s head developer of defense and chemical industries, began South
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Korea’s foray into nuclear armament.26 Park constantly encouraged a reluctant Oh to
consider the advantages and necessity of becoming a nuclear state. The background for
Park’s reasons may be summarized from one quote, “We need to free ourselves from
dependency on U.S. military protection. . . . Can we develop nuclear weapons?”27 This
non-rhetorical question was regularly asked and even more so months before the
volatility of Park’s last days.
Park gave orders to Oh to add a nuclear program under the Agency for Defense
Development. In turn, this created the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI),
the organization intended to recruit top engineers.28 Besides shifting away from US
military dependency, Hong explains the other motifs that Park had to gain from going
nuclear. Furthermore, he details the effects that American pressure had on a close Asian
ally; these factors are, therefore, the basis for his thesis.
Hong breaks his thesis into two bullet points. First, the American agenda under
the Nixon Doctrine made Park uneasy. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” contradicted America’s
“full commitment (containment) policy” needed to keep South Korea safe in a region
dominated by two communist superpowers – China and the Soviet Union.29 Second, Park
knew his fortunes were coming to an end since the Vietnam War was dwindling. Fearing
that the US would renege – as in pulling out troops from the peninsula – on their
assurance to protect South Korea, Park aggressively and clandestinely pursued nuclear
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technology. He even went as far as to hire Park Dong-sun, a wealthy Korean lobbyist, to
bribe members of the US Congress to support his nuclear campaign.30
Park’s nuclear ambition came to a swift close after a series of missteps. Park and
Oh severely underestimated American international intelligence. Most prominently,
several French and Belgium nuclear scientists employed under Oh were on American
espionage payrolls, thereby Park’s program had double agents in it from the start.31 This
not only soured relations with America and other Asian-Pacific allies, but this did more
harm to Park’s image during his final days.
Hong posits that the American public’s lack of sympathy and news coverage after
Park’s death may have been partly due to this. Hong assesses that Park’s covert attempts
to acquire something as profound as weapons of mass destruction made him look foolish,
dangerous, and unpredictable in the international community.32 Furthermore, it was
revealed that Park still had ambitions of restarting the nuclear program a couple months
before his death.33
The article ends implying that after these revelations, Park’s death may have been
a relief for American officials. It comes to no surprise that immediately after Chun Dohwan’s coup in 1980, President Chun eagerly exposed Park’s dormant nuclear
ambitions.34 This was done as a ploy to garner US approval due to the fear of getting
forced out office by American officials. As such, Chun immediately dismantled the
nuclear program, thereby resetting relations back to a good tone.
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Immediate Aftermath on Nationalism
Fuji Kamiya’s article was written a couple months after Park’s 1979 death at the
time of power consolidation enacted by General Chun Doo-hwan (1980).35 Fuji
highlights the immediate effects that occurred after the assassination. She also
hypothesizes what the future holds for South Korea and its relationship, both politically
and economically, within the East Asian region.
Fuji stresses that Park’s two greatest achievements were “economic success” and
South Korean regional “legitimacy.”36 Park’s economic campaigns have been covered
extensively, however, her take on Park’s “national legitimacy” is an overlooked topic.
The context behind this date to Rhee Syngman’s tenure (1948-1960). Fuji posits that
Rhee’s vision, and therefore nationalism, was “anti-communism” and “anti-Japanese.”37
Rhee’s lack of developmental planning was, therefore, the primary variable to the ROK’s
pathetic and illegitimate global status. International consensus considered North Korea
(DPRK) as the “legitimate spokesman for Korean nationalism.”38 Hence, the DPRK was
the de facto successor to be head of the peninsula after the 1953 Korean Armistice
Agreement.
The DPRK championed unification and “self-reliance” within the economy,
military, and polity. The DPRK’s “self-reliance” stance was later dubbed juche. 39 As
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such, the ROK was automatically on the “defensive.”40 This was evident as economy,
infrastructure, and international relations were significantly better than the Rhee Era
ROK. For example, the DPRK always led UN negotiations and unification plans.41 On
the opposite side, Rhee snubbed most attempts for discussions as he was only concerned
with receiving American-backed UN aid. But just as quick as Rhee’s ousting was, Park’s
swift ascension dramatically changed South Korea’s fortunes.
During and after Park’s rule, the South grew increasingly confident on the world
stage. The ROK swiftly overtook the DPRK’s economy while ROK actions in Vietnam
displayed how far their military progressed since their “burdensome” days.42 Perhaps the
most significant outcome was that the tables were finally turned. Park was able to shed
the ROK’s “inferiority complex.” South Korea now led negotiations as they dictated the
terms of unification. More importantly, the ROK was considered the sole successor of the
peninsula.43
On the Northern end, the DPRK suffered massive economic decline while
tremendous foreign debts were never paid back.44 This era also began the North’s descent
into international isolation.45 Oppositely, in the South, decisive autocratic leadership
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mixed with free-market mechanics displayed to the world a new type of Korean
nationalism. Fuji, however, does not mention the name of this “new nationalism” nor
does she explain it. Nevertheless, in summary, Fuji’s analysis infers that juche
nationalism was a catastrophic failure. The ROK was now “legit” as all things Koreanrelated relayed back to the vibrant southern-tipped nation.

Immediate Aftermath on Politics: Kim Dae-Jung’s Interview, Part I
Soon after General Chun’s military consolidation, Kim Dae-Jung (1924-2009)
moved to the US to get away from Chun’s life-threatening regime. While on the
international stage, Kim promoted the strengthening of direct democratic institutions. In
an interview conducted by World Policy Journal, Kim outlined his plans for a more
politically-open Korea.46
The first part gives context behind the 1980 Gwangju Massacre. This event fueled
Kim and fellow opposition leaders to bring their plight to the world stage. The interview
is mostly a response for US action in promoting “social democracy” in the Third World.47
However, Kim also critiques the role that the Reagan and Carter administrations played
while simultaneously castigating Chun’s repressive policies.48
Richard Falk, the interviewer, first acknowledges how Reagan took credit for
Kim’s extradition to the US and then asks Kim’s opinion why he was released. Kim
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reasons that it was politically convenient to “separate me physically from the Korean
people,” so that Chun, supported by American diplomats, could “soothe” the agitated
Korean public. Moreover, Chun wanted to repair his damaged image abroad in order to
“secure [more] loans” from Japan.49
Kim critiques America’s back-and-forth role upon his release. He acknowledges
that Carter’s actions led to his release from prison, but only after Carter’s initially passive
stance was criticized by other democratic nations. Kim claims that the Carter and UN
administrations knew about the sociopolitical unrest and aggressive militarization during
a post-Park Korea. Evidently, the two administrations stood silent as Chun carried out
two coups in 1980.
Chun, additionally, went as far as to usurp US-backed military commands by
ordering DMZ stationed ROK troops to combine with Jeolla Province divisions – a
southern province where Gwangju is located – in order to clampdown on protestors. For a
visual reference of troop movements please refer to Map 3.1. Kim suggests that this was
a pivotal point for the American-Korean relations, as the public became “disappointed by
America” for not intervening on the crackdown. Consequently, a vocal minority, mostly
the youth, started an “Anti-American” campaign that culminated in 1987 during the
Reagan Administration.50
The next part of the interview notes that the Chun regime held Kim responsible
for “instigating” the Gwangju Massacre.51 In response, Kim counterclaimed that Chun
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often falsely accused many groups that do not fall in line with his agendas, including
Christians and Buddhists.52 It comes to no surprise that Kim was accused of “inciting
violence” and sentenced to death by Chun.53
Finally, Kim ended this portion on a constructive note. He posits that overall the
event had positive ramifications. Chun’s over-the-top and violent antagonism displayed
that his regime was threatened by the democratic populist movement. Chun’s democratic
antagonism only garnered Kim more international admiration, and because of this
popularity, saved him from instant execution. Moreover, Kim reiterated that Gwangju’s
greatest achievement was that it gave the alienated and violently oppressed a global
voice.54
Map 3.1. The infantry divisions and routes
used to quell Gwangju protestors. Please
note that the 20th Infantry Division – under
the command of US General John A.
Wickham – was the unit diverted away
stationed DMZ orders. See John A
Wickham, “Chapter Seven: The Kwangju
Tragedy,” 139. Source: Google Maps;
lines and positioning made by author.
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Immediate Aftermath on Politics: Kim Dae-Jung’s Interview, Part II
During the other half of the interview Falk asks Kim about his thoughts on Park’s
regime, his death, and how Park compares to Chun. First, Kim recollects the general
attitude that the public felt for Park. Even though Kim and Park were long-time
adversaries, Kim does acknowledge, albeit rather faintly, that “Park was responsible to
some extent for Korean economic development.”55 However, Park was able to do so
through the “exploitation of the people,” as seen through “inequitable distribution of
wealth and income.” This was evident as Park’s policies incurred high inflation that
plagued the early 1980s economy.56
Falk then asks Kim to compare Park’s public approval with Chun’s. Kim
acknowledges that although mass dissent plagued the end of Park’s life the public still
saw him as “legit.” The primary reason was that before the May 1961 coup South Korea
was essentially a failed state. State failure was apocalyptic in proportion as law, order,
and basic necessities were, for the most part, absent. When Park took charge, there was
little to no opposition from the public. Kim reasons that Koreans “were sick and tired of
disorder.”57
In comparison, Kim suggests that Chun was “illegitimate” in the eyes of the
public. Even though Park initially forced his ascendance to the presidency, Park did win
three elections, albeit with allegations of tampering.58 Nonetheless, even with
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questionable elections, Park gave Koreans a little taste of democracy. The flirtation with
direct elections only whetted the public’s political appetite and was evident as opposition
constantly protested Park’s iron-gripped Yushin rule.59
Nonetheless, a large proportion of the public “legitimized” Park as he brought
order, economic growth, military strength, and cultural pride back to the South. On the
other end, Chun brought none of those accomplishments to the table. Kim suggests that
Chun never won any election and that he was riding off Park’s legacy. Ironically, Chun
also inherited Park’s inflation problem, and that in turn, was one variable that
overwhelmed his tenure.60
Additionally, Kim hypothesizes the primary variable that caused the public’s
disdain for Chun was right after Park’s assassination. Choi Kyu-hah immediately became
acting president right after the Park’s death.61 According to Kim, Choi proposed the idea
of enacting open elections to help quell urban uprisings. Unfortunately, this was not
meant to be as Chun took control through military force – mirroring Park’s 1961 takeover
– and thwarted all notions of free elections. This variable, according to Kim, trumped all
the dramas that occurred to him and other opposition leaders.
Finally, Kim concludes the interview by summing up the two strongmen’s
legacies. Park’s clash with the opposition was systematic as he methodically silenced
prominent dissidents; simultaneously, Park raised the country’s standard of living and
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installed law and order. On the other end, Chun was blunter, ineffective, and more
personal when it came to dissent. He took away the one thing that affected all
socioeconomic classes, an individual voice. When compared to Park, Chun only offered
nothing but inflation and disorder.62

Origins of Minjung, Part I: The Colonial Era
The ideas for minjung originated during Korea’s colonial age. Minjung is a
Korean word that means “mass of the people,” and therefore, is a term that has been
reinterpreted many times by scholars and politicians. Likewise, many movements
sprouted because of it, thereby adding more complexity and confusion when defining the
term.63 A History of Korea, however, proposes a brief definition of the movement,
“Minjung represents a majority of people who are presumably exploited by the
numerically smaller ruling elite, particularly, the urban proletariat.”64 Basically, a mantra
of the disenfranchised versus the well-off.
On the other hand, the monograph South Korea’s Minjung Movement provides
countless essays that explain other distinct characteristics. Kang Man’gil proposes an
unorthodox definition that encompasses historical progression.65 Kang proposes that
minjung means a national movement stretched out into a three-period timeline. “[First], to
maintain sovereignty in the face of the aggression of capitalistic powers; [second], to gain
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liberation from colonial rule; and [third], to overcome division and reunify the nation.”66
Essentially, this is a Marxist take on minjung.
Kang’s supports his thesis in chronological order. The first period began during
Japanese occupation. He posits that the first mention of minjung was in 1919 when a
national independence movement, dubbed “The Declaration of the Korean Revolution”
(Choson hyungmyung sununso), erupted. The declaration was officially written in 1923
by nationalist Sin Chaeho. Sin wrote the declaration as a response to the actions
committed by the extremist liberation group The Righteous Brotherhood (Ui ryol dan).
The Brotherhood, although violent in their means, were “revolutionary” according to
Sin.67
Sin noted that the Brotherhood’s goal was “To preserve the existence of the
Korean people, the Japanese robbers must be expelled; the only way to expel the
Japanese is through revolution.”68 Whether the revolution was violent or peaceful was
never expanded on; nonetheless, Sin dubbed these axioms into larger themes called the
“Minjung Revolution” and the “Direct Revolution.”69
Kang emphasizes the effects that Sin had on the minjung movement. While not
literally stated, it is implied that Sin was the grandfather of the movement because he
incorporated many populist trends – such as national identity tied to ethnicity and land –
with colonial independence. In Sin’s own words, “minjung are those who can neither live
nor die according to their own will since they are . . . restricted in their liberty of
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action.”70 Therefore, it is possible to see Marxist class struggles mixed with Sin’s
teachings and early Korean democracy.
While Sin’s definition draws comparisons to other independence movements from
other Imperial-ruled Asian countries, he distinguishes this movement to pertain only to
ethnic Koreans on peninsula soil.71 Sin wrote that minjung participants are those “who
continuously progress in order to fulfill their goal with the intention of not living . . . if
they cannot expel the Japanese from [Korean land].”72 Mirroring the violence of The
Righteous Brotherhood, Sin’s minjung meant a fight to the death in order to expel
Japanese elements from Korea.
To sum it up, the origins of minjung are heavily tied to Sin Chaeho’s work and is
even implied that he was the founder of the movement. The initial intent was to deny
Japanese, and foreigner, rule on the Korean people, land, and culture. Therefore, minjung
was an ethnic ideology that bordered on extremities, and therefore, corroborates with
Professor Andre Schmid’s analysis on Sin’s ethnonationalism. Meaning, minjung went as
far as to advocate a struggle to the death if Imperial Japan continued their rule on the
peninsula.73
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Origins of Minjung, Part II: Post-World War II and National Division
During the colonial age, minjung was an umbrella tenet focused on anyone who
opposed Japanese rule. The people included in the movement were “intellectuals,
workers, and petite bourgeoisies.”74 Principally, the socioeconomic and political status of
Koreans were secondary. The movement, therefore, squarely focused on Sin-inspired
nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments.
The division of Korea in 1945 inadvertently split the minjung ideology.
Originally, the movement meant liberation from Imperial overlords, but, after the
division, minjung changed to incorporate a wide array of meanings many of which
contradicted one another.75 Consequently, North and South Korea had their own distinct
connotations. Moreover, the Japanese invasion of China (early 1930s to 1946) also
coincided with minjung. Due to the proximity and similar anti-Imperial themes, Chinese
nationalist movements – both Kuomintang (KMT) and Communists (CPC) – influenced
it.76 As such, North Korea centered minjung around “workers and farmers,” similar to the
CPC.77 While in the South, it focused on “minor landowners and national capitalists,”
similar to the KMT.78
Sin voiced his observations by comparing that the national movement was
emphasizing “European-style bourgeoisie.” This meant that European-parliamentary
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representation mixed with a modern industrialized market was an element of minjung.79
On the other end of the political spectrum, the rise of bourgeois rule affected Korean
laborers and communists. The concerns for the new communists were the unchecked
powers that Japanese colonists and wealthy elites had.80 Due to rising industrialization,
powerful capitalist magnates – both Japanese and Korean in origins – exploited most
laborers. Simply put, minjung, alongside its “European-style bourgeoisie” tenets, had
both capitalist and Marxist aspects.
Even though minjung had right and left political components, the core of the
movement focused on a people’s revolution against colonial struggle. More specifically,
it meant that the Korean people, no matter political and socioeconomic affiliation, must
fight to maintain their heritage, land, and culture against “foreigner thieves.”81

The Challenge in Defining Minjung, Part I
Since the days of its colonial conception, minjung incorporated many supporters
from a diverse socioeconomic spectrum but took a dramatic shift in meaning during the
turbulent Chun-ruled 1980s. Kim Hyung-A elaborates more on Kang Man’gil’s minjung
analysis. Both authors agree that it is essentially a form of struggle for the oppressed;
however, Kim notes the difficulty that researchers have in conceptualizing minjung.82 In
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other words, the challenge of defining minjung can be summed up by identifying what
the key concepts of minjung are and examining who the people that make it were.
Kim’s essay ascribes two South Korean intellects, economist Park Hyon-chae and
sociologist Han Wansang, as the leading experts on minjung analysis. The first part is
dedicated to Hyon-chae’s theories. Hyon-chae’s thesis centers on the keyword,
“proletarianization.” This term is defined as “an increase in the number of people who
lack control over the means of production and survive by selling their labor power.”83 His
analysis, therefore, takes on Marxist themes, and as such, is rooted in the 1970s when
Park Chung Hee heavily industrialized the nation. In turn, Hyon-chae attributes South
Korea’ dramatic s post-1960s development as a shift into modern capitalism, and, hence,
the beginnings of “proletarianization.”84
Before Hyon-chae contextualizes “proletarianization,” or contemporary minjung,
as the three main players to the movement: farmers, laborers, and the urban poor.85 Due
to the desperation of finding new economic opportunities in a new capitalist society,
Hyon-chae’s thesis is essentially a reinterpretation of Korea’s socioeconomic ladder. The
ladder begins with farmers, then devolves into laborers, and then into the urban poor who
are considered the lowest of the economic classes.
Referring to Han Seung-mi’s Saemaul Undong analysis, Hyon-chae expands on
Han’s work by implementing that the mass urban migration of poor farmers is a primary
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variable.86 While Han denotes that most of these farmers were elderly, Hyon-chae gives
no reference to age.87 However, he designates that most of the migrants only had an
agrarian skillset, and, therefore, could not adjust themselves to an urban work setting.
Accordingly, farmers became poorer and fell down the socioeconomic ladder,
thereby becoming urban laborers. The term “laborers” is also synonymous with lowwaged – both blue and white-collar – menial workers.88 Due to bare-bone labor laws and
the dominant chaebol system, work exploitation was endemic. As a result, laborers
disintegrated into the bottom of the stratum and became a new social class, the “urban
poor.”89
The urban poor takes up most of Hyon-chae’s theory. He expands on this class by
redefining it into three categories. First were urban tradesman, many of whom were
independent laborers scrounging for low-paid work. This is corroborated by economist
Chang Se-jin as he notes that work contracts were outsourced by chaebol companies. 90
Second were industrial and small business workers many of whom were temporary and
worked in hazardous fields such as the steel and chemical industries. Finally, the
unemployed were the lowest of the classes and constituted the largest percentage of the
urban poor. This group also came into prominence during the high-inflationary years of
the Chun regime.91
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Hyon-chae concludes that the consequences of Korea’s rapid industrialization
culminated in the 1980s. In doing so, this decade was characterized as the “era of
proletarianization.” More specifically, the era was when both government and capitalist
enterprises – mostly the chaebol system – severely exploited an already-downtrodden
population. Due to the near-invincibility of the government, chaebol companies, and the
military, most of the oppressed rallied to the only tool powerful enough to enact civil
change, Western supported democracy.92

Minjung as a Form of Popular Culture, Part I: The Origins
Minjung is an ideology that encompasses a wide range of beliefs. While political
and social tenets are commonly discussed, an overlooked area centers around popular
culture themes. Choi Chungmoo uses this as a tool to help define minjung.93
Choi begins by agreeing with other researchers that minjung is a form of antiimperialist nationalism. However, Choi’s stance differ because minjung is further
symbolized as a contemporary “struggle against a capitalistic world order.”94 She
assesses that minjung was an effect of Third World struggles.95 Choi does not mention
Soviet influence, rather, she places the skirmish as a sole byproduct of “[European]
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imperialistic nationalism and capitalism.”96 In other words, South Korea’s newly
industrialized capitalist society, and to an extent East Asian capitalism, is Western in
origin.
Choi backs this claim by referring to Song Konho’s thesis, post-Korean War
nationalism was distorted by “Western bourgeoisies.”97 Song argued that Rhee
Syngman’s regime (1948-1960) warped Korean nationalism to fit a Western image; it
manifested into a “distorted bourgeois nationalism.”98 This meant that Rhee’s goal for
Korean society was to achieve a Western and American-like middle-class status. Simply
put, Choi’s definition of minjung is an antithesis to Rhee’s version because it uses
Marxist scholarly analysis.
Choi ties this as part of the “minjung culture movement” that erupted after the
Korean War.99 This theme gained prominence as Korean society was influenced by
“[Western] market-oriented foreign culture.”100 As a result, the new market-economy
alienated people who did not have the resources to afford American-modeled education
and lifestyles. Consequently, the estranged used media as a referendum against prevalent
Western bourgeois themes; and eventually, the sentiments manifested in the form of
theater.
During the chaotic years of Park Chung Hee’s death and Chun Doo-hwan’s rule
(1979-1988), many forms of media – including staged dramas – were considered dissent
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and were therefore banned. Likewise, protestors, many of whom were young university
students, voiced their oppression through underground theater ensembles. This form of
demonstration caught on with the poor and rich alike as they could relate to strong antiestablishment themes.101 Due to a surge in popularity, many plays dispersed onto other
forms of media outlets, such as poetry, novels, and comics (manhwa).

Minjung as a Form of Popular Culture, Part II: The Malttugi Skits and Ojeok
Choi highlights one area of theater that transcended socioeconomic statuses. The
play Malttugi is part of a theatrical genre that gained prominence in the 1960s. The skits
were aimed at critically representing the sacrosanct, yet ironically corrupt, yangban
upper-class. The art employs the use of shaman-inspired masks and dances to portray
lower-class skirmishes with corrupt-ruling elites.102 The plays are based upon an antihero
slave, also named Malttugi, who ridicules the yangban elites through bawdy puns and
obscenities.103
During an age of heavy censorship, the main theme of Malttugi was ridiculing
the corrupt and privileged through as much bombast and vulgarities as possible.
However, by the 1970s, minjung theatrics took on a whole different meaning. The
changes can be attributed to anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist playwright Kim Chiha
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(born 1941). Kim’s 1970 magnum opus Ojeok (“The Five Bandits”) is a pansori-styled
play largely influenced by Malttugi themes.104
Ojeok is a production that uses an eighteenth-century Joseon backdrop, and on the
surface, Kim’s play looks like a Joseon satire; however, it has little to do with any period
piece. Instead, Ojeok is a contemporary piece that criticizes Korea’s military-backed
chaebol culture. Kim symbolizes the “Five Bandits” as the president (Park Chung Hee
and Chun), the military, chaebol conglomerates, and corrupt politicians. Likewise, all
entities signed a deal with foreigners to industrialize and bring wealth to Korea. This was
done, however, at the cost of the poor, elderly, and agrarian.105 Fundamentally, Ojeok is a
harsh critique of the state’s military backed capitalism. Kim says, “ruling bourgeoisies –
[Park, state authorities, and chaebol] – having exclusive access to wealth [and power]”
signified the era that minjung artists represented.106
Finally, malttugi and pansori performances were considered low culture art
during the Joseon era but artists like Kim Chiha introduced the old form to a new
generation. Instantaneously, Joseon theatrics caught the attention of the youth and, as a
result, became synonymous with culture native to the peninsula. It is therefore common
to see malttugi and pansori performed side-by-side with ancient Korean performances
For context, the history of pansori starts with the translated term, “excess of sounds.” It is a
play on words that involves a variety of sounds clashing together. On the surface it is a musical
storytelling that usually involves one singer and one drummer. The art form has its origins in the
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such as shamanistic (sin’gyo) dances.107 Furthermore, pansori has become such an
integral part of contemporary high culture that it has taken on a simpler and more
operatic theme. It is common to see pansori plays inclusive of only a female opera singer
and a man playing a drum (soribuk). Therefore, the bombast and vulgarities are replaced
with a female performer singing a tale for the audience.108
In summary, the mask-dance drama became an icon of the people’s resistance and
a new part of the minjung identity. This began in the 1960s when Malttugi plays critiqued
upper-class elites; however, during the 1970s, Korean theater took on a whole new level
of depth with Kim Chiha’s Ojeok play. Kim’s piece was one factor that helped change the
minjung ideology into one that critiqued the state while simultaneously alluding to antiimperialist (anti-foreigner) themes. Inadvertently, it also created a contemporary form of
high culture for a newer generation.

Figure 3.1. Picture 1 and 2 are from the annual Mask Dance Festival in Andong, South Korea. Taken from the Korean
Ministry of Culture and Tourism Department. Picture 3 is a mix of malttugi and sin’gyo (shaman) dances. Please note
the person to the left is performing a malttugi dance similar to Picture 2. The person on the right is performing a
shamanistic ritual. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 3.2. Picture 4 is a Joseon painting of pansori performers presenting in front of a chungin (middle class)
audience. Picture 5 is a modern pansori play. Pansori usually consisted of only two performers, a singer (sorikkun)
and a drummer (gosu). Note the differences in physical makeup. Joseon era performances stayed mostly true to the
original form of two commoners – usually men – screaming and singing obscenities in front of an all-male audience.
Contemporary performances have become more theatric in appearance and presentation. Modern pansori plays
usually consist of a male drummer and female singer. As such, pansori has become more operatic in style – a female
lead singing and acting a story – compared to their Joseon counterparts. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The Religious and Spiritual Tenets of 1980s Minjung
Minjung is more than a political ideology as it is also a principle that encompasses
religious and spiritual teachings. Two major religious orders, Buddhism and Christianity,
while immensely different from each other, all fall within minjung’s umbrella. Scholars
Mun Chanju and Donald N. Clark highlight the contributions – in respective order – that
Buddhism and Christianity had upon the movement.109
Mun Chanju gives a brief history on concurrent Buddhist movements that
happened during the 1980s minjung demonstrations.110 Likewise, Mun aptly names the
movement “Minjung Buddhism” and sets its origins during the colonial era. He credits
the Jogye Buddhist-monk Han Youngun (1879-1944) as the grandfather of the
movement.111 Han tied independence with Buddhist teachings and taught that “Buddhism
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should no longer serve the oppressors but rather the oppressed.”112 Han’s teachings
alluded to the many Japanese soldiers who claimed they were Buddhists but were also
incongruously staunch supporters of violent imperialism.113
Mun concludes that the violent imperial mindset carried over into contemporary
times. Specifically, the aggressive state-sponsored crackdowns fueled Minjung Buddhists
to be part of the urban dissent. This played a variable in Kim Jae-kyu’s decision to
assassinate Park in 1979 – towards the end of Park’s tenure Kim became a staunch
opponent against reckless suppression – while also contributing to the mass protests that
toppled Chun’s presidency.114
Donald N. Clark’s analysis is like Mun’s essay as both deal with minjung’s
religious themes. Instead of Buddhism, however, Clark focuses on the Christian aspects
of the ideology, thereby also aptly naming the movement “Minjung Christianity.” The
movement occurred during the 1960s Yushin era. The main players were the Vaticansupported Korean Catholic Association and the Protestant – comprised mostly of
Presbyterians and Methodists – National Christian Council. While both sects have far-
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ranging theological differences, Clark contends that they came together as a response to
Park’s and Chun’s elimination of suspected communists.115
One reason that both regimes scapegoated religious followers was due to the
political events of the 1960s and 1970s. This was an era when Marxist independence
movements commonly occurred in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Due to
Christian groups’ strong emphasis on social welfare, Clark postulates that Park and Chun
associated Christians, and to an extent Buddhists, with supporting global socialist
movements.116
A second intriguing, albeit very unorthodox, reason was that a diverse range of
Christians sought to join minjung protestors because of Biblical history. Many Christian’s
denoted minjung with the words suffer and struggle. Minjung Christians, therefore,
likened their liberation efforts against Imperial Japan and the Park-Chun regimes to that
of “Israelite minjung” people.117 Otherwise put, many Korean Christians equated Imperial
Japan and South Korea’s authoritarian era as the Biblical Egypt.
Clark analogizes this through Hebrew history: “the liberation of the Israelites
(oppressed Koreans) from captivity in Egypt (Korea during the colonial age and during
the Park-Chun era), their suffering during forty years of wandering in the desert (decades
of political oppression and protesting), and their deliverance into the Promised Land (the
future of living in an independent, democratic, and united Korea)” was all part of God’s
plan. To put it in another way, “God permitted the Hebrews (Koreans) to be oppressed,
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but when they finally took action (grueling life and death protesting), He delivered them
to salvation (independence, democracy, and national unification).”118 Indeed, Minjung
Christians had a cause to fight for similar to that of Moses.
Clark concludes that the actions of Korean Christian played a tantamount role in
getting the protestors’ voices heard within the global Christian community. The needed
attention and sympathy from Christian-majority nations – they were also conveniently
pro-democratic – helped popularize minjung. Granted this was during a time when Cold
War politics dominated world news. Finally, Clark notes that Minjung Christians lived to
realize that two of their three goals were achieved: South Korean independence from
authoritarianism and the establishment of a modern republican system; however, national
unification is still yet to be seen.119
***
Even with Park Chung Hee’s death in 1979, the former strongman’s vision lived
on. South Koreans, however, saw this an opportunity – through Choi Kyu-hah’s
capitulation and promise of democratic elections – to resurrect republican representation.
In hindsight, this was not meant to be. General Chun Doo-hwan enacted an instantaneous
and unforeseen coup, similar to Park’s. Obsessed with Park’s bushido society, the newlytitled President Chun continued Park-policies backed by deadly violence and armed
force. Thereby, the new dictator strengthened Park’s chaebol and Neo-Confucian
institutions. The next chapter, therefore, seeks to analyze the background that Chun’s
autocracy produced and the socioeconomic consequences that led to the prominence of
the minjung movement.
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Chapter IV:
Analysis – Nationalism After Park’s Death (1980-1988)
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Saemaul undong, the export-chaebol economies, Yushin, and bushido-based NeoConfucianism were heavily entrenched in 1970s South Korea. Poverty was rapidly
alleviated due in part to these heavy-handed policies.1 Chairman Park did the
unconceivable and turned his “bankrupt firm” into a prosperous corporation.2 But just as
suddenly as Park ascended in 1961, his reign abruptly ended when he was assassinated on
October 26, 1979. The shooter was his best friend and KCIA director Kim Jae-kyu.3
While scholars debate the motives surrounding Kim’s unexpected slaying, it is possible
to ascertain that domestic dissent during the late 1970s and inner circle conflicts were the
two most prominent factors leading up to the killing.
Inner circle quarrels within regimes are nothing new, the events surrounding the
assassination, however, beg an analysis. Kim Jong-pil (born 1926), and one of the
founding members of the KCIA, was a firsthand witness and recalled Jae-kyu saying:
If we’re too harsh in suppressing the demonstrators in Busan and
Masan [calling for democracy], there will be a huge backlash from the
people down there. But the ruling Republican Party isn’t giving
President Park the right advice because it fears Cha Ji-cheol (Park’s
chief bodyguard). I am going to get rid of him today.4
The demonstrations in Busan and Masan, two major port cities in the southern regions,
were just the beginning of what would become frequent, almost daily, protests and
marked the 1980s as an era of extreme societal changes. This chapter accordingly seeks
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to explain the most prominent transformations of the post-Park 1980s, specifically, the
causes behind them, how his successors handled such alterations, and which agendas
from Park’s era changed.

Major Players: Chun Doo-hwan and Kim Dae-jung
Koreans lived a decade under the anti-democratic Yushin government, and Park’s
death immediately created turmoil for politicians and citizens alike. Prime Minister Choi
Kyu-ha (1919-2006) became acting president, but in October 1979, was later elected and
served until August 1980.5 On the civilian side, Choi set plans to allow future presidential
elections as a response to urban and student protests.
In a 1983 interview, longtime opposition leader Kim Dae-jung (1924-2009) noted
the significance of these elections, “After Park’s assassination in 1979, the Korean people
entertained the dream of democratizing the nation.”6 Granted, under Park the public did
flirt with three direct democratic presidential elections – the 1963, 1967, and 1971
presidential elections – albeit with allegations of vote tampering.7 Nonetheless, according
to Kim, these initial flirtations “legitimized” Park’s government, at least until the 1972
Yushin decree.8
On the other end, however, politicians, military, and business elites, many of
whom prospered under the Yushin government, felt threatened by direct elections. Due to
this, Choi’s presidency was short lived and was spent trying to quell vacuums among

Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 477.
Dae-jung Kim, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, “On Korea,” World Policy Journal 1, no. 1
(Fall 1983): 220.
7
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 470.
8
Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, Falk, “On Korea,” 222.
5
6

136
government and business elites. The pivotal figure among them though was Major
General Chun Doo-hwan (born 1931; presidency 1980-1988).9
General Chun knew the vulnerabilities that Park left behind, and, like any
scheming tactician, he took advantage of those weaknesses. On December 12, 1979,
Chun – taking a cue from Park’s 1961 coup – consolidated his power among military,
business, and political power brokers. Chun enacted a coup and took over the
government, dissolving the presidency and National Assembly in the process.10 Taken
from a US Embassy report shortly after, Chun defended his actions as “a reply to the
12/12 incident was an accidental outgrowth of a legitimate effort to carry out his
investigation of the assassination of President Park.”11 Accordingly, this was just the first
step in the lack of American oversight during Chun’s tenure.
Even the most powerful politicians and organizations were caught off guard by
the coup. Major Park Jun-kwang, Chun’s subordinate during the coup, attested that:
In front of the most powerful organizations under the Park Chung-hee
presidency, it surprised me how easily Chun gained control over them
and how skillfully he took advantage of the circumstances. In an instant
he seemed to have grown into a giant.12
The December Coup went off without a hitch and Chun emulated Park-like efficiency
throughout the takeover. Bushido tactics, simply put, worked with Park’s coup and now
with Chun’s.
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Moreover, the international motives from both strongmen were uncanny. In a
1983 interview, Park and Chun’s longtime opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung, suggested
that:
The US government played some role in [creating both]. . . . In neither
of the two coups that helped solidify [Park and Chun’s] rule did the
United States do anything to discourage the lawless actions of [both
men].13
Because Park and Chun got away with such transgressions – without the reprimand from
their closest geopolitical ally, the United States – Chun’s regime was poised to copy
Park’s successes.
In hindsight however, this was where the similarities ended. The most glaring
differences between the two strongmen was the public’s preliminary passive emotional
state. After Park’s coup, a weary and apathetic Korean public did not possess the will to
protest such sociopolitical volatilities. In the same interview, Kim Dae-jung, summed up
that Park’s initial support was due to “[Koreans] just being sick and tired of disorder.”14
Kim’s statement somewhat corresponds with Park’s radio transcripts about first “filling
the people’s belly.”15 This meant that both Kim and Park knew bringing basic societal
necessities – law, order, and food – was tantamount in shaping a leader’s agendas.
General Chun’s regime, nevertheless, did not see any of Park’s initial successes.
Since the beginning of his forceful takeover, Chun’s government was built on shaky
foundations. First, South Korea was on the verge of achieving affluency. The country
was modernizing at a rapid rate, thereby fulfilling the needs for basic necessities;
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whereas, Park heavily capitalized on South Korean poverty. This was evident in the
actions of a booming and educated middle class who now had the luxury of leisure
activities, such as tourism, consumer shopping, and entertainment.16
Secondly, even though Korea was still a militarized state, law and order was
achieved, and petty and financial crimes were rapidly diminishing. The average Korean
could now walk to newly-built supermarkets and shopping malls without the fear of theft
and assault. Furthermore, Koreans could now invest their growing wealth – earned
through chaebol jobs and soldiers’ “Vietnam Income” remittances – without the worry of
confiscation. In fact, state officials encouraged savings and investments through chaebolowned banks.17
American expatriate worker and Seoul investment banker Scott E. Kalb testified
to the changes that the average Korean was undergoing in the late 1980s:
It's no accident that everyone came out into the streets just as Korea
had its biggest economic boom in five years. The more the standard of
living improves, the more sophisticated the populace becomes, the
more they demand a political system that matches their economic
status. This was not a revolution so much as a realization of their
status.18
Whether Park knew this “realization” and whether he accounted for it is speculation;
however, Chun willfully and forcefully ignored the idea that affluency needs a more
“advanced political system.” Indeed, the Korean public outgrew the need for strongmen –
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inclusive of their nationalist vehicles – to guide them. In short, South Korean society,
according to Kim Dae-jung, was now self-sufficient economically and psychologically.19
Chun’s ignorance was none more evident than in the consequences of the BusanMasan (“Bu-Ma” for short) Democratic Protests (October 16-20, 1979). This occurred
during the last month of Park’s life, so the late dictator never lived to see the
consequences; that experience, however, was fully felt by Chun’s regimes.20 Bu-Ma was
simply the precursor to intense daily protesting. These actions were some of the catalysts
that warned Chun of his demise; a response to three-decades worth of autocratic
governance; and more importantly, the spark that shot minjung to prominence.

Minjung, Part I: Origins
Minjok was defined by Sin Chaeho as “the people.” Park took these tenets and
effectively shaped them to build South Korea in his image. Minjok is essentially an allencompassing principle created specifically for the Korean people; therefore, all Koreans
are entitled to use it no matter their socioeconomic and political status.21 During the last
days of the Park era and throughout Chun’s reign, Koreans took Sin’s minjok and created
a new movement that served the public’s interests. The name of the movement is minjung
(pronounced meen-joong) and is synonymous with the word democracy.22
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It is possible to see the similarities with Park’s minjok agendas and how that
inadvertently influenced minjung movements. Nadia Y. Kim posits that Park’s minjok
used the idea of a homogenized and hardworking ancestry to instill a common goal
among a low-morale constituency.23 Kim Jinwung‘s definition by comparison is a
movement for the “common people, as opposed to a ruling elite . . . minjung represents a
majority of people who are presumably exploited by the numerically smaller ruling
elite.”24 Kang Man’gil proposes a more unorthodox meaning to the 1980s movement.
Kang posits that minjung began well before the 1980s, that it was developed in three
periods, and had its origins in the short-lived Korean Empire era. Kang defined it as:
[First], to maintain sovereignty in the face of the aggression of
capitalistic powers; [second], to gain liberation from colonial rule; and
[third], to overcome division and reunify the nation.25
When all definitions are combined then it is reasonable to look at minjung and minjok as
one entity; it is a yin to a yang meant to restore sovereignty from “foreign powers” and
give that power back to the “low-morale” public.
Park, however, altered Sin’s minjok ideologies so that he could restore his version
of sovereignty back to the Korean people. For example, during the late 1970s, Park was
slowly alienating himself from American allies due to Yushin-influenced crackdowns and
ambitions for nuclear armament.26 Furthermore, President Carter’s soft-power approach
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also meant withdrawing most US troops and aid to an already industrialized and
modernized South Korea – at least in the standards of Third World development. In
comparison, protestors during the Chun era sought their own sovereignty from what they
perceived as foreign interference, particularly from American Cold War politics. This, of
course, did not sit well with the new dictator.27
Chun was no stranger to appeasing Western allies. His regime sought to better
relations with the US by pandering to the demands of the Reagan Administration.
According to Kim Jinwung, the 1980s were a “return to the honeymoon period” for
American-Korean relations.28 Likewise, Chun showed adept statesmanship, and as a
result, Reagan officials overlooked Korean sociopolitical issues.29
While lauded by the Reagan administration and Cold War analysts, Chun's
appeasement strategy was not received well in the peninsula.30 As taken from Chun’s
1981 visit to the White House:
I am happy to say that President Reagan gave me firm assurances that
the United States has no intention of withdrawing the American forces
in Korea. I am pleased that the present level of United States military
presence in Korea will be maintained.31
Along with Chun’s willingness to dismantle Park’s nuclear programs, this pro-military
position cooled tensions with the ROK’s Pacific allies. The Korean public, however, was
already exhausted from an overmilitarized state. The fact that a foreign military power
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supported this, even though it promised to reduce troops, was cause for concern.32 It is
therefore possible to deduce that the new “foreign elements” minjung was concerned
about – in this case American armed forces – showed similarities to Park’s anti-foreigner
campaigns. However, instead of expelling those elements, like how Park enacted
Sinophobic campaigns, Chun’s Korea embraced and entrenched themselves in it.
Framed differently, after the use of military force in the Bu-Ma Protests, Koreans
were rightfully weary of the deadly precedent set by Park. In retrospect, Chun’s regime
was not scared to regularly employ these same tactics. Simply put, American military
support and foreign aid antagonized minjung protestors because it amplified and
encouraged the atrocities committed by Chun.33
Ultimately, the initial phase of minjung can be defined in one sentence: It was a
counter-ideology to decades worth of Park-led bushido and Neo-Confucian governance
and, more importantly, to Chun’s abuse of foreign powers. The reason why it took off
during the 1970s and 1980s was, as Kim Dae-jung puts it, Chun was not as “calculated
and systemic” as Park.34 Chun was reckless with Park-styled bushido power and his
frequent brutality showed it. No one – least of all the US – was there to stop him. He was
a powerful schoolyard bully with no authorities to admonish him.

Minjung, Part II: The Gwangju Massacre and Beyond
Bu-Ma was still fresh in the minds of Koreans, and concurrently, minjung was in
the midst of an identity crisis. Out of necessity, minjung had to look back to the same
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minjok creeds that Park once used for his benefit, but this time it was to serve the public.
Protestors were now espousing minjung tenets in support of democratic elections.
Importantly, these protestors initially came from a diverse constituency derived from
university students, urban blue-collar laborers, Buddhists, and Christians. They were later
joined by the elderly, women, and white-collar workers.35 Therefore, it is important to
examine the first major consequence from Chun’s clash with minjung diversity.
As with most demonstrations, violence and volatility is a real possibility; minjung
was no exception. The Gwangju Massacre (also known as the Gwangju Uprising and
Democratization Movement) began on May 18, 1980 and lasted about nine to ten days.
University students from around the nation gathered to protest Chun’s December 1979
coup. As such, once Chun consolidated his power, he enacted martial law. Just as quickly
as protesters gathered around city halls and university campuses, so did armed
government forces. This was none more evident than in Chonnam University in Gwangju
City.
What began with local authorities trying to disperse campus protestors, escalated
when authorities started arresting and beating student dissenters. Everything culminated
when ROK soldiers clubbed a deaf bystander, Kim Gyeon-cheol, to death. News of the
death quickly spread around the country and mass protest tens of thousands of
participants erupted as a result. Similarly, Chun ordered more ROK forces to deal with
the matter. In the end, an estimated – there are no official records as Chun destroyed
them all – 3,000 casualties befell the small city with at least 150 to 500 students and 40
government authorities dead.36
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Minjung started in the most tragic way possible. Blood was shed; de facto
minjung leader Kim Dae-jung was imprisoned and charged for inciting the crime;
protestors were immediately incarcerated, tortured, and executed; and Chun’s regime
continued the deadly antagonism for eight more years. Compared to Park’s minjokbushido ethics – known to onlookers as the foundations for South Korea’s prosperity –
minjung’s democratic nationalism looked like a failed experiment.37 Bluntly put, minjung
looked like a pathetic counterpart for Park’s Social Darwinist society.
For the Korean public, however, this was far from a weakness. The ferocity and
brutality of Chun’s repressive tactics verified one thing, if minjung was weak and a
failure then the almighty Chun and his upper echelons should not be bothered by it. Kim
Dae-jung reiterated this as his role as minjung leader. Kim’s main goal was to voice the
will of the people, and therefore:
The regime is afraid of any remark I may make . . . the fact that the
Korean media are prohibited from reporting my name, is clear evidence
that the government knows the great majority no longer believe its
fabrication.38
So, in the physical sense, minjung failed miserably; there was no way to match the
authoritative powers of the armed forces. Nevertheless, this new type of nationalism was
winning over the hearts and minds of the people, and more importantly, it was winning a
war for Korea’s spirit and culture.
Minjung Spirituality
While Kim was detained, Chun – just like Park – ordered an execution. However,
Gwangju’s tragedy propelled Kim and the dissenting public into international
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prominence, and as a result, Chun instead put Kim under indefinite house arrest.
Interestingly, one overlooked factor for sentence leniency was Kim’s religion.
During the 1980s, Christianity was gaining a foothold and it so happened that Kim
was a Roman Catholic – as with thousands of other dissenters – protesting alongside
Korean Protestants.39 Kim tied minjung to the new spiritual movements taking over the
peninsula, in spite of Chun’s efforts to repress them:
Christianity, as an influential spiritual force, has taken root in Korea and
has strengthened the democratic movement. Of particular value are the
Christian beliefs that all people, men and women, have rights and that the
dignity of all, regardless of wealth or educational status, is sacrosanct.40
This verified that Christian and minjung polemics fit together side-by-side. The
“universal sacrosanct” that Kim posited was a stark contrast to the bushido NeoConfucianism promoted by Park and Chun. The disparity of the ideologies was so bipolar
and extreme that it was no coincidence global Christian and Catholic organizations, such
as the World Council of Churches and the Vatican, pressured Western leaders to pay
attention to the plight of the few.41
Minjung Culture
While minjung was making waves in the spiritual community, culturally it was
shifting literature, art, and media away from decades of Park-Chun suppression. This was
no more evident than in pop culture. Choi Chungmoo posits that minjung’s contribution
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to Korean culture – and therefore her definition – was a “struggle against a capitalistic
world order,” one that was created by Park and spearheaded by Chun.42 The sufferers,
accordingly, used pop culture as a form of dissent and to help spread their message far
and wide.
Choi’s thesis is unique because she combines elements from Kang Man’gil thesis
along with Song Konho, both of whom are prominent minjung historians. Choi posits that
Korean nationalism in its rawest form – as in Sin and Choe’s original teachings – is all
about the exploited Korean masses. However, Rhee and Park “twisted and distorted” it to
fit a Western image. In other words, Korean nationalism became a “distorted bourgeois
nationalism” that dictators, from Rhee to Park to Chun, used to effectively manipulate
and exploit their Korean brethren.43 Minjung pop culture was, therefore, a response to
what Korean nationalism had become.
Minjung’s pop culture presence was most tangible in theater form. Minjung artists
and protestors, such as playwright Kim Chiha, cleverly looked back into Joseon past to
make a statement against ruling elites. Granted, Joseon history was demonized as weak
and “parasitic” by Imperial academics and Park.44 Suffice it to say, this art form did not
sit well with Chun’s mighty dictatorship.
Now the tables were turned, minjung artists labeled former Park elites, along with
Chun’s regime, as part of the weak and parasitic yangban class. For example, Kim
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Chiha’s Ojeok (“The Five Bandits”) play used pansori and malttugi theatrics – these were
prominent art styles in the Joseon era – in an effort to criticize Park-Chun’s military state,
the chaebol oligarchy, and corrupt politicians.45 But perhaps the most prominent subject
matter from minjung art was its anti-Japanese themes.
It was a known fact that Park was an admirer of Imperial Japanese institutions and
heavily relied on Japanese aid; in addition, Chun continued a lot of Park’s pro-Nippon
policies. Minjung anti-Japanese themes, therefore, quickly became popular with the
masses. Underground artists took the repressed and pent up rage from decades of past
Imperial atrocities – Park and Chun suppressed these concerns through state-owned
media – and created themes of “Japanophiles” selling out Koreans for wealth.46 In the
end, this created a narrative that implied that there was a Japanese elitist culture
entrenched in the polity and that minjung was the antithesis to this.

Figure 4.1. Left, ROK special forces heading towards Busan during the Bu-Ma Protests. Right, a
memorial from Gwangju Memorial Park reenacting students carrying a protestor to safety during the
Gwangju Uprising. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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late 1890s to the end of World of War II. Examples of these crimes include forced sexual slavery,
indentured servitude, the destruction of Korean cultural relics, assassination of prominent royalty and
political leaders, and unauthorized territorial acquisitions, like Dokdo islands. See Jinwung Kim, A
History of Korea, 330-335.
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***
Before Chun’s reign, various minjung definitions developed that were a result
from the chaos of the 1979 Bu-Ma Protests. At first, minjung was a disorganized
movement devoid of a solid meaning. However, the pandemonium from Chun’s 1980
coup and his deadly actions in Gwangju during the same year tempered minjung. The
new movement showed signs of solidifying the basis of minjung nationalism. More
importantly, this was nationalism catered for a newer affluent and more educated
generation.
In the end, minjung protests coalesced into one major theme: dissent against an
entrenched elite who were likened to neo-yangban exploiting the masses. The only way
for minjung to combat elitism was to use a tool so heavily repressed by elitists:
democracy. Subsequently, Chapter Six details these collisions and how it played into
Chun’s demise. More specifically, it examines external variables, such as socioeconomics
and international pressure, that affected minjung. Lastly, the chronology shifts into more
contemporary times (1990s-2016) as it examines the legacy minjung had on Park’s
legacy and what nationalism means in the 2000s and beyond.
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Park’s sudden death in 1979 signified one thing, the 1980s was up for grabs for
anyone willing to flex their bushido strength, and from that power vacuum arose General
Chun Doo-hwan. As such, the new strongman showed no signs of changing the status
quo Park meticulously built. However, in the early 1980s and born through the ashes of
Chun’s chaos, a new type of Korean nationalism – dubbed minjung – arose. This
ideology was a sharp antithesis to Chun’s regime and Park’s bushido-chaebol society;
and, while originally weak, minjung would take about a decade to gain the needed power
to topple bushido nationalism once and for all.

The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part I: Inspiration and Timing
Many scholars agree that the 1980 Gwangju Massacre (The Gwangju Uprising)
was the catalyst that began President Chun’s long descent; however, it would take almost
a decade (1980-1988) before he resigned. This era was known for frequent university and
urban protests, but the 1987 June Uprising (June Struggle) stands out as the final
facilitator that marked the end of Chun’s regime.1 The event was so pivotal that it
resulted in South Korea finally stepping away from decades-long autocracies.2
George Katsiaficas’s monograph details the last days of Chun’s tenure.
Katsiaficas begins by emphasizing the size of the June protests compared to its Gwangju
counterpart. 3 The Gwangju Massacre, although large due to causalities, was

1
George Katsiaficas, Asia's Unknown Uprisings, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th
Century, Volume 1 (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), PDF e-book, 278.
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election in sixteen years.
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decentralized in leadership, and therefore, an accurate estimate of participants is difficult
to assess.4 However, the leadership in the June Uprising was more concrete and data
collection was more effective. The total tally within a three-week span, according to
Historian Kang Man’gil, was close to five million protestors.5
South Koreans are no strangers to mass protests and the population size was only
the tip of the iceberg. What made this protest different though, and more conclusive in
results, was the leadership, organization, and the time of occurrence. The uprising even
crossed international boundaries as it was strongly influenced by Korea’s Southeast
Asian neighbors, the Filipinos. The toppling of the Ferdinand Marcos regime (19651986) was a large inspiration for iconic protest leaders, such as Kim Dae-Jung, that it
aided them in enacting similar revolts.6
Furthermore, the waning Cold War era gave Koreans an opportune moment to
cause an international uproar. 7 Anti-autocratic and pro-democratic proponents came from
both left and right of the political spectrum. These organizations were also spiritually
diverse and included a coalition of secular and religious unions, and, moreover,
participants came from all socioeconomic backgrounds. Due to such diverse
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representation, South Korea’s plight finally caught the attention of America and the
Western World.8

The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part II: The Beginnings
Decades of Western indifference towards Korean politics culminated when Kim
Dae-Jung called out the back-and-forth policies of both the Carter and Reagan
administrations.9 Kim’s wakeup call to South Korea’s allies was in response to numerous
protestor causalities, many of whom were students and religious pacifists from the
Buddhist community. But perhaps what caught the full attention of the Reagan
Administration were the deaths of university students Park Jong-chol and Lee Han-yol.10
The death of Park Jong-chol (1964-1987) caught the attention of many influential
news outlets including the New York Times. Jong-chol was one of many dissenters, since
Park Chung Hee’s tenure, who was imprisoned and tortured to death. However, what
made his death significant was the carelessness in which Chun operated.11 Chun’s violent
and carefree attitude with handling dissent caught up with him when security forces could
not subdue the millions of protestors inquiring about Jong-chol’s fate.
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Jong-chol’s death was also a wakeup call to the public. Protestors finally knew of
the brutal and secretive measures Chun was willing to undergo to silence them. While
this type of cruelty brought millions into the cities to protest, it also brought many
different, often clashing, objectives. This fracture was detrimental in achieving prodemocratic goals, and therefore, after Chun’s brutal suppression, a sense of unity was
crucial for survival.
Evangelical Reverend Oh Choong-il (born 1940) knew of this predicament and
became one of the lead promoters for a unified body. Oh was familiar with the problems
that disunity – as in protesting without a single concrete goal – caused during the
Gwangju Massacre; and in turn, the Reverend was quick to act. In May 27, 1987, Oh and
leading representatives created the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution
(NCDC or Kukbon).12 This was the primary organization that united leaders from all
factions into one common cause.13
Just as swiftly as they were made, Kukbon planned simultaneous national protests,
mostly occurring in major urban areas, on June 10. Kukbon’s primary goal was to end
autocracy and enact immediate, legitimate, and universal suffrage. The organization also
incorporated the “guarantee of the basic rights of workers, farmers, and urban poor” as
well as the “rectification” of the chaebol economy in order to better serve the people.

Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 282.
Katsiaficas notes that the coalition included representatives from “Christians, Buddhists, bluecollar workers, farmers, urban poor, women, youth, artists, writers, professors, lawyers, families of
arrested activist groups, politicians, regional movements, Chaeya (antigovernment activists), and
reunification supporters.” Katsiaficas mentions that many leaders, protestors, and politicians were proAmerican, however, radical anti-American units did make their way into Kukbon. Most of the radicals
were university students and communist advocates; this resulted in many extreme requests, such as
severing ties with the Western World. Consequently, in-organization clashes erupted which caused many
Kukbon leaders to dismiss and drown their pleas. See George Katsiaficas, 283-284 and 301.
12
13

154
This ideology was enough to integrate a majority of the Korean public.14 Unfortunately,
Oh and Kukbon leaders underestimated the volatility that would occur when they left out
the demands of radical university students.

The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part III: The Death of Lee Han-yol
State authorities found out the days wherein Kukbon was set to enact mass
protests plans and quickly moved to stop all participants. In turn, student protestors lost
patience with Kukbon-methods. On June 2, most university campuses took matters into
their own hands, and the results were premeditated police clashes. Most notably, Korea
University student and lead activist Lee In-young was arrested.
This was an initial blow to the youth movements – a coalition Kukbon fought hard
to unite – and resulted in enraging most campuses. Police proceeded to universities with
hopes of quelling protestors by using beatings and tear gas. To the surprise of state
authorities and Kukbon activists alike, hundreds of thousands of students were willing to
risk serious injuries, life imprisonment, torture, and death.15
On June 8, student protests culminated when Yonsei University student Lee Hanyol was struck on the head with a tear-gas cannister; he ended up in a coma and died
shortly thereafter. The efforts at which Chun silenced media and domestic travel were
astounding; nonetheless, news of Lee’s death traveled like wildfire. Not only were urban
Koreans informed, those in towns and even villages knew of the death.16 It was only a
matter of time before international audiences took notice.
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The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part IV: The Final Straw
State officials placed the sole blame on Kukbon. On June 10, and fearing for their
lives, Kukbon leaders congregated at an Anglican church located in the heart of the Seoul
protests. If they were going to die, then their deaths had to be heard by the millions
surrounding them. Soon afterwards, police barricaded and enclosed the leaders in, it
appeared as if Kukbon’s time was up. Miraculously, local travelers spotted the
organization’s dire predicament, and just like Lee’s death, the news spread nonstop. 17
Additionally, on the same day a multitude of protests were to take place, Kukbon,
students, international observers, and state authorities had no idea what was going to
happen.
Open-ended questions arose from everyone involved: Were the protests still
happening? Was this the final straw that held Korea together? Will the army and the
millions of protestors engulf the country in flames? More importantly, were Chun and the
protestors willing to destroy a country Koreans sacrificed so much for? Dubbed “D-Day,”
and with embassies on high alert, Reverend Oh and Kukbon leaders decided that this was
Korea’s only chance for real democratic change. Kukbon rang the church’s bell forty-nine
times signaling to all of Seoul that the plan was on; shortly afterwards, police stormed the
church and arrested all members.18
The immediate effects were earth-shattering. State authorities could not contain
the millions of protestors in Korea’s largest metropolises. White-collar workers, who
were once on the sidelines, joined the protests. This group – garbed in expensive suits –
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fought with as much viciousness as the rest of the crowd. Witnesses even recounted this
group throwing office supplies, along with Molotov cocktails and flaming toilet paper, at
authorities. Thus, spectators took notice of this unorthodoxy and aptly dubbed them the
“the necktie brigade.”19 Finally, everything concluded when Seoul protestors coalesced
around Myeongdong Cathedral. The once peaceful church was now a symbol of
ferociousness.
On June 16, pro-American protestors pleaded to U.S. officials for help but were
immediately snubbed by the Reagan Administration. Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Armitage said “Frankly, we’re really busy,” referring to America’s simultaneous
endeavors in Kuwait and the Iran-Contra Affair blowback.20 Consequently, and with the
attention of the New York Times, burning effigies in the likeness of President Reagan
erupted in Myeongdong.
Alongside the effigies, police finally ran out of riot suppressing gear. Protestors
disarmed depleted authorities, stripped them of their vestments, and released the
humiliated police force back into the public. The goal of the dissent was not to kill fellow
Koreans – no matter the affiliation – but to give Chun an ultimatum that the public is
stronger than any state power.21 In short, anti-Americanism was at an all-time high while
US interventionism was nowhere to be found.
Chun took this as a sign for unabashed executive power and planned to divert
ROK military to aid police. Many things can be said about American inaction, but
military indecisiveness is not one of them; ROK forces were under strict US orders not to
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engage or leave any posts.22 Chun easily disobeyed and mobilized forces on June 18, and
with that, the last straw for American officials. On June 20, Secretary of State George P.
Schultz arrived in Seoul to demand an instant resolution. At the same time, the
Department of Defense threatened all ROK forces with imprisonment if they usurped US
orders.23
The clashes with state officials lasted until June 26 and was dubbed the
“Showdown.” Once thought of as impossible, the Korean public finally saw Chun in an
aura of impotency. With the end of American indecisiveness, state authority was finally
exhausted. As a last-ditch effort, Chun ordered the use of live ammunition; however,
police officials finally had enough of the chaos. With stations burning around the nation,
authorities gave up fighting with their Korean brethren. In the end, thousands of security
personnel joined the protests and called on Chun to step down.24
On June 29, after a decade of executive abuses, the rule of President Chun was no
more. Under the extreme pressure of the U.S. and an inevitable coup d’état, Chun
capitulated to Kukbon demands. The Reagan Administration, shocked by a close ally’s
strong anti-American sentiment and the destruction that occurred under their watch,
called for the guidance of leaders, such as Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-sam, to help
repair the nation.25
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A Comparative View, Part I: The Four Leaders
General Park Chung Hee “inherited” a country that was in calamity economically,
politically, and socially.26 But before Park’s legacy can be analyzed it is important to
analyze how his tenure and the circumstances surrounding it compares to other dictatorial
leaders. Correspondingly, many academics address three other Asian leaders in the same
limelight as Park. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) of Turkey, Lee Kuan Yew (19232015) of Singapore, and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) were all autocratic leaders who, just like Park, ruled during times of extreme
crises. Ezra F. Vogel, therefore, compares Park’s career and legacy with these three
counterparts.27
Vogel describes the history behind each leader’s inherited crisis beginning with
Ataturk. Ataturk was notable for taking the reins of a beaten down post-Ottoman Empire
Turkey (1922) and propelling it into modernization. Ataturk accomplished this by
adopting institutions from the Great Western Powers – the very same powers that
defeated the once-powerful Ottomans.
On the Malaysian Peninsula, Lee Kuan Yew took the helm of an ethnically tense
former colonial nation.28 Before the birth of the Republic of Singapore (1965), Malaysian
Singapore (1963-1965) was a desolate city-state devoid of any functioning logistics,
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security, economy, and infrastructure. Just like Park, Lee turned that around in a lifetime,
and as a result, became one of the most highly developed (HDI) nations in the world.
Likewise, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping took a “failed state” – one that was devastated
by the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) – and
enacted economic liberalizations that resulted in state-guided capitalism. This is also
famously known as Deng’s version of “socialism (or capitalism) with Chinese
attributes.”29 Taking cues from Park’s chaebol project, this economic system projected
the PRC into a global powerhouse.
Although these four leaders had some socioeconomic similarities, in the political
realm, all had mirror-like governance. Each leader had long uninterrupted tenures where
democracy was secondary to economic and industrial reforms. Plausibly, this means that
each leader preferred autocratic governance to quickly consolidate power, pass
uninterrupted legislation, and to entrench their respective nations with single goals.
More importantly, the greatest binding variable was a deep history of suffering
endured through imperialism and Western interference.30 Nevertheless, while all four
leaders denounced foreign influences and colonization, they were perceptive enough to
predict that the modern world was one dominated by Western institutions – and
additionally, in Park’s case, Japanese institutions.31
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A Comparative View, Part II: Background and Careers
Historical experiences are a crucial factor in shaping a leader’s motifs, and one
factor that affects governance is conflict. Park, Ataturk, Deng, and Lee lived through
their fair share of political and social skirmishes. Except for Lee, all leaders had some
form of military background.
Ataturk and Park were both officers who had prestigious military educations.32 In
1905, Ataturk graduated from the Ottoman Military Staff College in Constantinople. In
1942, Park graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan
Gakko) in Tokyo.33 In addition to military higher education, both men fought in wartime
environments. Ataturk saw frequent combat in wars leading to World War I and the
Turkish Independence War. Park fought under the Japanese banner suppressing guerilla
activities near the Korean border. Most notably, however, both men were well-versed
with governing styles used by Imperialists and the Great Powers.
Deng had no formal military education; however, he was initially trained in
guerilla tactics by Soviet advisors (late 1920s) and in 1934 by Mao Zedong and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).34 Most remarkably, Deng survived Mao’s infamous
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returned to Korea in 1946 to attend Korea Military Academy (Hwarangdae) in Seoul. During the Korean
War (1950-1953), Park started as an officer and swiftly rose ranks to brigadier general. See Ezra F.
Vogel, 515, 518, and 522.
34
Deng, alongside Mao and early CCP officials, endured the Long March (1934-1936) against
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Nationalists (KMT). The Long March was the closest the KMT got to
exterminating the CCP. The CCP evaded Chiang’s forces by retreating to the outskirts of Northern China.
During World War II, the CCP and KMT temporarily joined forces to fight Imperial Japan (1937-1945).
After the war, the second phase of the Chinese Civil War escalated (1945-1949) where Deng was Red
32
33
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Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and in-party purges. Due to the extremities of the Mao
Era, Deng knew first-hand that not adapting to a rapidly changing world and shunning
foreign innovation was detrimental to Chinese development.35
Lee Kuan Yew, the most scholarly of the other three, had no military training or
combatant experience. Instead, Lee studied law and politics in world-renowned
universities including Cambridge.36 He was well-versed in British common law and was
adept at stirring effective dissent through legal and civil means. Lee was also no stranger
to violent sociopolitical conflicts; he survived numerous riots from all sides of the
political spheres.37 Similar to all three, Lee was thrust into an executive position during a
time of extreme vulnerability.

Army vice-chairman and propaganda chief. He was noted for playing a large role in securing peasantry
support towards communist causes. In turn, the KMT lost Chinese public backing and were routed to
Taiwan in 1949. See Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York:
Basic Books, 2015), 254-255; and Patricia Buckley Ebrey, History of China, 263 and 287-289.
35
China during the Mao Era (1950s-1976) was a “failed state.” During the Great Leap Forward
(1958-1962), Chinese industry focused solely on making steel through questionable methods. A large
portion of the agrarian population was diverted to small community-ran steel mills, and consequently,
grain and consumable industry was diverted. Also known as “collectivization,” this was the main
variable for the Great Chinese Famine (1959-1961) and resulted in the deaths of 15 to 30 million people.
Mao lost prestige and party-power after this catastrophe while Deng started to rise ranks bolstered by his
radical reforms. Such reforms included commerce and economic decentralization and emergency foreign
aid assistance. Mao’s influence among the polity faded but his support with the youth was high, thereby
resulting in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The movement was known for the creation of the Red
Guards, consisted mostly of high school and university students, many of whom purged and killed Mao’s
dissidents; this included top military and political officials. Deng was one of many Party elites who were
purged; however, his public persona was strong enough to avoid death, instead he was put under house
arrest. See Westad, 333-341 and 353-361; and Ebrey, 308-310 and 314-319.
36
Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 523.
37
The first riot Lee experienced was the May 1954 Riots caused by the British enactment of
colonial conscription laws. Lee and other intellectuals created the People’s Action Party (PAP) as a
response. Initially, the party aligned itself with Marxist independence ideologies but gradually shifted
away as Lee promoted the use of Western institutions – mainly commerce and trade – for development.
Singapore’s vulnerability came when Malaysian Prime Minster Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903-1990),
expelled them in 1965. Consequently, Singapore’s initial years were mired by the activities of extremist
factions. Threats from in-party communists, Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic radicals, and anarchists
were numerous. In addition, the lack of material resources – ranging from food, potable water, and
commodities – and human capital, such as skilled and educated workers, threatened to topple the infant
city-state. See Ezra F. Vogel in The Park Chung Hee Era, 516, 524-526, and 529.
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Vogel thoroughly details all four leaders’ backgrounds, however, his main
emphasis, and therefore conclusion, is comparing their strikingly volatile nationalist
origins.38 Each leader’s respective nation was in their infancy before they were thrust into
prominence. In summary, Park’s Korea was born through a military coup based on the
rejection of ineffective leadership; Deng’s China was born through the turmoil of the
Mao Era; Ataturk’s Turkey was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire; and finally,
Lee’s Singapore was born through Malaysian eviction.

A Comparative View, Part III: Distinguishing Park’s Korea
Vogel assesses that the initial leadership of Park differed greatly from the others.
One aspect Park did not have in common was that he was neither elected nor was he ever
known for his deep-seated patriotism. Starting with Ataturk, he was a hero of the Turkish
Independence War, and likewise, was the head of the dominant independence-nationalist
party, the Republican People’s Party. In turn, he had major backing from both party
officials and the public which resulted in his swift 1938 election as the first president of
the Republic of Turkey.39
Lee was a major figure of the People’s Action Party during and after Singapore’s
brief stint in the Malaya Federation (1963-1965). Similar to Ataturk, Lee had the backing
of his party and became the party’s prime minister in 1959. His leadership was also
extended and solidified shortly after Malaysian expulsion in 1965. Lee stands out as
being the only executive to see the full extent of his nation’s progress as he lived well
into the twenty-first century.

38
39

Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 534.
Ibid., 523.
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Deng, however, did not go through initial democratic-like elections. Instead, Deng
was a prominent figure in the CCP with a long and storied history of survival alongside
Mao. In 1978, Deng was released from confinement and repeated another quick rise
within CCP ranks. During his ascension, he cleverly, and clandestinely, consolidated
party power under his faction. Concurrently, Deng managed to oust major figures with
close ties to Mao’s disastrous socioeconomic policies.40 After the power struggle, Deng
promptly replaced Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, in 1982, thereby becoming the CCP’s
premier leader.41
Vogel grounds his analysis on the term “legitimacy.” Essentially, Ataturk, Lee,
and Deng were “legit” among their respective constituencies. Whether it be through
elections or party support, the three leaders systematically used the political system to
climb their way into leadership. Park, on the other end, inverted their methodologies.
Instead, Park took control of Korea through force, a force that was eerily similar to many
strongmen of that era.42

40
“Gang of Four” was Deng’s most dangerous opposition. The Gang was a political faction
composed of former elite-CCP officials, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, and Mao’s
widow – Jiang Qing. They were created during the Cultural Revolution with Jiang Qing leading the
faction. After consolidating enormous power using the Red Guards – the Guards systematically purged
the Gang’s in-party opposition – Mao unexpectedly died in 1976. The Gang saw this as an opportunity to
seize the government. However, a power struggle between Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng (1921-2008),
resulted in Hua and a Deng-led CCP arresting them. In 1981, all four were convicted of usurping power
during the Revolution, along with the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of innocents. This resulted in
lifetime imprisonment for all members. See Westad, 294-296; and Ebrey, 333-334.
41
Mao had a tenuous relationship with Hua. Mao was quoted saying that Hua’s only attractive
quality was his “oafish loyalty.” While Hua was initially praised for his quick expulsion of hardliners,
such as the Gang of Four, CCP elites became distressed over Hua’s lack of developmental planning.
Fearing a return to revolutionary days, party and military officials quickly disposed of Hua through
nonviolent means. See Westad, 371-372.
42
Other comparable prominent strongmen are Chile’s Augusto Pinochet (coup enacted in 1973)
and Mexico’s Porfirio Diaz to Cardenas Calles (1910-1936). See The Park Chung Hee Era, 582.
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Furthermore, Vogel labels Park’s rise to power and his legacy as the “most
controversial” out of the three.43 The forceful takeover of the government only scratches
the surface of controversy. During a time of intense Korean-Japanese animosity, Park’s
career and upbringing left a disdain for him in modern Korean historiography.44 Park’s
“Japanophile” background is substantiated through his Imperial tenure as an officer and
pro-Nippon reform policies. Furthermore, Park’s relegation of Imperial World War II
atrocities in favor of economic policies bestows him a mixed legacy, one of grand
adoration or bitter scorn with little-to-no middle ground.45

Figure 5.1. From left to right, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1919, Deng Xiaoping in 1979, and Lee Kuan Yew in
2002. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 541.
Ibid., 538.
45
Imperial Japanese atrocities included sexual slavery (also known as the “comfort women
issue”), human experimentation, and forced relocation into Manchurian concentration camps.
Additionally, the recollection of Meiji-era infractions, such as the assassination of Empress
Myeongseong (1851-1895) and maritime (Dokdo) border disputes, also strained contemporary KoreanJapanese relations. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 308 and 349.
43
44
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Park’s Economic Legacy, Part I
Park Chung Hee’s achievements are a contentious theme for modern Korean
scholars. The debate about Park’s over-excessive use and abuse of executive power and
whether it was worth the result – a highly developed South Korea – is an eternally
debated topic. The keyword among academics, however, is the word “excess,” and
therefore, Professor Kang Myung-koo and Economist Chang Se-jin analyze and
breakdown this term through the perspective of the average South Korean.46
Kang’s research involves Park’s economic system and the larger picture of what it
all meant. To put it in his own words, Kang’s thesis explores, “how a developmentalist
mentalité formed in the family system, during the Park Era” and “how this is related to
the formation of individual and collective identities.”47 On the other end, Chang’s
research is a quantitative supplement to Kang’s analysis and involves the dissection of
industrial growth and the effects it had on the standard of living.
Noting the importance of Parks Five-Year Plans (1962-1986), Kang splits up
Korean economic growth into five-year intervals. He quantifies the total GNP averages
for each period and concludes that total GNP growth amplified at 200-fold. Numerically,
GNP grew from $2.3 billion in 1962 to $458 billion in 1995. While total tally is
important, Kang emphasizes that per capita growth is more significant due to the wealth
achieved by the average household. Per capita GNP sat at $87 and exploded to $10,076

Myung-koo Kang is a Professor of Political Science in City University of New York (CUNY).
Myung-koo Kang, “Compressed Modernization and the Formation of a Developmentalist
Mentalité,” in Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought,
Democracy, & Cultural Influence, ed., Clark W. Sorensen and Hyung-A Kim (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 167.
46
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over the same period. On average, growth achieved an annual rate of 8.38 percent within
three decades.48
Kang uses plenty of line graphs to visually represent an upward trajectory of this
data. This skyward trend symbolizes the instantaneous wealth achieved by the average
household. Kang accentuates that this growth was never seen in modern economic
history. While Korea’s East Asian neighbors – Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore – achieved
similar spurts, the magnitude of GNP progress and the rapid alleviation of decades-long
poverty was unheard of at the time.49
Kang’s research, moreover, breaks this affluent trend into two tiers. The first
category explains the “collective identities” of Korea’s business mindset; and the second
analyzes those same identities in a familial and individual setting. In other words, it
explores the sudden prosperity that affected Korea’s cultural, fiscal, and national psyche.
Additionally, Graphs 5.1 to 5.3 are presented to better situate Kang and Chang’s data.50

Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 168.
Ibid., 172.
50
Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and
Fall of Chaebols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), PDF e-book, 310.
48
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Disclaimer: The graphs shown are replicated by the author to depict a summarized view of Kang’s data. Please note
that Kang uses official World Bank data; however, data only goes back to 1968. Data from 1961 to 1967 were not
officially recorded but the Bank of Korea (BOK) recently provided rough estimates. All data was combined to show
a larger and more complete representation.
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Graph 5.1. The graph plots yearly growth from 1963-97. Please note the dotted lines are estimated figures taken from
the Bank of Korea (BOK) while the rest are taken from the World Bank. Source: Se Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 309310; the World Bank archives; and the Bank of Korea archives.
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Graph 5.2. The same data was used from Graph 5.1 but in a bar graph form; in addition, Five-year Plan averages are
visualized alongside “Year-by-year” data. Please note that the serrated bars from 1963-67 are estimated data taken
from the BOK while the rest are from the World Bank. Se Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 309-310; the World Bank
archives; and the Bank of Korea archives.
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Graph 5.3. Shown is a per capita GNP line graph. Please note that data from 1960 to 1997 was officially recorded by the World Bank, whereas Graphs 5.1 and 5.2
use BOK data from 1963 to 1967. Se Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 309-310; the World Bank archives; and the Bank of Korea archives.
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Park’s Economic Legacy, Part II – Park’s Chaebol Legacy
Instantaneous growth plays a huge role on legacies and nationalist trends. On the
surface, Park’s heavy support for chaebol policies are credited for the boom that ushered
South Korean prosperity. However, deep within that system lies a hidden enterprise, one
that helped chaebol succeed worldwide. Kang surmises that the “state-mobilized
developmental model” – the core of the chaebol system – was a fervent bid to flood the
markets domestically, and more importantly, globally, with “quantity rather than quality”
made products.51
The “quantity-over-quality” model emphasized sheer volume of sales rather than
long term appreciation. Getting Korean-made products into international households was
more important than gaining prestige in the market place. This is further corroborated by
Chang’s research in The Rise and Fall of Chaebols. According to both Chang and Kang,
South Korea’s full entrance into the market, around the 1970s, occurred during an era
when Japanese and German products dominated global trade.52
In a bid to emulate these exporting powerhouses, chaebol companies fervently
followed them into the same saturated industries. Specifically, rising prices for JapaneseGerman automobiles, electronics, and appliances left cash-strapped consumers priced out
of the market. Accordingly, chaebol found these gaps as an opportunity; and
consequently, a new business model was quickly adapted and implemented. However,
those ambitions were not without its shortcomings.53

Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 168.
Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 34.
53
Chang and Kang note that chaebol ventures emphasized trade diversity in a bid to see which
endeavors could survive or fail. Along with well-known automotive (Hyundai and Kia) and electronicappliance (Samsung and LG) industries, chaebol undertook lesser-known fields such as semiconductors
51
52
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Korean industries were still in their infancy upon entrance, and likewise,
inexperience is detrimental to the quality and integrity of a product.54 Initially, rapid
adoption of Korean goods in North American markets was a positive sign that the new
chaebol scheme worked. The cheap price-tag and abundancy of diverse products
challenged foreign competitor rates. This came at a cost, however, as many consumer
complaints arose – criticisms about product lifespan and defectiveness were common.
Multinational business watchdogs, such as the Better Business Bureau, sharply criticized
the integrity, in labor and quality, that chaebol promoted. In turn, analysts were quick to
label the flooding of the market akin to an inverse “pump-and-dump” scheme.55
Due to these “pump-and-dump” tactics, Korean products were known to be of
cheap and subpar quality when compared to Japanese and German products. Nonetheless,
Chang accentuates that chaebol motives were to frantically gain a foothold in global
markets no matter the ramifications.56 Additionally, an unintended side-effect also
occurred, one that chaebol CEO’s could not have predicted.

(SK Hynix) and steel production (POSCO). Chang also mentions that Taiwanese and Singaporean
companies concurrently competed with similar industries, mainly in semiconductors and transistor chips.
This led to even more diversification as chaebol entered more specialized and less saturated fields. Such
industries include organic chemicals (Hanwha Chemicals), tire production (Hankook Tires), and offshore
rigging (STX Offshore and Shipbuilding). See Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 85-88 and 114-116.
54
Yu C. Huang and Yao J. Cheng, “Stock Manipulation and Its Effects: Pump and Dump versus
Stabilization,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 44, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 792.
55
According to Chinese economists Yu Huang and Yao Cheng, a “pump-and-dump” is an illegal
equity scheme where a company artificially raises their stock price in a bid to entice unbeknownst
outside investors. The sudden initial rise triggers mass buying, and the result is an exorbitant price tag
enacted through the illusion of hot-buying trends. Once the stock price is high enough, company insiders
then “dump,” or sell-off, all their positions, thereby securing profits and flooding the market with nowworthless equities. In the chaebol case, instead of artificially raising product prices, chaebol flooded the
market to drastically depreciate prices. Thereby, “pumping” means filling the market with an
overabundance of cheap goods until overall prices lower. However, “dumping” – or leaving the market
after profits – does not occur, instead Korean companies doubled down on exports. This caused many
international and domestic competitors to shut down due to the futility in competing with such low
prices. See Yu C. Huang and Yao J. Cheng, “Stock Manipulation,” 795-797.
56
Chang, Financial Crisis, 84.
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Chaebol mass exporting strategies undoubtedly succeeded in bolstering their
presence around the world, but there was an ironic and unintended twist – mediocre
product quality inadvertently strengthened the image of other competitors’ products.57
While more expensive, consumer confidence towards non-Korean products – particularly
Japanese – rose as they felt their price-to-quality ratio was substantially better than
chaebol quality. Essentially, early chaebol undercutting schemes accidentally labeled
Japanese merchandise as a “better bang for the buck.”58
Nevertheless, chaebol tactics were heavily used during the latter half of Park’s
tenure (1975-1979) and well until the end of President Chun’s regime (1980-1988).
Perhaps the greatest consequence of these heavy-handed practices was the influence it
garnered in future exporting methods. The effects that chaebol had on a newly marketliberalized China was enormous.59 Similarly, China took this design and amplified it on a
mammoth scale – one that affects markets today.60

Park’s Economic Legacy, Part II – The Chaebol’s Effects on the Average Korean
Chaebol legacy was for the most part innovative as a developing model.
However, many overlooked the impact it had on the Korean psyche. Kang analyzes these
effects in what he coins as “developmentalist mentalité.” He defines this term as “a state

Chang, 84.
Ibid., 86.
59
Chang mentions Chinese business practices being similar to Korean, Taiwanese, and
Singaporean models. State-owned (state-guided) companies, like chaebol, were entities that enacted
these exporting tactics. These companies initially used cheap labor, well below market value, to flood the
market. Additionally, the Chinese combined long-term, low-floating currencies to help depress labor
prices, and thereby enticed foreign companies to use them as a cheap manufacturing base. Oversight
committees, such as the World Trade Organization, accuse China of purposely keeping currency low and
blocking labor (capital) inflation in order to undercut world markets. See Se-jin Chang, 47 and 76-77.
60
Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 261.
57
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of mind, behavioral style, and a structure of feeling that infatuates most South
Koreans.”61 Kang designates this term as all-encompassing, pertaining to business,
political, familial, and individual ethics.
Business and political psyches are evident through the term “infatuation.”
“Infatuation” in this case means an obsession on “administrative efficiencies” – in both
companies and the polity – that bolsters “rapid economic development.” Simply put,
wealth accumulation was, and still is, the name of the game; meanwhile administering
growth initiatives is the only goal of bureaucracy.62
Development is also linked to Korea’s Confucian roots that consequently merged
politics, chaebol, and individual ranks as inseparable entities.63 Kang postulates that this
relationship created a “vertical loyalty” mobilization.64 Contextually, this meant that
companies that performed well were rewarded with more state funds and contract
prioritization. This is very similar to a kind of “Confucian favoritism.”65
All players in the system were affected by this “favoritism,” however the average
Korean worker and consumer felt the shocks more deeply than the ruling elites. Kang
suggests that the “individual identities” of this group were modeled after the businesspolity psyche. Paraphrasing sociologist Yim Huisop (Im Hee-seop), Kang sums up the
newly inherited psyche as “South Koreans having a strong class consciousness because

Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 167.
Ibid., 176.
63
Seung-Mi Han, “The New Community Movement: Park Chung Hee and the Making of State
Populism,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 80.
64
Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 176.
65
Since Confucianism is patriarchal, this scenario would be similar to a father (Park, Chun, and
the polity) favoring exceptional children (chaebol that performed financially well and exceeded export
quotas) by rewarding them with praise and gifts (state funds, long term labor contracts, and
deregulation).
61
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they understand and organize human relations and social ethics in order of rank.”66 In
other words, the bureaucratic chaebol culture dispersed onto the citizenry’s professional
and societal ranks; “Confucian favoritism” and the public were indivisible. Suitably, this
begs an analysis on how the average citizen can climb the new Confucian socioeconomic
ladder.67
Kang identifies materialism and consumerism as the tools of achievement.68 The
new consumerist culture was a byproduct of the frantic production quotas levied onto the
export economy. This new culture mirrored the worldviews of Korea’s Western allies,
specifically American consumerism. Not only was Korea producing en masse for
international markets, but domestically, never-before-seen surpluses of food, electronics,
automobiles, and fashion were readily available to the public. Once foreign to Korean
society, supermarkets, department stores, shopping malls, and tourist hotels sprouted all
over the nation.69

Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 180.
To give a historical comparison, since the introduction of the market economy, modernization,
and chaebol reforms Korean lifestyle underwent a momentous transformation. Drawing comparisons to
Japan’s post-World War II construction, Andrew Gordon mentions danchi, or public housing initiatives,
enacted shortly after the war. See Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 257. Similarly, the days
of living among immediate, extended, and in-law families within a communal village-town (hanok maeul
and min sok chon) and under a thatched-roof house were a distant memory. Park’s many Five-Year Plans
(1962-1976) incentivized rapid urban migration through the creation of public housing policies. See
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 444. In 1962, Park created the Korea National Housing Corporation
(Hanguk toji jutaeg gongsa), better known as KNHC or LH. See Hye-hoon Lee and ROK National
Assembly, Korea Land & Housing Act. Since many rural workers flocked to urban areas in hope of
securing lucrative industrial jobs, the KNHC was responsible – through the mass construction of
apartment towns – for finding affordable and government-subsidized housing. Interestingly, this new
trend had no Korean language origin, so new “Konglish” – a portmanteau of Korean and English –
words were created. Terms such as apateu (apartments) and opiseutel (office-studio rooms) coined these
trends and are now real estate vernacular.
68
Shortly after Park’s death (1979), a change in demographics was evident. The 1980 Census
Bureau recorded a prevalence of a large middle and upper-class populations; affluency was now
commonplace. See Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 310.
69
Myung-Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 181.
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Analogous to winning the lottery, an over-excess of spending was commonplace.
This new arrangement was in part a variable that propelled the market economy to new
heights. The biggest consequence, however, was that it also instilled an “excessive,
rugged individualism.”70 Yim Huisop suggests that this mentality took over the “selfreliant” and “strong self-defensive” lifestyle of the olden days.71 Kang concludes that this
individualist mindset was the core of the “developmentalist mentalité,” and for better or
worse, resulted in the hypercompetitive “achievement-centered behaviors” that are
prevalent today.72

The New Korean Generation, Part I: Chaebol Reforms
Chaebol reforms were one of the most defining features of the 1980s to 2000s;
this era was synonymous with “Korean market liberalization.” According to Economist
Chang Se-jin, chaebol liberalization in Korean economic terms meant the full
privatization of state-guided conglomerates.73 Liberalization slowly began under
President Chun’s far-right political party, Minju jeonguidang (DJP); revised during Roh
Tae-woo’s non-affiliated independent party (term: 1988-1993); and then further

Myung-koo Kang, 181.
Yim posits that during the chaos of the Imperial and Korean War eras (1910-1953) a
communal attitude of self-defense and reliance defined the Korean psyche. Due to the constant threat of
death and enslavement, Koreans had no choice but to band together in order to survive. However, as
affluency was achieved, that conviction slowly gave way to a materialistic individual mindset. See
Myung-koo Kang, 180.
72
“Hypercompetitive” in this sense is all encompassing. It refers to modern South Korean overcompetition in the job market, higher education, student endeavors, business ranks, and owning the latest
market trends. Moreover, this extends to “national competition,” or competing with Asian counterparts
on global education, healthcare, standards of living, and ease-of-doing business ranks.
73
Chang, Financial Crisis, 58.
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accelerated under Kim Dae-jung (term: 1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun’s (term: 20032008) center-left Minju dang (commonly known in English as “Minjoo”).74
Before liberalization, Chang paraphrased the booming economy as “Korea being
a victim of their own success.” Initially, the DJP’s platform heavily supported Parkinspired chaebol economics. However, Korea’s swift GNP rise, along with large looming
international loans, created a severe inflationary problem. This discrepancy led America,
one of Korea’s largest creditors, to take notice and instigated that chaebol success came
at the expense of US manufacturing. After Park’s nuclear program fiasco, Chun and the
DJP were quick to appease American officials.75 The pressure amidst a threatened trade
war and forced loan repayments resulted in the easing of two-decades worth of
protectionist policies.76
Since state, labor, and chaebol were highly dependent on another – arguably one
entity – any changes on a macro level severely affected the micro level, and vice versa.
Coupled with easing foreign trade policies and more aggressive militant-like protests,
labor unions experienced renewed vigor. After the success of the 1987 democracy
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From the 1980s to 2010s Korean political parties often changed and merged with one another.
The start of a major conservative party began in 1963 when Park Chung-hee created Minju
gonghwadang (Democratic Republican Party, or DRP). But, when Chun took office in 1980 he dissolved
DRP and merged prominent DRP technocrats into his own party, the Democrat Justice Party (DJP). Roh
Tae-woo was originally in the DJP but after the 1987 presidential elections Roh opted to be an
independent president. However, DJP merged with other prominent pro-business factions. They later
called themselves Jayuhan gukdang (Liberty Korea Party, or LKP). LKP then changed their name to the
more current and commonly known Saenuri, or Grand National Party. See Jinwung Kim, A History of
Korea, 435, 469-479, 485, and 521-538.
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Chang, Financial Crisis, 57.
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Chang also notes that “liberalization” and anti-protectionist policies meant that the state could
not fund chaebol and make direct business decisions anymore. The result was many chaebol “going
public” by opening shares in the Korean stock exchange (KOSPI and KOSDAQ). Chang’s monograph
defines macroeconomics as the changes – through legislation or external factors – affecting the polity
and nation. Microeconomics mean changes that affect the individual, local business, and chaebol. See
Se-jin Chang, 169, 189, and 236.
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movements, the newly-elected Roh Tae-woo ran on a platform that gave into union-labor
demands that resulted in instantaneous conglomerate regulations.77 The immediate rise of
factory and service wages was an initial success for left-wing movements and was partly
a factor that eased public tension after the 1987 June Uprising.
The consequence of higher wages, both in blue and white-collar sectors,
correlated to higher priced end-products. The end of the 1980s and the early 1990s saw
Park’s cheap export schemes implode from within; and just as rapidly as it was enacted in
the 1960s, two decades later saw the sudden collapse of the model. Lackluster chaebol
products lost their low-priced competitive edge. They now faced top-tier foreign products
competing on the same price platform. Nonetheless, chaebol’s “cheap exporting
innovations” lived on as the forthcoming Chinese economic boom easily took over the
vacuum left behind.78

The New Korean Generation, Part II: A New Economic Shift
Historian Jinwung Kim, Sociologists John Lie, and Park Myoung-kyu analyze the
contemporary Korean generation.79 Even though their research was written in the mid-

Chang, Financial Crisis, 62.
Chang and Jinwung Kim detail the political consequences of high labor costs. Chinese mass
exports and higher Korean wages amplified the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The result was
devastating for Korean employment. An abnormally high unemployment rate and a slow recovery
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2000s, much of it still holds up. 80 Kim’s last chapter in his monograph expands on the
achievements and challenges that both Korean states are still undergoing with Lie and
Park concurring on a similar basis.81 Lie and Park, however, emphasize more on the
effects that post-Cold War culture and the 1997 Asian Crisis had on today’s South
Korean youths.
Lie and Park use the consequences from Dr. Hwang Woo Suk’s work as an
introduction.82 Even though Dr. Hwang’s work was a scandal – dubbed by Western
media as “The Dr. Hwang Scandal” – the authors posit that this was still a major event as
it signaled Korea’s instantaneous entrance into biotechnology research. This exhibited
that within three decades a country that once relied on horses for plowing and oil lamps
for lighting now had the resources to try and compete for groundbreaking future
innovation. They further suggest that the entry into the Tech Age, while mired by a
scandal, cemented Korea’s place as an “emerging soft power.”83
These achievements set the context of Lie and Park’s thesis. The authors
accentuate that Korea’s entrance into advanced technology research – not only in biotech
but also in telecommunications, medical technology, and robotics – and the export of
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Korean popular culture, also known as hallyu are telltale signs that a country has
achieved highly developed status. 84 For context, Lie and Park base their definitions of
“soft power” on prior American and British achievements.85
Korea’s ascension into affluency reinforced their global influence, however, Lie
and Park posit that this achievement came at a price for the younger generations.86 The
authors mention the effects that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had on the peninsula.87
This was a significant event as it signaled to Korean lawmakers and entrepreneurs that
there was an overreliance on a manufacturing economy. As a remedy, government and

Hallyu roughly translates to “Korean Wave.” Hallyu is a term used to coin the Korean popular
culture phenomena; it is also a blanket word to include all forms of media and fashion trends. Hallyu
includes K-pop music, TV soap operas, movies, and novels. In more recent years, internet comics
(manhwa, or better known in Konglish as webtun), and competitive online gaming (e-sports) are now a
staple of hallyu. The authors posit that Korea was “long an importer of Western popular culture,
especially American popular culture,” but now hallyu is part of “New Nationalism.” As hallyu media
became more prominent with the youth, young Koreans viewed this as a form of national pride. While
American media still has a large presence in South Korean culture, mainly in movies, hallyu media has
consistently topped sales charts in the tiny peninsula, easily eclipsing their Western counterparts.
Furthermore, hallyu’s international success – also topping Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian media
charts – is a sign of a successful “soft” approach. See Jinwung Kim, 553-554; and John Lie and Myungkyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 61.
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business leaders stressed the importance of shifting to a service-oriented economy. In
other words, Korean economists insisted that “innovation through leading-edge
telecommunications and information technology” was the future, and not
manufacturing.88
The new economic changes had the most impact on the labor level. Since the
heydays of the chaebol export boom (1970s to 1988), Korea’s global competitiveness
was rapidly vanishing. Newly-liberalized Chinese markets were taking the export world
by storm. Taking a cue from their Korean neighbors, China now held the premier
advantage with cheap labor, worker surplus, and new factory infrastructure. China was
now set to bestow the world an even more glut of cheap goods.89
Lie and Park conclude that this predicament had enormous ramifications on the
Korean psyche. Once a national pride for Korean laborers and leaders, the manufacturing
economy was bleeding money. To further salt the wound, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
threatened the prosperity that Koreans worked so hard for. Appropriately, this begs an
analysis as to how a nation can survive crises after crises and come out stronger. That
answer was taken to heart by President Roh Moo-hyun (1946-2009) and his support for a
newer tech-driven generation.

The New Korean Generation, Part III – Generation X
The parents of Generation X contributed to Korea’s accumulation of wealth, but it
was their children that experienced a Korea in a near-depression-like collapse.
Politicians, laborers, business leaders, and innovators were forced to adapt to a new
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globalized market. The result was a technology-driven campaign that focused on the
quality of infrastructure, logistics, communication, and product superiority.
The Asian Crisis largely impacted chaebol exporting tactics. While exporting was
still important to the conglomerates, the fanaticism of Park’s “export-dumping” schemes
did not hold up in a more connected market.90 The advent of dirt-cheap Chinese exports
caused politicians and business leaders to work around that. Once a laughing stock due to
lackluster quality, Korean leaders quickly passed chaebol quality-control regulations.
Now that chaebol brands were known throughout the world, albeit with a bad reputation,
it was up to conglomerates to combine product quality and affordability, a tactic that their
Japanese counterparts perfected.91
A new technology-driven government – enacted during the end of Kim Daejung’s administration (term: 1998-2003) – was one of President Roh’s top priorities. The
blueprints were laid for the next generation to follow; and this was the next phase of the
economy.92 Because of this, Korea became the most “wired country” in the world and
one of the most invested research and development markets.93 Internationally, the most
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noticeable effect was the astounding rise of chaebol product quality. Once playing catchup to Japanese companies, quality-control and technology initiatives eventually propelled
Korean goods above the sales of their staunchest top-tier competitors, such as Sony and
Apple.94
In conclusion, Korea’s technological ambitions shifted the outdated export culture
into an “R&D culture,” colloquially known as “the faster, the better culture.”95 The shift
was due in part to China’s preeminence as the world’s exporting giant coupled with the
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Korean leaders decided that instead of
competing in a losing game, it was better to challenge the quality-to-price market as seen
with Japanese counterparts. This was accomplished by heavily investing in technology,
research, and innovation. In essence, Korea never lost their trading culture but rather
research and innovation were exported instead of cheap overproduced goods.

The New Korean Generation, Part IV: A Shift in Generations
Park Myung-kyu and John Lie finish their research with an analysis on South
Korean “New Nationalism” and “Post-Traditional Society.”96 These terms are set postCold War (1991 to present) and are used to examine the sentiments of Generations X and
Y. Park and Lie give a brief historical explanation on the nationalist sentiments of past
generations. The authors posit that before this era Cold War paranoia against North
Korean conspirators and saboteurs was a prominent theme.97
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South Korean Cold War nationalism incorporated a wide-array of ideologies. This
meant that Park Chung Hee’s generation were generally pro-big business, pro-American,
anti-North Korean, anti-communist, and, to an extent, pro-Japanese. Park and technocrats
promoted and relied on these ideologies to garner support for South Korea’s
development.98 The older generations, who were mostly agricultural and urban factory
workers, strongly supported Park. Likewise, Lie and Park compare this generation to
their children and grandchildren. In other words, the last part of the authors’ analysis
examines the large generational gap among these three groups.99
While Park’s generation contributed to Korea’s rapid development, they are
gradually fading away as most of them are retirees. Many are well past their sixties with a
good portion situated in the eighties onward.100 Furthermore, there is a change in
demographics and composure of the Korea’s legislative branch, the National Assembly
(NA). In 2004, a momentous replacement occurred, 63 percent of NA members were
composed of new first-time elected politicians while 43 percent of them were aged in
their thirties to forties.101
Lie and Park correlate that a younger voter demographic was wholly responsible
for the shift in sociopolitical views, thereby resulting in newer politicians mirroring
ideologies of their younger constituency. These new sociopolitical sentiments are coined
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“New Nationalism” and include national pride in the recent hallyu phenomena and a
warming of relations towards their Northern brethren.102 Equally, younger Koreans view
anti-communist sentiments as largely a vestige of a bygone Cold War era. Expectedly,
the youth also strongly support more progressive Minjoo politicians, such as Presidents
Kim Dae-jung (1924-2009) and Roh Moo-hyun (1945-2009), who are arguably
forefathers of “New Nationalism.”103
To show how much newer political establishments inversed Park and Chun era
politics, Lie, Park Myung-kyu, and Historian Jinwung Kim underlined one of Minjoo’s
trademark policies, the “Sunshine Policy.”104 Policies such as these and Korea’s
endeavors into R&D and popular culture, are all aspects of a maturing highly developed
nation, and more importantly, a “softer” approach to global influence.
In retrospect, the authors associate Park era nationalism as more in line to a “hard
power” stance. The current generation, however, relegates that stance as a remnant of
Korea’s turbulent past, a past that caused tremendous growth and prosperity alongside
immense suffering. Moreover, South Korean power now lies in its “soft” approach to
international influence as easing of Northern relations, the exporting of quality products,
and hallyu are key to growing South Korea’s global prestige.
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relations. As a result, Kaesung Industrial Complex – located on the DMZ border – was created to engage
in trade and relief efforts with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung won a Nobel Peace Prize the same year for
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The New Korean Generation, Part V: Transition to an Open Access Order (OAO)
You (Yu) Jong-Sung implements economist Douglass North’s Access Order (AO)
theory to explain the rapid rise of South Korean development.105 Yu posits that Korea’s
rise to an Open Access Order (OAO) occurred after Chun’s ousting in 1987.106 More
importantly, Yu emphasizes that the 1980s democracy movements, chaebol reforms, and
Korea’s “survival” of two profound recessions – the 1997 Asian Crisis and the 2008
Financial Crisis – are OAO trademarks that prove an ongoing robustness in South Korean
society.107
The bulk of Yu’s research is set in the early 1980s to early 2000s; however, the
most important period is 1997 to the present. Yu labels this timeframe as the “Transition
to OAO” era.108 He signifies this period as an effect of the “Korean democratic
renaissance” that was largely a result from the successful 1987 protests. From 1988 to
1997, Koreans saw center-left opposition dominate the legislative and executive branches
of the government. Alongside political change, Koreans saw rapid chaebol dismantling
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and regulation coinciding with steady economic growth. The 1997 Asian Crisis, however,
tested the resolve of those gains.109
The election of Kim Dae-jung in 1998 proved a turning point. Although, Kim was
elected in what should have been a clear-cut victory for the “Asian Nelson Mandela,” it
was instead a closely contested race largely affected by the pessimism surrounding the
financial crisis.110 While Kim and his Minjoo Party still had a strong voice in the
government, a span of ten years saw the new center-right Saenuri Party gradually gain a
foothold in the NA. In 2008, former Hyundai Construction CEO and Saenuri leader, Lee
Myung-bak (born 1941), was elected president. Yu further accentuates this decade as the
moment Korea cemented their OAO status.
The significance of this bureaucratic change was that Korea underwent “two
changes of government, from conservative to liberal (1998) and from liberal to
conservative (2008), thereby satisfying the so-called two turn over test for democratic
consolidation.”111 In contrast, the era from 1960s to the 1980s were known for violent
consolidation – Park and Chun’s coup and electoral dissolution – through executive-led
military intimidation. Yu adds that Korean societal robustness underwent “military
restraint in both elections” and came out even stronger.112 He concludes that Korea’s
near-miraculous democratic emergence promptly completed NWWW’s “three doorstep
conditions.”113
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In summary, key democratic events were a gateway to Korea’s entrance into
highly developed territory.114 The 1980s protests, the 1990s executive and legislative
transitions, and the 1997 and 2008 Financial Crises were testing grounds to see whether
Koreans had what it takes to join the few select nations representing affluency, stability,
and global prestige.

The New Korean Generation, Part VI: Korean Educational Culture
Korea entered OAO status during the late 1990s. Yu Jong-Sung analyzes this
achievement from a sociopolitical viewpoint; however, Yoon Bang-Soon highlights the
consequences that Park Chung Hee’s technocratic culture had on modern Korean
education.115 Specifically, Yoon’s thesis addresses the effects that Park-led (state-led)
overeducation initiatives had during the period of 1966 to the 1990s. She coins this
cultural phenomenon as a “Reverse Brain Drain (RBD).”116
Yoon’s research begins with a brief history of Korean “brain drain.”117 Shortly
after the Korean War (1953) and until the mid-1960s, an influx of Korean refugees from
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war-torn country sides and razed cities emigrated all over the world, most notably to the
US.118 Beginning under President Rhee, a large portion of tertiary students were sent to
pursue overseas training in science and engineering.119 The 1964 census taken by the
Korean Ministry of Education reported that 91.4 percent of those students had chosen the
US for their studies abroad. Many would later claim residency and permanently stayed in
America.120
Park took swift notice of the discrepancy and in 1966 began Korea’s first attempt
of “systematic repatriation”; the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was
created as a result.121 KIST began recruiting top academics from the US and West
Germany to help lead heavy multidisciplinary R&D agendas. Due to Park’s close
relationship with the two countries, KIST created joint exchange ventures with them.
This endeavor was successful due to all three participant countries’ strict contractual
limits on work-student visas. Once a student or professional was finished training in the
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host country, American, West German, and South Korean immigration departments kept
a close tab on them until eventual repatriation.122
Historians Moon Chung-in and Byung-joon Jun quote Park’s pragmatic stance on
immigration, “I don’t care [what] the national origin of capital [is]. I welcome capital
from the United States, West Germany, Italy, and other European countries. Even if it is
Japanese capital, I don’t care as long as it is used for the economic development of our
country.”123 To obtain this needed capital, a “carrot-and-stick” tactic was used to entice a
hungry goal-driven citizenry. Park correlated and fervently promoted patriotism, prestige,
and lucrative job opportunities, mostly within government and chaebol careers; and this
in turn, bolstered already successful KIST initiatives.124
Expatriate Koreans were now eager to bring foreign-learned skills back to the
motherland, and accordingly, this resulted in the RBD phenomena. The chance to obtain
these once abundant positions profoundly altered the educational culture of future
Koreans. Simply put, frequent and efficient repatriation, along with domestic emphasis
on higher education, bestowed Korea with an overabundance of advanced degree holders
and, for better and worse, altered future career aspects for Korean youths. Due to this
abundance, an old joke among Korean academia was created, “PhD holders are a ‘dime a
dozen.’”125

Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain,” 8.
Chung-in Moon, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in The Park Chung Hee
Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 127.
124
Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain in South Korea,” 9.
125
Ibid., 7.
122
123

189
The Candlelight Revolution
The Candlelight Revolution (Chotbul hangjaeng), also known as the 2016-2017
South Korean Protests, was one of the most significant events in modern Korean
history.126 Beginning from October 2016 to March 2017, the South Korean government
underwent a society-shattering scandal perpetrated by President Park Geun-hye (born
1952), daughter of Park Chung Hee, and her closest confidants.127 John Delury and
Alexis Dudden’s articles, both written within a month of each other and published in the
same academic journal, detail the context leading up to the scandal and the consequences
that it had on modern Korean politics.128
Delury’s thesis is told in question form, “What does it take to peacefully remove a
democratically elected president from power?” Delury credits “idealistic students,
intrepid journalists, invigorated parliamentarians, and outraged urbanites.” He also labels
them as “traditional forces of dissent.”129 On the other end, Dudden’s thesis is similar to
Delury’s. However, instead of focusing on the agents of dissent – Dudden also credits

The name “Candlelight” comes from the theme of protestors bringing candles or small bulbs
to the demonstrations. Candles are symbolic for transparency or shining a light on the secrecy of Park
Geun-hye’s corruption.
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“traditional forces” for toppling Park Geun-hye – she focuses on the major players behind
the scandal and how they affected current Korean society.130
Both authors begin on the same note, Park Geun-hye’s close friend, Choi Soon-sil
(born 1956), was the person who ignited the investigations behind the scandal.131 Delury
reports how fast investigative journalism and a digitally connected population were
inquiring about any “backchannel” and illegal dealings.132 He further adds that initially
there was a slow response from bureaucrats and authorities.
Specifically, some Minjoo and Saenuri politicians were reluctant to pursue
allegations due to party and business ties with the implicated suspects. This was also
compounded by the near-impossible impeachment process.133 However, after deliberation
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Young-soo, was accidentally killed during the fallout. Immediately, Tae-min’s “psychic ability” to speak
with the dead caught Park’s attention and a friendship was born. Equally, Geun-hye and Soon-sil became
close friends – even attending college together at one point – as Soon-sil took the motherly gap that Yuk
once filled. In 2016, Soon-sil became a prime suspect when she and her business firm cleaned up and
moved to new offices. Samsung tablets were recklessly thrown away and journalists found caches of
incriminating evidence that pointed her and Geun-hye in approving secret backdoor deals. Immediate
public backlash occurred as journalists spread the news internationally. Dudden coined this scandal
“Choi-Soon-sil-gate” while Western media outlets, like the UK’s Telegraph, labeled it “The Korean
Rasputin Scandal” and “The Korean Shaman Scandal.” See John Delury, 98-99; Alexis Dudden, 86-88;
and Seok Hwai Lee, “The Most Powerful Person in South Korea,” Straits Times.
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Furthermore, Choi Soon-sil had a real estate business firm before and during Park Geunhye’s presidency. The tablets revealed Park funneling public funds to not only Choi’s firm but to other
prominent business magnates. Bookkeeping data revealed bribes traced back to prominent chaebol
magnate and Samsung Vice CEO Lee Jae-yong. Jae-yong is the eldest son of CEO Lee Gun-hee, aptly
coined “The Prince of Samsung.” Furthermore, Choi also bribed Park officials to influence Seoul’s Ewha
Women’s University admissions – one of the world’s largest and most prestigious all-women universities
– to accept her daughter and inflate her grades. In February 2018, Choi was found guilty for abuse of
power and bribery. She was fined 16 million USD and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In February
2017, Lee Jae-yong was sentenced five years in prison for bribery. However, in February 2018 he was
released due to a successful suspension request. See John Delury, 98-99; Dudden, 86-88; and Seok Hwai
Lee, " Most Powerful Person in South Korea," Straits Times.
133
The South Korean impeachment process needs a two-thirds majority vote from the three
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and pressure from outside variables – the public and international media – politicians
chose to do an internal investigation, albeit at a slow pace.
Dudden’s article accentuates the crucial initial actions that university students
played. Specifically, during the timeframe of bureaucratic apathy, student protests were
fueled by the transgressions committed by Choi. While there was a myriad of other
reasons for massive student agitation, Dudden alludes that Park and Choi’s misdeeds
conflicted with Korea’s fervent education and work cultures; this amplified the
resentment of millions of hardworking students and white-collar workers.134 Students felt

hundred-member National Assembly (NA). Afterwards, the nine-member Constitutional Court (Supreme
Court of Korea) needs over a simple majority – minimum six members in support of impeachment – to
uphold the impeachment as legitimate. See Article 111.1 in the ROK Constitution. At the time of the
scandal Saenuri and right-leaning factions composed over 50 percent of the NA. The Supreme Court was
split evenly with left, right, and independent-leaning judges. Politicians initially rebuffed protests as they
thought this task was impossible. However, a year of protests resulted in overwhelming bipartisan
support. A 234 out of 300 NA vote passed followed by a unanimous 9-0 Supreme Court decision in favor
of upholding impeachment.
134
For context, Korean public schooling begins from elementary (kindergarten to sixth grade),
to middle school (grades first to third; otherwise known as seventh to ninth grade in America), and
finishes in high school (grades first to third; otherwise known as tenth to twelfth grade). While the inschool hours are similar to American schooling – about five to six hours daily attendance – the afterschool curriculum adds an additional three to seven hours. Most students attend after-school academies
(hagwon), or in a more denigrating term “cram schools,” that cater to suneung (colloquially known as the
“Korean SATs”) subjects (math, reading, science, and English). According to a 2009 statistics research
by University of Illinois, 87.4 percent of elementary students attend hagwon; followed by 74.3 percent of
middle schoolers; and 53.8 percent of high schoolers. Post-university hagwon attendance is an
exceptional case as most participants attend campuses catered to tier-based chaebol and civil service
exams. Reminiscent of Goryeo-Joseon (918-1897 CE) government exams (gwageo), civil service testing
pertains to all state-funded jobs, such as military officers, educators, first-responders, and administrators.
Chaebol testing pertains to entry-level jobs, such as paid interns who have the potential to rise into
management positions. Both exams are called Kodeung gosi (“fifth to seventh -- the highest levels -- tier
exams”) and consist of advanced math, science, reading, English, and other career-related subjects. Due
to the hypercompetition for these jobs, entire city districts, such as Seoul’s Noryangjin, have economies
centered on educating, feeding, and housing gosi students (gosi hakseng). Likewise, this was unique to
Korean society so “Konglish” terms arose from it. For example, gositel are dorm-guesthouses meant to
shelter exam students. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 551-553; Jin-lee Jung, “Supplemental
Education in Korea,” 1-2; and Bo-eun Kim, “Jobseekers Drawn to Civil Servant Exams,” Korea Times.
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a resurgence of “cronyism” reminiscent of Park Chung Hee’s and Chun’s chaebol
state.135 Delury aptly concurs and labels this resurgence as an “imperial presidency.”136
Delury and Dudden also suggest that bureaucrats’ preliminary indifferences were
superseded by the fear of repeating the 1980s democracy movements, one where students
from the same campuses enacted nationwide revolts and riots. Equally, both authors
concur that the Candlelight Protests were situated in a perfect time just like their 1980s
brethren. Akin to the global popularity of the 1980s protests, factors such as the 20152016 US Presidential Campaigns and the Brexit vote satiated the Western world’s
appetite towards the election process. Therefore, it struck a strong interest when Western
media found that a tiny country known for technology, orderly conduct, and a strong
Pacific alliance could amass millions of demonstrators while enduring year-long civil
protests.137
Both articles conclude on the international community’s praise for the
demonstration’s nonviolent and efficient nature; however, both stop short of mentioning
the future challenges of the Korean sociopolitical sphere. Dudden, however, gives a brief
projection on Korea’s 2018 direction. Dudden’s conclusion is highly critical of the
Trump administration due to the antagonistic “fire and fury” stance towards North
Korea.138 She suggests that this is an antithesis to South Korea’s peaceful rhetoric.
Additionally, Dudden casts the recently-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in as a
disciplined but cooperative leader in contrast to Trump’s “reckless” diplomacy.139
Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight,” 89.
Delury, “The Candlelight Revolution,” 97.
137
Delury and Dudden label the Candlelight Revolutions “peaceful.” Peaceful in this context
means virtually no property damages and no reported injuries and deaths. See Dudden, 89; and Delury,
96-97.
138
Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight,” 91.
139
Ibid., 92.
135
136
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In short, the protests were a success and arguably surpassed the 1980s movements
in efficiency and international adulation. The level of swift organization, mass
participation, and peacefulness cemented Korea as a role model for twenty-first century
civil dissent.

Park Chung Hee’s Approval
A Korean Gallup poll conducted in August 2015 followed by a September 2015
Diplomat article highlights sentiments harbored for past South Korean presidents since
Rhee Syngman’s (Lee Seung-man) election in 1948 and until Lee Myung-bak’s final year
in 2012.140 The polls include a total of eight presidential choices, thereby comprising
executives who were directly voted on while disregarding any “acting presidents.”141 The
presidents included in the survey are, in no specific order, Roh Moo-hyun, Roh Tae-woo,
Park Chung Hee, Kim Dae-jung, Rhee Syngman, Chun Doo-hwan, Kim Young-sam, and
Lee Myung-bak.142
Gallup’s methodology includes a sample population of two-thousand anonymous
voters aged nineteen to over sixty.143 The response method was conducted through

Gallup Korea is an extension of Gallup Analytics (Gallup, Inc.). Gallup, Inc. is a premier
international polling thinktank. Their main objective is to quantitatively analyze sociopolitical trends.
They are noted for their extensive research on vote polling and leadership approval ratings. Furthermore,
Gallup Korea’s research mixes Korean and English together, therefore translation may be needed in some
areas.
141
Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 174 - August 4-6, 2015 (Week 1), (Seoul:
Gallup Publishing, 2015), PDF report, 9.
142
Article 71 in the Republic of Korea Constitution states that the “Prime Minister or the
members of the State Council in the order of priority . . . shall act as president in case of vacancy or
incapacitation of duties.” Article 2 states “The first presidential election shall be held not later than forty
days before the Constitution enters force.” Therefore, when a president is incapacitated due to death,
resignation, or court proceedings – such as Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Park Geun-hye – the
PM becomes “acting president” for no more than forty days. Within that timeframe snap elections are
held to allow citizens to directly vote for the next successor.
143
In Chapter II, Article 15 of South Korea’s “Public Official Election Act,” the minimum age
140
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telephone, MMS texting, and paper ballots. The survey questions included presidential
job performance evaluation, reasons for positivity/negativity, and the voter’s party
affiliation. Gallup concluded that Park Chung Hee – with 44 percent of the votes – did
the “best job leading the country after liberation.” Roh Moo-hyun followed with 24
percent, then Kim Dae-jung with 14 percent. The rest had an irrelevant 3 to 0.1 percent
positive response rate.144
In context to presidential policies, 67 percent responded that Park “did many good
things.” This is compared to the next two highly rated presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh
Moo-hyun, both scoring 50 to 54 percent respectively. Within that question were also
subsets of policies that responders marked as “good things.” Park received an enormous
52 percent for “economic development” – alluding to chaebol and industrialization
reforms – followed by the “New Village Movement (Saemaul undong), and 12 percent
for “improving the general public’s standard of living.”145
Inversely, Gallup also asked “which presidential acts were the wrong things.”
Park overwhelmingly received 84 percent of the votes, with 74 percent towards Yushin
constitutional laws and 10 percent for the 1961 coup. These transgressions easily eclipsed
Chun’s democracy crackdowns, which hovered around 7 percent. However, if
considering the Gwangju Crackdowns as democratic oppression – these were categorized
separately – then the number rises to 20 percent.146

to vote for all public officials is nineteen. It is also worth noting that Korean ages are based on the lunar
calendar along with counting womb development as one age year. Meaning, there is a discrepancy of
about one age-year compared to Western age-dating. Therefore, the minimum voting, conscription, and
legal age of nineteen is equivalent to eighteen in America.
144
Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 174, 9.
145
Ibid., 12.
146
Ibid., 13.
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As this was strictly a statistical survey, Gallop did not include a conclusion.
Steven Denney, however, analyzed the Gallop results and compared it to other past
polls.147 Denney’s conclusion concurs with other academics in regard to Park’s legacy, it
is highly divisive and “mixed” at best.148 He compares Park’s legacy to Taiwan’s Chiang
Kai-shek and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. Along with mixed feelings, Denney denotes
that Park, Chiang, and Lee are highly successful “non-benevolent developmental
dictators.”149 Successful in this context means raising the standard of living.
In the same year, Denny analyzes a Seoul University poll, in conjunction with the
Korean newspaper Joongang Ilbo. The poll concluded on a similar basis, Park’s
“economic growth” positively overwhelmed his “questionable” political actions.
Unfortunately, the weaknesses of both polls come from the lack of linking demographics.
For example, the presidential “good/bad policies” survey lacked characteristics, such as
age, household income, and region.150
In other words, presidential legacies and public policy sentiments are evaluated as
independent and wholly separate entities, thereby missing any linking features, like what
age groups and income brackets support Park and which ones do not. Graphs 5.4 to 5.8,
furthermore, help visualize Gallup’s analysis with data taken and translated from the
Korean Gallup survey.

Steven Denney is a Professor of Global Affairs in the University of Toronto.
Steven Denney, “The Mixed Legacy of a South Korean Dictator,” Diplomat, September 17,
2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-mixed-legacy-of-a-south-korean-dictator/.
149
Denny, “Mixed Legacy,” Diplomat.
150
The 2015 Gallup poll also had an independent survey to complement “the best South Korean
leader since 1945” poll. This poll was in relation to Park Geun-hye and Saenuri approval ratings. The
demographics are as followed, people aged 50s to 80s had a 60 to 70 percent support of Park Chung Hee.
Additionally, they were categorized on which candidate and party they supported in the 2012 elections.
Over 65 percent of them supported Park Geun-hye and her Saenuri colleagues. See Gallup Korea, Gallup
Korea Daily Opinion No. 174.
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Graph 5.4. Source: Gallup Korea, “Korean Presidents Who Did the Best Job.” Graph by author.
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Graph 5.5. Source: Gallup Korea, “What Park Chung Hee Did Right.” Graph by author.
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Graph 5.6. Source: Gallup Korea, “What Park Chung Hee Did Wrong.” Graph by author.
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Graph 5.7. Source: Gallup Korea, “What Chun Doo-hwan Did Right.” Graph by author.
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Graph 5.8. Source: Gallup Korea, “What Chun Doo-hwan Did Wrong.” Graph by author.
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The Dokdo Islands Dispute, Part I
Authors Lee Seokwoo, Lee Hee Eun, Harry N. Scheiber, and Jon M. Van Dyke
research the historical and legal analyses behind the Dokdo Islands dispute.151 The
authors’ essays introduce the territorial clashes between Korea – inclusive of both North
and South – and Japan.152 Seokwoo and Hee Eun’s research is a brief historical overview
on the origins of the conflict. Whereas, Scheiber and Van Dyke follow up by describing
the legal disputes behind them; they are particularly interested in the treaties and
international negotiations that led to such contentions.
Seokwoo and Hee Eun label Dokdo as one of the last vestiges from Japan’s
colonial age (1895-1945). The authors also suggest that the issue is similar to Japan’s
claim on Russian Northern Territories (Kurile Islands) and Chinese-Taiwanese Senkaku
Islands (Diaoyudao Islands). All three case studies share the theme of unresolved World
War II negotiations; additionally, Dokdo is seen as more of a victim due to direct and
ineffectual US-Pacific oversight.
Japan’s claim to Dokdo officially began in 1905 when the Shimane Prefecture –
located in Honshu island near Hiroshima – incorporated most territories surrounding the
East Sea (Sea of Japan). Japan’s 1905 claim was an effect from their decisive victory in
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).153 The result was international acknowledgement

Seokwoo Lee is a Professor of International Law at Inha University, Incheon; Hee Eun Lee is
an Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Handong International Law School, Pohang; Harry N.
Scheiber is a Professor of Law and History at University of California, Berkeley; and Jon M. Van Dyke
is a Professor of Law at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa.
152
“Dokdo” is the Korean term for the islands while “Takeshima” is the Japanese label. The UN
also labels them “Liancourt Rocks.” The tiny islands are situated in the East Sea (Japan Sea) located east
of South Korea’s Gangwon province and North of Japan’s Honshu island. It is also worth noting that the
name “East Sea” is also a similarly contentious issue. Likewise, Japanese label the sea “Sea of Japan
(Japan Sea)” while Koreans and the UN label it “East Sea.”
153
The Russo-Japanese War occurred during the peak of Japan’s Meiji Reforms (1868-1912).
Japan’s decisive military victory is partly attributed to the successful naval battles led by Admiral Togo
151
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(The Treaty of Portsmouth) for Japan’s East Asian protectorate rights. Initially, Dokdo
was not mentioned as a territory, however, Japanese officials eventually labeled the
islands as terra nullius. In other words, Dokdo was an uninhabited area – perhaps
unknown to pre-twentieth century Western-Japanese cartographers – and by default was
in Japan’s sphere of influence.154
The timeline shifts to the aftermath of Japan’s August 1945 surrender and the
effects from the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. After former Imperial territories
gained independence, the treaty sought to conclude compensation and reparation claims.
While land reforms and infrastructure remuneration were addressed in the former
colonies, Dokdo was overlooked once again. Because of this, Dokdo’s ownership has
been a strain on Korean-Japanese relations for more than five decades.155
The authors conclude by outlining four points describing the issue from a Korean
perspective. First, the issue at heart is about past Japanese aggression lingering on until
contemporary times. Second, Imperial Japan’s takeover of the Korean peninsula is further
exacerbated by the violent use of military force to incorporate remote islands. Moreover,
Dokdo’s spanning reach in the East Sea was used to benefit Japanese military and
commercial ventures at the expense of Koreans. Befittingly, modern Korean academia
emphasizes the last two points.

Heihachiro, labeled by Western media as the “Asian Horatio Nelson.” The war quickly ended in one year
resulting in the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth. The Treaty was administered by Theodore Roosevelt, who
won a Nobel Peace Prize from it, and put an end to Russian expansionism while signaling Japan’s
hegemony in Asia. This status gave Japan exclusive protectorate rights over Korea and Manchuria,
thereby signaling the beginning of the Imperial Era. See Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan,
121.
154
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and
International Justice” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice (Leiden, Netherlands:
Brill Publishers, 2011), PDF e-book, 1.
155
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, 2.
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Third, Korea has a “tremendous amount” of historical evidence, and more
importantly, ancient records mentioning sparse occupation.156 Lastly, modern Japanese
scholarship still perpetrates past aggressions in a “nationalistic tone.”157 For example,
memorials like the Yasukuni Shrine and “textbook distortions” offer no apologies for past
transgressions of international order; this is compared to Germany’s full contrition
regarding Nazism. The diminutive references towards Imperial war crimes and military
aggression are meant to justify past wrongdoings and to “promote” a “distorted version”
of patriotism and nationalism.158

The Dokdo Islands Dispute, Part II
Scheiber and Van Dyke’s essay focus on the diplomatic and legal aspects of
Dokdo. Scheiber’s basis is that Korea has a very strong claim to the islands, and, if an
“international tribunal were to adjudicate the dispute, Korea would likely prevail.”159 He

The Goryeo-Song (circa 1145CE) book Samguk Sagi is an anthology of historical documents
detailing Korea’s Three Kingdom Era, otherwise known as the histories of Baekjae, Silla, and Goguryeo
(57BCE – 668CE). The anthology contains manuscripts and maps describing the “State of Usan-guk.”
Usan-guk was founded and ruled by Silla general Kim Isabu (ruled during the 6th century CE). Samguk
includes maps of Usan-guk with islands spread east of Ulleung-do Island, South Korea. Due to these,
Korean historiography asserts that Kim Isabu incorporated Dokdo into his rule centuries before Japan
first laid eyes on the rock islands. See Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo,”
1-4; and Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF), Dokdo, 24 and 55.
157
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo,” 2.
158
The Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja) is a Shinto memorial constructed in 1869 by the Meiji
Emperor. The shrine commemorates individuals, soldiers and civilians, who died while serving Japan,
and came under controversy after World War II. Japanese officials decided to enshrine most soldiers that
served in World War II and beyond. This included war criminals found guilty by the 1946 International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). The most infamous official was former Imperial Army
General and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo (1884-1948). The IMTFE found him guilty of being a leader in
enacting “aggressive war tactics against various nations” and the inhumane treatment of war prisoners
and civilians. Tojo was also found guilty of contributing to the massacre of millions mostly located in
Manchuria and Korea; he was later executed by hanging. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 601;
and Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 137 and 230.
159
Harry N. Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality: Perspectives from Law
and History on War Guilt in Relation to the Dokdo Island Controversy,” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal
and International Justice, ed., Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers,
156

204
explains that the Dokdo issue is mostly resolved as most international legal entities
attribute the islands as Korean territory. However, a concrete conclusion is yet to be as
the legal world awaits Japan’s official recognition of Dokdo as Korean territory.160
Scheiber furthermore expands on Dokdo litigation by criticizing two of Japan’s
“conventional legal frameworks,” ones that are still used today. First, the terra nullius
argument cites that Imperial Japan was in their rights to incorporate unclaimed or
undiscovered territory. However, this argument is rendered moot by many ancient
documents, such as Samguk Sagi, alongside other recorded recollections from medieval
trading vessels. Plainly put, a meticulously recorded history strongly disavows terra
nullius. Moreover, Japan’s use of this argument further cements Imperial history as a
“progression” that forced “Korea into a subservient status” intent on being “exploitative”
through “cruel rule.”161
Secondly, the vague territorial borders created by the San Francisco Peace Treaty
is used by the Japanese government as a defense. Scheiber notes that Korea’s exclusion
from treaty negotiations renders it impotent under current laws. If international courts
were to resolve the issue now, Korea’s past omission would allow the treaty to be thrown
out under outdated clauses.162
Subsequently, Scheiber posits that historical context was a crucial variable that
may have avoided the conflict altogether.163 Scheiber and Van Dyke attribute the United

2011), PDF e-book, 13.
160
Scheiber., 17.
161
Ibid., 16.
162
Ibid., 17.
163
Scheiber and Van Dyke note that Korea’s exclusion is attributed to a variety of variables. The
most prominent is General Douglas MacArthur’s sympathetic views towards a war-torn Japan.
MacArthur’s sentiments created a protective screen for Japanese negotiators. Furthermore, while the
Korean War was escalating in 1950, MacArthur was under the role of Supreme Commander for the
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States’ ineffectual attitude as a primary variable for American officials staying on the
sidelines; equally, their motives are also up for debate. One prominent reason was that
high-ranking US bureaucrats were distracted with Cold War Korean border clashes –
later escalating into the Korean War – and could not be bothered with resolving such
isolated claims. Subsequently, Japanese negotiators took advantage of the distraction and
excluded “Takeshima Island” as part of the territorial compensation clauses.164
Conversely, in exercising their right to exclude “Takeshima Island,” Japan
inadvertently forced themselves to agree to all terms set forth by the 1943 Cairo
Conference and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation.165 The clause in the Cairo Conference
states that “Japan will be . . . expelled from all other territories [inclusive of all Pacific
islands].” The Potsdam clause further cements these ultimatums by “limiting Japanese
sovereignty limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and to such
minor islands as we determine.”166 The “minor islands” label is accentuated as this term
is subject to changing times, thereby entailing that Japan should reevaluate all claims,
through UN oversight, to any contested islands.
In summary, postwar Japanese negotiators cleverly conveyed initial negotiations
in their favor, but, due to the outdated and arbitrary nature of such clauses, current

Allied Powers (SCAP). One of the SCAP’s tasks was to transform Japan into a manufacturing hub to
help provide a stable supply line for Pacific forces in Korea, and later Vietnam. Due to this, the SCAP
overlooked – whether intentionally or out of ignorance is up for debate – wartime issues, such as Dokdo
disputes and sex slavery (“comfort women”). Building Japan’s new economy and without any
hinderances was the main priority. See Andrew Gordon, 282; and Jinwung Kim, 349-350 and 257.
164
Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality,” 24.
165
The Cairo Conference and Potsdam Proclamation were conferences that outlined Japan’s
terms of unconditional surrender. Explicitly, these conferences demanded that Japan give back all lands
taken during World War II and to abolish any form of enslavement and indentured servitude among
affected regions. The conferences were led by Allied forces; however, the only Asian power present was
China’s Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) represented by Chiang Kai-shek. Korea was, therefore,
left out of crucial negotiations that dictated the future of the peninsula. See Harry N. Scheiber, 19-21.
166
Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality,” 19.
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international courts can easily discard them. Furthermore, Van Dyke warns that in
hindsight Korea’s exclusion from vital negotiations left out needed historical context –
such as almost a millennium worth of recorded ventures – that may have swayed General
MacArthur, also known as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), into
a more sympathetic role. This ultimately doomed what should have been a small issue
into decades worth of antagonism and fervent nationalist propaganda perpetrated by both
Korean and Japanese politicians.167 Figure 5.2 and Maps 5.1 and 5.2 contain pictures,
translations, and geography to help visualize the conflict.

Figure 5.2. Pictured is a translated excerpt taken from the government textbook Yeogi-neun Dokdo. Please note the
top source labelled “삼국사기 (1145)” is the Goryeo-Song anthology Samguk Sagi. Source: Northeast Asian
History Foundation (NAHF), Yeogi-neun Dokdo, 55.

During Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency (term: 2003-2008) Korean public-school curriculum,
from primary to secondary, required students to study Dokdo history. Likewise, Japanese curriculum
includes “Takeshima” claims while disregarding ancient Goryeo-Song history. In 2008, the conflict
escalated when Korean officials temporarily recalled the Japanese ambassador in Seoul as an attempt to
protest the whitewashing of history. See Jon M. Van Dyke, “Chapter III,” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal
and International Justice, 39; and Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 326 and 357.
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Map 5.1. Pictured is a copy of a map from Samguk Sagi. Circled are the islands of Usan-guk (Ulleung-do and Dokdo).
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Map 5.2 Pictured are three maps from 500 to 1500CE with the historical lands – also taken from Samguk Sagi sources – of Usan-guk and Dokdo circled.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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The “Comfort Women” Issue, Part I: Masculine Perspectives
Watanabe Kazuko analyzes how East Asian patriarchy influenced the “comfort
system.”168 Starting from 1918 and ending in 2000, Watanabe gives a brief history of
Japan’s prostitution system.169 She posits that the primary variable in Japanese sex
culture are the impenitent positions instilled by “Confucian patriarchal culture.”170 She
also adds that “Confucianism had taught [women] that [their chastity] was more valuable
than their lives.”171 Consequently, this created a “chastity myth” that collectively bound
both men and women.172
The myth was not only tied to women but also to men. Men were stigmatized with
hyperactive libidos while a woman’s worth was acquiescent to their virginity. Moreover,
men – fathers, brothers, and husbands – whose loved ones were “deflowered” were
branded as weak protectors under the same system and, therefore, were subject to be led
by more dominant men.173
Another factor that amplified patriarchal culture was wealth. Watanabe notes that
“‘Wealthy Japan’ has become the most notorious country in the world for recruiting and
exploiting women.”174 In other words, as Japan’s wealth flourished so did the
normalization of the sex industry.175 Watanabe posits that during the “First Wealthy Era

Kazuko Watanabe was a Roman Catholic nun and professor at Notre Dame Seishin
University, Okayama.
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Kazuko Watanabe, “Trafficking in Women's Bodies, Then and Now: The Issue of Military
‘Comfort Women’,” Peace & Change 20, no. 4 (1995): 22.
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Watanabe mentions that Confucianism is a cultural set of laws originating from Ancient China
that spread throughout East Asia. She mentions that it is highly patriarchal due to the power position
originating from fatherly figures. Thereby, women, especially the youth, are relegated to a submissive
position.
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Watanabe, “Trafficking in Women’s Bodies,” 22.
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Ibid., 23.
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“Wealthy Japan” is a two-era dichotomy. The first era of prosperity began during the end of
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(1912-1945)” Japan’s strong Confucian culture – manifested through military, business,
and civilian spheres – was a benefactor that created the “comfort system.”176 Moreover,
the SCAP’s oversight and punishment system during Japan’s post-World War II recovery
(1945-1952) was collectively lenient. Such clemency still lingers on the current polity’s
agenda, one that mostly consist of males.
This mentality ultimately carried over into the “Second Wealthy Era (1960s1991),” a period known for Japan’s ascension as an economic superpower. Concurrently,
domestic sex industries, such as local red-light districts, and international sex tourism
flourished. When collectively combined, Watanabe posits that this is a strong motif for
modern Japanese culture’s “non-recognition of past crimes” or, in other words,
insensitivity and willful ignorance of wartime sexual abuse.177
Watanabe’s emphasizes that in 2000 and beyond Japan shows some signs of
capitulating to international pressure; she labels this era as part of Japan’s
“instrumentalist nature.” This post-modern nature was achieved through “women’s

the Meiji Emperor’s reign until the World War II (1912-1945). The second era began shortly after the
SCAP’s exit and lasted until the Japanese Real Estate Asset Burst (1960s-1991). See Watanabe, 26-27.
176
For contextual history, the “comfort system” officially began in 1932 when Imperial military
clashed with Chinese officials in Shanghai. The “Shanghai Incident” prompted Japanese authorities to
quickly set up more bases and civilian outposts around colonies and protectorates. Nearby, sprawling
entertainment districts appeared overnight. Expatriate Japanese – consisted of military, civilian, and
government officials – used these districts for their leisurely activities, most notably, gambling and
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collective voices” becoming a “great force for [contrite] changes.”178 Watanabe
concludes that Confucian patriarchy still affects the government’s perturbed apologetic
responses. Additionally, her solution involves NGOs playing a bigger role in informing
the public about the plight of “comfort victims.”179

The “Comfort Women” Issue, Part II: Japan’s Stance on Contrition
Ku Yangmo focuses on Japan’s apologetic stances towards the “comfort system.”
Ku attempts to answer the question as to “why Japanese behaviors differ over time in
addressing apologies and compensation.”180 His research centers mostly on quantitative
deduction. Ku sets up a three-tier case study using causal theory in which he analyzes and
correlates various dependent (DV) and independent variables (IV) through a
chronologically leveled setting.181
The first tier of the study involves government “contrition responses.” This is
Ku’s DV (outcome variable) while the IVs are geopolitical and economical eras.182 He
labels his outcome variables on a three-level response: “no contrition, shallow contrition,
and deep contrition.”183 Ku’s second tier evaluation identifies a dichotomous IV labelled
as a “strong or weak transnational activism power (TPA).”184
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TPA is defined as progressive or conservative political cooperation among
activists, nationalists, and NGOs. TPA may also include international laws, such as the
Rome Statute.185 Ku categorizes “strong TPA” as a “progressively ruled government
body with low nationalist priorities and high social justice policies.” A “weak TPA” is a
conservative government with high nationalism and low social justice priorities.186 Ku’s
conclusion, or third tier analysis, combines and evaluates all variables from the first and
second tier.
The third-tier analysis uses two axes of IVs. The first axis is arranged in four
levels and split among four chronological decades starting from the 1950s and ending in
the mid-2000s. Ku chose these eras due to the importance they had in catering to
“Instrumentalism.” “Instrumentalism” is defined as a “state taking interest in contrite
stances when there is a security and/or economic advantage as a result.”187 The second
axis consists of labels portraying TPA sentiments and the various degrees of
“Instrumentalism.”
Ku’s data depicts the 1950s to 1980s as a conservatively-ruled era that held “no
contrition” stances. This is further amplified by low geo-economic interests from former
“comfort-system countries.” However, the years between 1991 to the mid-2000s show
the government shifting their stance from “no contrition” to “shallow contrition.” This is
due to the rising fiscal and military positions posed from South Korea, China, and
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Taiwan. In addition, North Korean security threats among nearby Japanese borders
further affected the shift away from “no contrition.”188 Conversely, apologetic measures
have largely been ignored for countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia who have
lower geopolitical influence compared to their East Asian counterparts.
The article ends with Ku acknowledging change, albeit very slowly, due to
regional and economic factors shifting away from Japanese interests. However, the most
recent twelve-year span data suggests that apologetic stances regressed quickly during
some periods of conservatively-ruled legislative and judicial branches. This may suggest
that international policies and condemnation have little influence over government
stances when compared to geo-economic variables.189
Similarly, Ku posits that the modern resurgence of Japanese conservativism –
seen through Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – may
“dampen transnational factors;” or in other words, apologetic stances will most likely
regress or be ignored under LDP leadership.190 Figure 5.3 provides a chart to better
situate Ku’s variables.

Figure 5.3. Ku’s independent and dependent variable alongside hypotheses from other scholars. Chart
made by author. Source: Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 246-248.
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Park’s bushido society was alive and well through his successor, Chun Doo-hwan;
and for a moment, it looked as if Chun’s use of Park-styled governance would hold up.
South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s was a booming society, abject poverty was abated,
and a new Western-modeled consumerist culture immersed a thriving middle-class. This
rags-to-riches story, nevertheless, came at a high cost. At the same time, Chun engulfed
the nation by amplifying Park-styled autocracy, thinking that this was the reason South
Korean society was booming and that he can get away with all power projections.
Behind-the-scenes, however, a new form of nationalism was solidifying as a
result. Minjung nationalism was a response to Chun’s oppressive regime. Starting in
1979, as a result from the Busan-Masan protests, this ideology formed through student
protests and was an initial failure – with Chun’s forces easily suppressing any dissent
through violent means. However, within a decade, minjung used democracy as a vehicle
while incorporating a big-tent philosophy. People from all walks of life, inclusive of the
disenfranchised, used minjung nationalism to promote universal suffrage and to vent
decades of pent-up rage against elderly poverty, gender income inequalities, and ignored
wartime atrocities.
The next section, therefore, finishes the timeline by analyzing the events that led
to minjung and to Chun’s eventual demise. Moreover, modern-day realities of both Park
and minjung nationalism are assessed side-by-side with current events, ones that are
eerily similar to the Park-Chun era.
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Chun’s Doo-hwan’s rule was in its eighth year and the dictator showed no signs
of stopping. The decade was mired in constant, often violent demonstrations, but no
matter how volatile the decade was minjung flames kept burning. Within nine years since
the Bu-Ma and Gwangju Protests (1979-1988), minjung became a solidified ideology
with a single end goal: the implementation of direct democratic elections. Similarly, the
primary variable that ousted Chun was overwhelming, massive, and diverse public
protests; however, there are additional factors, such as popular culture, religion, and
American response, that played an important role in shaping minjung nationalism from
the late 1980s onwards.
The first part of this chapter, therefore, seeks to explain the outside factors that
influenced minjung in the 1980s and how that set the foundations for contemporary South
Korean nationalism. The external variables examined are the socioeconomic events that
occurred domestically and internationally. Subsequently, these actions led to the
culmination of minjung nationalism during the 1987 June Struggle. Prerequisite events
leading up to June are therefore examined as well. Specifically, spiritual and feminist
roles are reanalyzed as imperative factors that contributed to Chun’s removal and
minjung’s ascension.
The second part takes some of these foundations, correlates them to modern times
(1990s-2010s), and concludes by exploring the future of South Korean nationalism. In
other words, it will discuss the role of minjung in the post-Chun era and the effects that it
may have on future generations. Accordingly, Park’s legacy is examined to determine
which vestiges of Park nationalism stick around today and whether they still impact
modern Korean government and society.
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Part I: The End of the Chun Era
Chun’s Economy
The 1960s to 1990s are dubbed “The Miracle on the Han River” due to South
Korea’s exponential economic growth.1 However, the term “miracle” is a misnomer that
suggests an unseen force bestowed South Koreans with sudden wealth; this would be
akin to winning the lottery. Undoubtedly, Park’s economic reforms and a determined
citizenry were key forces behind the miracle, and this, of course, did not happen
smoothly.
Park’s economy during his last days was firing on all cylinders partly due to a
series of Five-Year Plans (1962-1986). However, the years 1979-1981 were tumultuous
politically and economically.2 This was due to Park’s death and the subsequent vacuum
that occurred; most prominently, this void caused the Korean market to crash. Hence, in
the first time since 1962, South Koreans experienced negative growth and uncontrolled
inflation.3
Chaebol companies, on the other hand, were still undergoing what Park intended
them to do, mass exporting, and by this standard, chaebol was extremely successful.4
This tactic required tremendous amounts of capital, and, befittingly, high profits are
needed to sustain it. Chaebol economics did the exact opposite, revenue, sales volumes,
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and export quotas were easily achieved but profits were nowhere to be seen. Instead,
Park’s administration was highly adept at securing low-interest loans from the US, Japan,
and the IMF, which, in turn, sustained the export economy.5
Chun’s regime, on the other end, did not begin with the head start that Park’s did.
Rather, it was during Park’s last year where the cracks of the chaebol economy showed.
Park’s slow alienation from Western allies due to his nuclear armament programs and
opposition crackdowns diminished his access to these loans. Furthermore, this was
exacerbated by the 1979 Oil Shock and aggressive “pump and dump” exporting.6
As reported from a 1990 US Embassy report, Americans business leaders from
the Park-Chun era were suspicious of the chaebol economy:
In the mid-1970s, the Korean economy displayed significant growth
and began to compete with the U.S. for international markets. In
response to aggressive Korean economic ventures, the U.S. began to
demand fair market access in Korea. In the 1980s this economic
competition caused serious friction as American trade and budget
deficits rose to an all-time high. To reduce the trade deficits, the U.S.
pressured for access to the Korean market.7
Chun eventually caved to US trade pressures, thereby opening some markets to American
companies; however, the damage was done. South Koreans saw the first hiccup in their
newly modernized market and the state of reliance that bushido economics was based
on.8
Just like the Bu-Ma protests, Park never saw the consequences of the 1979-1980
crash; Chun did, however. People were starting to see the facade behind bushido
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nationalism. For example, bushido economy emphasized financial autonomy through
sheer will and strength; however, the absence of cheap loans made this anything but
independent. Chaebol CEOs, employees, and the public saw just how dependent their
economy was on global factors as inflation skyrocketed upwards to 25 percent while
household wealth stagnated.9 In short, Chun’s initial economic tenure can be summed up
in one sentence: the chaebol and bushido economy were nothing but a paper tiger.10
Christianity and Women
The months leading up to the landmark “June Struggle” saw the culmination of a
decade’s worth of protests. The last transformation of minjung nationalism was in sight,
and not even the protestors knew what would become of it. While the protests were
initially carried out by university students, the urban poor, and artists, Chun’s handling of
the economy – in particular, the dismantling of Saemaul undong in the early 1980s –
garnered the anger of one of Park’s most loyal constituents, the rural population.11
For context, Chun’s administration diverted Saemaul funds, among many other
Park era programs, from rural communities due to the economic turbulence of the 1980s.
Likewise, village communities felt the oncoming economic pressure – accumulated
wealth vanishing overnight – and emigrated to metropolises as a result. Still, their
Chang, Financial Crisis, 57.
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poverty followed them to the cities. What the former villagers did gain, however, was a
newfound appreciation for spiritual comfort. Consequently, a burgeoning and relatively
new urban community came from those same villages, and surprisingly, women
constituted a good portion of it.12
These female villagers, who were once relegated to housework and family life,
emigrated to urban areas in droves with the hopes of providing for their impoverished
families.13 This group, although still a minority, was paid severely low wages. Usually,
women were relegated to menial positions in healthcare, clerical, hospitality, and textile
services.14 Nevertheless, no matter their position many of those women shared one thing
in common, Christianity.
The power of the burgeoning Christian movement cannot be understated. It not
only affected the minjung movement and its leaders, such as Kim Dae-jung, it also
inadvertently gave a voice to the disenfranchised, including female laborers, the elderly,
and the disabled. One such woman, among many others, was Song Hyo Soon. Song lived
in a fatherless household with her disabled mother and younger siblings. She also came
from an impoverished village that did not see the effects of Saemaul undong. In the late
1970s, at the age of sixteen, she migrated to the city intent on working in a factory as the
family’s sole bread earner.15
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Ms. Song was fired from her factory job after filing a complaint to the Labor
Bureau after years of dangerous working conditions. Immediately, she banded together
with other affected women and found solace in spirituality. Not only did Song voice the
plight of her recently terminated female coworkers but also the sentiments of the nation’s
oppressed. Song wrote:
[She and her friends] rented a room near the factory to continue the
fight. The first night, ten women sat together to have dinner. Since they
did not have a table, they used the floor. One of them said grace: “Oh,
God, we will trust you and depend on you even in the most difficult
situations. Please take care of us and keep us from giving up and from
compromising with injustice.” They sang a protest hymn often sung
by Christians and students, and cried.16
The hymn’s appeal with both students and Christians was not an act of coincidence;
rather, this was the core of minjung nationalism. Korean citizens from all walks of life
shared Song’s feelings, and towards the end of the 1980s, realized they were living in an
elitist society – a society Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson warned about. Ironically, this
society was also one General Park sought to destroy when he took over Rhee’s oligarchic
government in the 1960s.17
In short, Park and Chun’s Social Darwinist society expected the weak, pathetic,
and oppressed to sit out during an era known for vibrant growth and wealth accumulation
– and for a time, this was the norm. As Song’s story attests, women were just one of
many minority groups that were marginalized in order for South Korea to flourish.
However, it was this group, alongside university students and many other activists, that
also played an important role towards universal democracy.
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Eventually, most oppressed groups came together under similar causes felt by
Song. These groups contributed just as much sweat and blood for South Korean
prosperity, so the understanding that Park and Chun’s society sidelined them was an
infuriating notion. This realization, in turn, allowed Koreans to go back to their minjok
roots; or put otherwise, Korea’s psyche was now in sync with Sin and Choe’s teachings.18
After three decades of twisted minjok agendas, the vicious circle was over, and, as Choe
puts it, Koreans were together again. Just as Koreans had to band together to fend off the
wrath of Imperial Japan, Koreans were bounded once again with one end goal: to survive
and replace Chun’s deadly fury with democracy.19
Kang Myung-koo ties these survivalist propensities to Park-inspired
“Developmentalist Mentalite.” Kang relates these principles to the teachings of
sociologist Yim Huisop that “South Koreans [due to strong class consciousness] have a
tendency to understand and organize human relations and social ethics in order of
rank.”20 While this may have been true for most of the 1970s and 1980s, 1987 was very
different. As attested by Ms. Song and reverberated by Christian leaders and minjung
protestors, 1987 was the year that the teachings of early Korean nationalists were heard
by the citizenry. Hence, and for a short time, political, gender, religious, and
socioeconomic lines were transcended in order to accomplish the impossible.21
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Kukbon
A common superhero plot is when each hero wields an extremely different but
beneficial set of skills with one goal in mind: to stop evil. Working together to achieve
this is difficult, sometimes violent, as egos may get in the way. The heroes may also clash
on occasion, failing to stop evil as a result. However, usually at the very end, success is
eventually achieved after each hero ignores their differences and convenes together for
the greater good. Colloquially speaking, this plotline draws many comparisons with
Kukbon and the June Struggle.
Kukbon (pronounced gook-bōn) was an organization consisting of the best that
minjung offered. It was diverse in nature and had a will that could not be broken even
with the worst of beatings. Most notably, Kukbon was comprised of protest leaders from
all different parts of the nation. Some groups included were blue-collar workers, doctors,
women, farmers, artists, and religious leaders from different sects – notably Christian and
Buddhist.22 As late as the mid-1980s, these groups had little connection with each other,
each assembly having their own set of sociopolitical goals of course.23
Minjung diversity, however, was not new and was a detriment eight years prior
during the Bu-Ma and Gwangju Protests. The lack of leadership and discipline led to
spontaneous and broken nationwide protest, and suffice it to say, not much was
accomplished. Leaders knew that if this was repeated, more tragedy would occur.
Likewise, Park and Chun officials knew this tactic very well, and, taking a cue from the
KCIA playbook, their plan was to always divide and conquer.24
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One way that Park effectively divided the opposition’s strength was by installing
a Neo-Confucian hierarchy in every aspect of society, from business to farming and to
consumerism.25 Chun’s regime effectively copied this for most of the 1980s; however,
1987 saw the last of it. Protestors finally figured out that division among them worked
terrifyingly well for elitists, and more so, it had a solidifying a grip over minjok
principles. Kukbon sought to counter this through experienced leadership, rigid
discipline, timed and organized mass protesting, and a fight to the death attitude.
The leaders chosen for this task were the experienced and meticulous Reverend
Oh Choong-il and the compassionate – yet orderly – Buddhist monk Gi Son. The
headquarters chosen was Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul; the frontline soldiers were
thousands of desperate, yet passionate, university students; and their moral and physical
support were millions of protesters nationwide. Finally, the chosen date to start mass
protests was around the anniversary of the Gwangju Massacre, May 18.26 Kukbon was
finally solidified and became a forced to be reckoned with. Three-decade’s worth of
bushido agendas finally met their match, and, in June, South Korean society and minjung
nationalism took center stage.
The June Struggle
The June Struggle is recorded as an event that lasted about nineteen days, from
June 10 to June 29, but actual protesting began in late May. The May-June protests were
a constant back-and-forth with state authorities – and encounters were often violent with
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no end in sight. This did not matter as millions of protestors felt an aura of invincibility –
in part due to Kukbon’s leadership. Likewise, and to the befuddlement of state
authorities, many activists were willfully arrested, tortured, and beaten just to make a
statement. The turning point, however, was when two university students, Park Jong-chol
and Lee Han-yol, were killed.27 Koreans, having had enough of senseless killings, were
in a furor.
The month of June saw urban areas – the center of Korean finance and
manufacturing – halt completely. Unexpectedly too, chaebol white-collar workers – the
last urban support of the Park-Chun era – were fed up with the protests. Granted, this
group had a lot to lose, such as gainful and well-paid employment, but nevertheless, the
deaths of the two students along with Chun’s slow capitulation to Western markets
revealed the dictator and chaebol’s true intentions.28
Worded differently, the Park-Chun economy only cared about the elites at home
and abroad. If the elites were willing to easily stamp out two students, then anyone was
fair game in this dog-eat-dog society. Akin to a pre-Park Korea, the law and order that
bushido emphasized, and arguably achieved, vanished overnight with the deaths of the
two students. Koreans from just about every corner and walks of life participated in the
protests.
What a sight to behold as well. Taxi drivers to expensive-suited employees –
dubbed the “necktie brigade” – were all participating in destroying police precincts,
military outposts, and government offices.29 Furthermore, spectators at home and abroad
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saw that Koreans were not only willing to sacrifice their well-being but the wealth and
prosperity they gruelingly built from scratch.30 Nevertheless, and even to the doubt of
Kukbon leaders, the citizenry kept their composure and order, destruction was kept
mostly to state facilities and causalities were low.
One American correspondent, Michael Breen, was taken aback by the ferocity –
yet well-ordered nature – of the protests:
Drivers blared their horns as a gesture of support. Police saturated
protesters with tear gas. They escaped through alleys and regrouped.
Shopkeepers pulled down their shutters but opened them to rescue
stragglers spluttering from the gas. The battle line kept shifting. The
rubble of street warfare was everywhere. Fist-sized chunks of paving
stone littered main thoroughfares. But there was an order. No shops
smashed, no cars overturned, nothing burned, and miraculously, no one
killed.31
Indeed, not an easy feat to achieve, and it only proved that June protestors were not
willing to stoop to Park-Chun bushido tactics.
On the contrary, Sin and Choe’s minjok ethics emphasized not to harm their
Korean brethren.32 The month of June, therefore, signaled the beginnings of South
Korea’s entrance into a highly developed democracy. For the citizenry, however, it
proved that minjung’s raw strength lied in the compassion for their land, culture, and
people – and not in Park’s might-makes-right principles. Otherwise put, minjung is
minjok, and vice versa. The Chun era personified the last remnant of Park’s agendas and
now they were both a thing of the past.
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***
It has been thirty years since Park Chung-hee shaped Korea into his image. Park’s
“developmental dictatorship” undoubtedly changed Korea’s socioeconomic and cultural
landscape; however, that was a bygone era. Gone was the age of bushido’s extreme
Social Darwinism and authoritarianism. This change was accomplished by minjung, a
movement that installed minjok’s unaltered form back to Korean society. When this was
achieved, modern Korean nationalism was changed forever. In front of it, was a new
societal frontier. Part II, thereby, seeks to explain what that new frontier is and the
elements – old and new – that shaped modern Korean’s patriotism and love for their
country.

Figure 6.1. Left, the flag (Taeguk-gi) of the Korean Empire (1898-1910). Right, the flag (also named Taeguk-gi) of
South Korea pictured in the photo “Minju juui yeo Mansae!” (Dear Democracy!). This is the most iconic photo of the
June Protests and was taken by photographer Koh Myung-Jin. Please note the similarities of both flags and that Sin
Chaeho and Choe Namson were both born during the short-lived Empire. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Part II
Half a year into 1988, the minjung movement was on the brink of success. With
millions of protestors nationwide, state authorities were exhausted and literally out of riot
suppressing gear. In desperation, Chun Doo-hwan ordered the use of live munitions. The
police force, however, finally realized that Chun’s madness had no bounds and disobeyed
his orders.33 Concurrently, cities were in an anti-American furor over the lack of
oversight, simultaneously burning handmade Reagan dummies; as a result, embassies and
consulates went on lockdown.34
A 1990 US government report succinctly summed their surprise minjung’s antiAmerican attitudes:
The young generations [generations born in the late 1960s to 1970s] are
more nationalistic because they have not personally witnessed U.S.
contributions to liberation in 1945 and to the Korean War in 1950. But
they do recall the questionable role of the U.S. in the Kwangju incident
in 1980 and the continuing U.S. pressure for market access during the
1980s. To this younger generation, the U.S. is just another country out
to fulfill its own interests.35
American “contributions” since 1945 to post-Korean War, therefore, were – and to the
dismay of young minjung nationalists – a necessity. South Korea, as John F. Kennedy
pointed, was a “hopeless” cause while military officials labelled the ROK as
“burdensome protectorate.”36 However, in the 1980s, American sentiments unexpectedly
mirrored that past.
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Just a couple days before the June Protests, US Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Armitage snubbed any involvement in Korean political affairs simply saying that
“Frankly, we’re really busy.”37 Thinking America would overlook all actions – thereby,
evoking Bu-Ma and Gwangju results – Chun ordered ROK troops to the cities as a lastditch effort to suppress the chaos. ROK troops were nonetheless under the guidance of
US General John A. Wickham, Jr. The American General immediately dismissed Chun’s
order on grounds of usurpation, threatening imprisonment for any ROK personnel willing
to follow the dictator’s lead.38
America’s blind eye was no more, the Reagan Administration’s panic over losing
such a close economic and military ally caused the US Secretary of State to demand a
resolution to the minjung protests. On July 10, 1987, Chun resigned from the presidency,
and with that the last vestige of Park-era governance was finished. Minjung finally
succeeded and democracy was immediately enacted on a national and local scale;
Koreans from all walks of life could now vote for their fates.39
With Minjung protesting over it was time to rebuild. The ideology succeeded but
now the need for the movement was in question. While minjung never went away, as it
was part of minjok ethics, the new sociopolitical frontier Korea was thrust into took
precedent over people’s everyday affairs. This next part, therefore, seeks to explain the
characteristics of that frontier. Specifically, what institutions took over bushido
nationalism; and the affects that Park and minjung still have on Korea today.
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Park’s Legacy at Home
After months of exhausting most state resources on protestors, along with
pressure from American allies, Chun Doo-hwan’s reign ended; Chun resigned on
February 1988.40 The last elements of the Park era gone. With Park’s agendas at a close,
analysts from Korea and the world were soon voicing their critiques of Park.
Domestically, Koreans had a mixed view of Park after Chun’s ousting. Chosun
Ilbo newspaper editor Lee Young Duk gave a lukewarm comment on Park’s governance:
We criticized Park Chung Hee because we saw things through the
prism of American democracy and human rights. But if we had had
American democracy in the 1960's, would we have achieved this much?
Perhaps Park Chung Hee's approach was better suited to the public
consciousness of the time.41
This was further reiterated by former US American-Korean ambassador Richard A.
Ericson, Jr., in a 1995 interview. Ericson recalled Congress’s sentiments towards Park:
Americans did not expect this kind of thing to happen [in reference to
Park’s human rights violations]. This went against all of our values, all
of our instincts, etc. And that it could not help but fail to influence
attitudes in significant sectors of the American public, including the
Congress, and the media, to develop anti-ROK government
attitudes. . . .42 The American press always portrayed [Park] as an
autocratic little monster.43
In short, minjung not only ousted Chun but tarnished Park’s legacy at home and abroad.
However, Park’s unorthodox governance, while heavily criticized, strongly influenced
the developing world until this day.44
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Modern Times: A New Frontier
Since the pinnacle of South Korean dissidence was over, the reinvigorated East
Asian republic was moving towards a new future. Elections were held immediately on a
presidential and representative level, and this time elections were strictly monitored for
integrity. Many thought the next president was to be minjung leader Kim Dae-jung;
however, another progressive candidate, Kim Young-sam, split the vote. To the chagrin
of minjung activists, South Korea’s next president was Chun’s original successor Roh
Tae-woo (term: 1988-1993).45
Even though President Roh briefly led Chun’s former political party, the
Democratic Justice Party, the National Assembly (NA) saw majority gains from the
progressive Minju Dang. As such, Roh’s presidency was hamstrung and tarnished from
past Chun atrocities; and, as an effect, he capitulated leadership to the progressive-led
NA.46 Some of Roh’s legislative retreats led to the beginning of chaebol regulations,
creation of safety oversight departments, and more union representation in the
workforce.47
The Roh era also marked South Korea’s entrance into highly developed economic
territory; similarly, it was undergoing the challenges that comes with the ascension:
cyclical recessions, high labor costs, and a switch from export to service-oriented
markets. As Kang Myung-koo posits, “developmental mentalite” was the new society,
one that mirrored Korea’s Western allies.48 Minjung seemed to be forgotten as the
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standard of living was rising and Koreans were now participating in a new
hypercompetitive environment.
Furthermore, Kim Jinwung details the very fabric of modern South Korea as an
“egalitarian and individualist” society still heavily engrained with “Confucian hierarchy”
especially in private affairs.49 Therefore, while Koreans were now past Park’s mightmakes-right governance, elements of bushido were evident through the hypercompetitive
nature of consumerism and class status – inclusive of job position, education attainment,
and owning the latest luxury items. In short, the socioeconomic lines that minjung
transcended was back and possibly more entrenched in people’s everyday lives.
Otherwise put, bushido culture was gone but Park-style Neo-Confucian nationalism was
still prevalent in the new consumer culture.
Nevertheless, that did not matter much to post-minjung Koreans. They were
experiencing a renaissance of republican representation, lessening restrictions on political
speech, and worker empowerment. In short, Koreans were enjoying the pleasures of a
highly developed life. Minjung protesting, therefore, completed its objectives, and the
time of intense political actions were over. In hindsight, however, this was far from the
truth as the ghosts of Park and minjung never died but instead were dormant, waiting to
strike when least expected.
After Roh’s tenure, the next presidents consisted of former minjung leaders, most
notably, Kim Dae-jung (term: 1998-2003).50 Kim’s presidency started on shaky grounds
due to the 1997 recession; however, his tenure was known for shifting South Korea into
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the digital age.51 Furthermore, Kim and a newer generation of Koreans took Park’s
bushido-styled technocracy and tempered it. The overemphasis on educational attainment
carried over so successfully that Yoon Bang-Song posits that there was a “reverse brain
drain (RBD)” engrained into Korean culture.52 Eventually, this gave way to the
hypercompetitive “developmental mentalite” generation and may have exacerbated this
social phenomenon.53
In summary, RBD was a product of Park’s technocracy – a vestige of bushido
academic culture – which instilled a new generation of youths to fervently compete in all
things academic and materialistic. Nevertheless, these were mostly positive outcomes as
South Korea turned into a “soft superpower.”54 Chaebol products were now high in
quality and outselling global competitors such as Sony; Korean broadband and
telecommunications led the world in innovation; new wave Korean pop culture (hallyu)
dominated media charts worldwide; and Korean biotechnology research was prevalent
worldwide.55
Ghost of Minjung
According to You Jung-sung, South Korea was now in the pantheon of highly
developed “OAO” territory. Koreans proved that their society and economy were robust
enough to undergo landmark events that would destroy most developing nations. The
East Asian republic survived numerous society-shattering protests, raised its HDI, and
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endured two recessions.56 Likewise, Koreans rightfully enjoyed a lifestyle afforded to a
few select countries with the tumultuous era of Park and minjung now relegated to
museums and textbooks. Therefore, a new generation of Koreans may have forgotten, or
perhaps willfully ignored, their developing past; but in 2012, Park’s ghost reemerged
once again when his daughter, Park Geun-hye (pronounced Pawk Geun Hey) was elected
to the presidency.57
The younger Park’s ascension, however, did not come overnight but was foretold
through minjung past. A newly empowered center-right party, Saenuri, gained
prominence during the 1997 Financial Crash. Arguably, their strict austerity measures
and deregulation of chaebol labor laws helped Korea survive their greatest economic
challenge since the Korean War. To prove this, Geun-hye’s predecessor and former
chaebol executive – CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction – Lee Myung-bak
(term: 2008-2013) was easily elected in 2007.58 Consequently, his resignation as Saenuri
leader allowed for Geun-hye to take his former position; once Lee finished his term,
Geun-hye won the presidency in a hotly-contested election.
Park Geun-hye’s presidency started out controversially and was mired in
allegations of corruption. However, in 2016, accusations culminated when evidence of
bribery and “Rasputin-like” control over the executive surfaced between Geun-hye and
her best friend Choi Soon-sil.59 Dubbed “Choi-Soon-Sil-gate,” comparisons of ParkChun elitism resurfaced, thereby signaling that some ghosts never die. As such, Geun-
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hye’s years of avoiding corruption charges signaled one thing: perhaps the new Korean
generation forgot their minjung roots.
On the contrary, just like a yin to a yang, Park and minjung could not exist
without one another. Consequently, minjung’s ghost resurfaced through the citizenry’s
rage, emotion’s mirroring the ferocity of the 1980s.60 Immediately, protesters, young and
old, took to the streets by the millions. As a result, the 2016 Candlelight Protests erupted.
Protestors nationwide occupied city halls, legislative houses, and the president’s
residence – the Blue House.61
The significance of these protests harkened back to Sin and Choe’s teachings.
New generations of Koreans were living through a “developmental mentalite” society
divided by status and materialism; however, the Candlelight Protests transcended these
lines, and, for a moment, Koreans were now one entity united – they were minjok.
Ultimately, the Candlelight Protests succeeded, and the younger Park was impeached and
arrested under corruption charges.62
Perhaps most notably however, newer generations outdid their minjung
forefathers. Gone were the days of state-authorized beatings and the burning of
government facilities. Whether other republics knew it or not, the Candlelight Protests
proved to the world that modern South Korean nationalism was synonymous with
peaceful and effective mass protesting.
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Park’s Legacy Abroad
Singapore and 1980s China (People’s Republic of China) saw similar rapidly
developing eras equivalent to their South Korean neighbors. The leaders of these two
nations were Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015) and China’s Deng Xiaoping
(1904-1997). Just like Park, they both ruled uncontested for decades by relegating and
suppressing democratic institutions. But more importantly, all three leaders followed a
state-building blueprint echoing Park’s “developmental dictatorship.”63
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew
On the surface Park Chung Hee’s and Lee Kuan Yew seem contrasted from each
other. Park’s agendas were based on Imperial bushido institutions while Lee used British
governance. However, when looking closer, the mentality behind their state agendas were
almost identical. When it came to economics, in particular foreign markets, Park and Lee
obsessed over copying the technocratic governance of exporting giants, Japan and West
Germany. Ezra F. Vogel analyzed these comparisons by explaining how both men
skillfully acquired all the “help and guarantee needed, through foreign assistance, in
achieving economic growth.”64
Primary sources on Lee are not found in Vogel’s analysis; however, using sources
taken from Lee’s own interviews and memoirs better situates the similarities that the
Singapore leader had with Park-like technocracy. In a 1979 interview Lee said:
Workers [in Singapore] were not as proud of or as skilled in their jobs
compared to the Japanese or the Germans . . . Then you have to educate
rigorously and train a whole generation of skilled, intelligent,
knowledgeable people who can be productive.65
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Furthermore, to achieve this highly educated and capable workforce, both men used
elements taken from Neo-Confucian principles to instill some form of societal and
psychological order.
As evident in Lee’s 1998 memoirs The Singapore Story, the former prime
minister gave an unapologetic take on his top-down leadership, “Between being loved
and being feared, I have always believed Machiavelli was right. If nobody is afraid of
me, I’m meaningless.”66 Furthermore, Lee’s analysis on non-Eastern societies are highly
reminiscent of Park’s law and order mentality:
The erosion of the moral underpinnings of Western society which
having lost its “ethical basis” had to accept guns, drugs, violent crime,
vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public – in sum the breakdown of
civil society.67
Without a doubt, Park and Lee emphasized Eastern-styled patriarchal leadership among
their “households.”68 Lee even stated that: “The ruler or the government does not try to
provide for a person what the family best provides,” and just like their economies, both
men wanted rigid stratified order in the citizenry’s private lives.69
In fact, these polemics came about through the anarchic beginnings of both
nations.70 Lee further reiterated that modern Singaporean prosperity was achieved
because of the state’s draconian intervention of lawlessness:
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[Singaporeans achieved] a well-ordered society so that they can have
maximum enjoyment of their freedoms. This freedom can only exist in
an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.71
Using Confucian-inspired agendas, both leaders’ nationalistic leadership was birthed
through chaos, and as a result, state prosperity was achieved.
No matter the similarities, however, the two executives never met and whether
each dictator’s government influenced the other is speculation. In the end, instead of
discussing which agendas affected one another, it is better to posit that Neo-Confucian
nationalism transcends political borderlines. As Lee succinctly analogizes, Park’s familial
socioeconomic perspectives falls in line with what “the family best provides,” no other
entity – government and business – can take that place.72
China’s Deng Xiaoping
Deng Xiaoping (pronounced Dung Shou’ping), on the other end, was more open –
and praiseful – about copying Park’s state-building campaigns. Harvard University’s
Senior US researcher William Overholt met with Park and Deng officials in the 1970s
and 1980s. Mr. Overholt, during an interview with the Korean newspaper Munhwa ilbo,
gave his analysis on both dictators:
President Park Chung-hee carefully observed his efforts to develop the
economy through the Saemaul Movement. At the time, there were
many demonstrations by students criticizing Park’s dictatorship, and I
was deeply troubled by the Korean debate over the issue of economic
development and democratization. Later, when I went to China, China
was in the same worry. I think Deng Xiaoping copied the development
strategy of Korea, the “Park Chung Hee model” as it is.73
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Park’s bushido-infused state-building certainly had an impact on Deng’s developmental
agendas that it was even dubbed the “Park Chung Hee Model.” Furthermore, Harvard
colleague Ezra F. Vogel expanded on the “Park Model” during a lecture at the 33rd
Korea Foundation Forum:
Just as Deng Xiaoping rescued China from the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution and transformed his country into a global economic power,
I think Korea of today wouldn’t be here if it were not for Park Chunghee.74
The “Park Model,” therefore, suggests that strongmen – and whatever nationalist vehicles
they need – are needed to “rescue” their countries at critical junctions. Rescue in this case
meant rapidly building a springboard to shoot the state into prosperity.
For Park, the critical eras include Korea’s destitution after the colonial era and
through the Korean War (1895-1953); for Deng, it was after Mao’s perilous Great Leap
Forward and Cultural Revolution Campaigns (1958-1976).75 As such, the results for both
nations were uncanny – instantaneous economic growth and societal order, albeit through
heavy authoritarian means. This was due in part to their pragmatic stances after decades
of political and socioeconomic ineffectiveness.
The key for both leaders was pragmatism. Deng famously analogized this in
relation to China’s overnight market liberalization, “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or
white, so long as it catches mice.”76 When compared to Park’s stances on capital loan
attainment, then it is easy correlate Yoon Bang-Song’s research with Vogel’s.77 In other
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words, bushido nationalism requires practicality, as seen through the Meiji emperor and
Park’s adoption of Western institutions. Of course, that comes at a high cost.
The cost being strict autocratic rule while violently antagonizing opponents and
drawing the angst of their respective constituents. In Park’s case, Yushin decrees,
violently suppressing opposition, and alienating close anti-Japanese constituents. For
Deng, similarly censoring dissent while shunning hardline communist elites – in the case
of market liberalization.78 Nevertheless, pragmatism is in both of their blood and is easily
their most observable trait.
However, there is also a more engrained and darker trait that Park and Deng
share, one that goes against the very grain of modern minjung nationalism. Their
Singaporean counterpart, Lee Kuan Yew, has been labelled a “benevolent dictator” due
to his less violent means of suppressing dissidence but, in contrast, Deng and Park used
much different tactics during the Tiananmen Massacre and the Bu-Ma Protests.
Ultimately, this meant that both chairmen suppression tactics transcended time.
Coincidentally, the 1989 Tiananmen Protests erupted shortly after the 1987 June
Struggle.
More importantly, it was a protest enacted by university students reminiscent of
minjung objectives. Even though each nation’s protestors had their own goals, some
goals did coincide with each other. For example, citizens demanded democratic
accountability for hardline politicians and reformation of China’s dependency on state-
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owned company finances. Tiananmen, therefore, was a fight against political and
business elites just like its minjung counterpart.79
Park and minjung nationalism are the opposite of one another, yet they are still
one entity. In other words, Park’s legacy at home and abroad are seen through the eyes of
minjung, and vice versa. From a Singaporean viewpoint, Park and minjung are
reminiscent of the Neo-Confucian hierarchy so deeply entrenched in the 1970s and
1980s. In addition, the technocratic culture learned from decades of foreign interaction
were what Park and Lee envisioned and is still very prevalent today. Consequently, a
high standard of living was achieved by both nations; therefore, this may be construed by
spectators as a positive outcome due to autocratic leadership.
From a Chinese viewpoint, Deng’s pragmatism coincided with Park’s willingness
to expand the country’s market economy, and, to an extent, be led by foreigners. As a
result, Chinese development mirrors Park’s “developmental dictatorship” system
resulting in astronomical poverty alleviation. Even more evident is that Korean
economist Chang Se-jin and many Western counterparts go as far as to label China’s
export economy an exact mirror of Park’s chaebol-export system but on a massive
scale.80
On the other hand, the practicality in minjung was securing a single cause that all
Koreans could support. Unfortunately, the Chinese case study shows the darker side of
South Korean nationalism as well. Minjung’s struggle was tragically repeated during the
Tiananmen Square massacre with adverse results – the continuation of strict autocratic
governance.
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***
The end of Chun’s reign was one of the last pieces needed to thrust South Korea
into a highly developed society. Hereafter, direct elections for presidents and
representatives allowed Koreans to control their fates unimpeded for the first time since
the inception of their young republic. The ghosts of Park Chung Hee and minjung,
therefore, were relegated to the annals of history. Furthermore, the “developmental
dictatorship” blueprint Park created garnered interest from other state-building
executives. Leaders from Singapore to China displayed many similarities to Park’s
unorthodox governance and nationalism, thereby ensuring that his agendas live on
outside Korea.
However, Park’s ghost still haunted the peninsula and was resurrected when his
daughter, Park Geun-hye, was elected in 2013. The ghosts of minjung revived alongside
Geun-hye amid a flurry of corruption charges and claims of oligarchic governance –
mirroring her father’s tenure. As a result, the 2016 Candlelight Protests and the younger
Park’s impeachment was a testament that South Korea’s strongman past and minjung are
one entity.
Ultimately, there are still elements of Park’s Neo-Confucian hierarchy in Korea.
Three decades of bushido and Social Darwinist cultures are still heavily entrenched in
modern society. However, minjung tempered those entities by focusing those elements
strictly on technological innovations, high-quality education, and burgeoning a popular
culture scene. Indeed, South Koreans came a long way from a past riddled with
destitution, violence, and autocracy. In the end, Koreans from all walks of life
painstakingly earned their status as an OAO power.
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Final Conclusion:
Park Chung Hee’s Nationalism in Perspective
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A Gallup Poll conducted in August 2015 surveyed voters aged 19 to 55 about
which “Korean President Did the Best Job.” Park Chung Hee received about 44 percent
of the votes; Kim Dae-Jung received about 14 percent; and Chun Doo-hwan garnered 3
percent.1 These three presidents were the main figures of the bushido and minjung
movements. Therefore, it comes to no surprise that Chun placed close to last in the poll
due to the overwhelming protests and international condemnation that engulfed his
presidency.
Park’s Gallup support, however, has some significance. Even with the volatility
during the Yushin decree until his death (1972-1979), Park’s administration received
overwhelming support from a range of survey-takers citing economics, Saemaul undong,
and poverty alleviation as his greatest accomplishments. On the other end, Park’s greatest
transgressions – titled “What He Did Wrong” and receiving more than 70 percent – was
Yushin and democratic suppression.2
Clearly, when coupled with Kang Myung-koo’s “Developmental Mentalite”
theory, it is possible to surmise that Park’s Neo-Confucian bushido agenda is generally
viewed favorably among current voters. In fact, Park’s bushido society, inclusive of
chaebol economics, brought South Koreans rapid wealth and a higher standard of living,
and due to that, it is received positively by most voters.
Of course, economic growth came at a significant cost. Park’s governance
capitalized on five centuries worth of Korean nationalist history combined with the
deadly Social Darwinist culture of the Imperial Japanese military. For better or worse,
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Park-era nationalism turned contemporary South Korea into an autocratic, highly
stratified, affluent, and materialistic-oriented society.3 In so doing, it perfectly falls in line
with Kang’s thesis and further cements Park with the title of “Developmental Dictator.”4
On the other end, Park’s Yushin tactics were almost universally despised; and
therefore, lends credence that minjung was a byproduct of bushido.5 This ideological gap
verifies one thing: from the 1900s to now, South Korean nationalism cannot be situated
in one single solid timeline. Referring to Figure II in the Introduction, it is a timeline with
a main branch, minjok, that deviates into two main branches, bushido and minjung.
Ultimately, only one branch, minjok, returns into the main timeline. Therefore, the next
conclusion seeks to combine all aspects of Park and minjung nationalism into an
organized timeline inclusive of point of divergences and convergences.
Timeline of South Korean Nationalism from 1900s to 2016
In the early 1900s, Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson, as a response to Imperial
Japan’s takeover, laid the foundation for Korean nationalism; the tenet they advanced
became what is known as minjok.6 Minjok is an ideology that means Koreans are bound
to one another by blood and land. Sin and Choe’s ethnic blood-land theory was based on
the ancient accounts mentioned in the Tan’gun creation story.7 In particular, the ancient
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lands that King Tan’gun ruled over extended past the peninsula and into a chunk of
Southern Manchuria; this was known as Gojoseon (Ancient Korea).8 Therefore, Koreans
from the tip of the peninsula to Manchuria were all one entity bound by ethnicity and
culture.
In 1944, a young Park Chung Hee was a Japanese Imperial officer stationed along
the Manchurian-North Korean border.9 This location is crucial because Park became
infatuated with both Imperial institutions and Sin-Choe teachings. Park took these
elements and created his own version of nationalism. From the Imperial end, Park took
Meiji institutions and Japanese bushido ethics and fused them with Korean nationalism.10
The result was a neo-nationalist take on Sin-Choe ideologies. Meaning, Park’s Korean
brethren were entitled to live in their war-ravaged lands but with one big difference,
ethnic Koreans were obligated to steer those lands into prosperity and into a “world
historical society.”11
But before Park could enact his societal takeover, South Korea was ruled under
another dictatorship by the American-backed Rhee Syngman. This regime lasted from
1948 to 1960. Rhee’s tenure can be summed up as an entrenched oligarchy that promoted
an elitist socioeconomic structure. Along with Rhee, the oligarchs consisted of corrupt
government officials and business owners who usually benefited from prewar
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connections. Park used this to his advantage when Rhee was ousted in 1960 due to
protests from the students and the poor.12
General Park swiftly labelled Rhee’s ruling philosophy as an effeminate and
tainted adaptation of Sin and Choe’s version. Rhee’s Korea, therefore, was weak in
General Park’s eyes. It did not stay true to the pure-blooded strength posited by Sin and
Choe's Tan'gun thesis.13 Park’s answer to Korea’s pathetic state was to install bushido
onto every aspect of his society. In a blink of an eye, the General masterfully enacted his
blueprint from the polity all the way to the countryside; this was the “Developmental
Dictator” at his finest.14
The vehicles Park used were Meiji zaibatsu (family-owned conglomerates)
economics – disguised and renamed as chaebol – mixed with an intrusive, yet
independent, form of Confucianism.15 This unique neo-Confucian nationalism established
a rigid hierarchy with Park situated at the highest position; and the polity, consisting of
technocrats, were next in line.16 Below them were chaebol institutions who dictated the
policies of the next in line: the newly-urbanized population.17 Chaebol are megacorporations that, with limitless state resources, were tasked with creating a booming
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market economy. As such, these conglomerates held immense power over newly-trained
professionals and unskilled laborers alike.18
The countryside, however, was different and could be considered a separate
entity.19 For context, before Park’s rule the countryside was ruled by a feudal-like system
led by elderly yangban landowners.20 But now, in barren rustic villages and towns, Park
officials gifted youthful farmers with cheap lands. The state supported these farmers
through the Saemaul Undong program, and instantaneously, upended centuries of
entrenched caste order in favor of meritocracy. Essentially, this program provided
limitless subsidies and employment to whoever could modernize infrastructure and
outperform produce quotas.21 Likewise, this rural and young constituency held immense
wealth and power and were essentially the head patriarchs of their domains.
In a nutshell, this was Park’s Korea. South Korea was a brand-new and dynamic
top-down pyramidal authoritarian system where the executive was the strongest entity.
Park fathered a young and reinvigorated state, economy, and countryside. This was
bushido Confucianism and state nationalism in perfect motion.22 Furthermore, a hierarchy
chart is presented in Figure III to help visualize the structure.
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Figure III. Park’s pyramid-like class structure. Chart by author. Source: Chang-hee Nam, “Big Business Clientelism,” 357-361; and Seung-Mi Han,
“New Community Movement,” 70-74.

250
Park's nationalist agendas were initially successful. In a decade, from 1961 to
1971, Park’s Korea saw tremendous growth, industrialization, and the growth of a
booming middle class; however, with those affluent trends also came the need for more
advanced governance and representation.23 In the 1971-1972 elections, Park and his
party, the Democratic Republicans, won a close election against the opposition; and thus,
Park saw the first signs of his bushido state being taken away from him.24 Accordingly,
Executive Park instituted the authoritarian Yushin constitution, thereby cementing
bushido as South Korea’s permanent nationalist institution. This, in turn, began the era of
strict autocratic governance that ultimately ended with Park's assassination in 1979.25
As a response, a new nationalist ideology was birthed from 1979 onwards.
Frequent student protests, starting with the 1979 Bu-Ma massacre, began the ideology
that is now known as minjung nationalism. Initially, this movement was void of any solid
goal, with different factions protesting differing goals. As such, minjung dissent was
doomed to fail and was usually suppressed through violent means.26
Although an initial failure, minjung nationalism only grew stronger and more
disciplined during the 1980s. The main catalyst for this growth were the policies of Park's
successor, General Chun Doo-hwan. Chun, from 1980 to 1987, amplified the bushido
culture left in Park’s absence in order to eradicate minjung and continue Yushin-like
autocracy – and this tactic worked very well.27 Chun kept a strong grip on the
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government and chaebol kept a strong grip on the market. In short, it appeared as if Chun
was poised to be the next Park showering Korea with wealth while keeping ultimate
power. In hindsight, however, Chun became the president that ended bushido
nationalism.
In late 1987, minjung took a final solidified form after the tragic results of the
Gwangju Massacre.28 The new nationalism combined years of diversity and conflicts into
one package, it was an antithesis to Park-Chun bushido and chaebol culture. Minjung
now emphasized universal democracy among the oppressed – such as the elderly, poor,
and women; but more importantly, minjung accentuated unity and strength among all
Koreans.29 Even with the intense urban protests, minjung protestors miraculously
survived suppression without breaking into factions. This meant that Sin and Choe’s
teachings were back in their rawest form and were fully manifested after three decades of
manipulation by Park and Chun. Simply put, Sin and Choe's minjok manifested itself
through minjung; both ideologies were one.30
In 1988 and beyond, minjung nationalism accomplished its goal, Chun resigned,
and the last vestiges of Park’s bushido state were over. Minjung was the new state
ideology as Koreans could now vote for their fates in frequent and open elections. Minjok
nationalism was short-lived, however, due to the completion of its goals. Likewise,
Koreans questioned the need for it as they rightfully enjoyed their hard-earned affluent
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status (OAO status). 31 Bluntly put, South Koreans were now in a good spot and went
back to their “developmental mentalite.”32
***
One thing can be said about Park-styled nationalism: the ideology accomplished
all the strongman’s state-building agendas. The “developmental dictator” rightfully
earned his title because South Korean society became fully modernized and prosperous
under a bushido blueprint. Middle-class affluence was in the reach of millions, but it was
granted only if the aspiring population played by Park’s rules. Consequently, and just like
Western counterparts, Park’s Korea during the booming 1970s and 1980s was influenced
by wealth and materialism resulting in the stratification of Korean society.33
Kang Myung-koo and Kim Jinwung posit, that Sin, Choe, minjok, and minjung
were now relegated to textbooks and museums as future generations focused their
attention on South Korea’s growing “soft-power” status.34 Meaning, combined with
consumerism, South Koreans were a “credential-fixated” society. “Stratification,”
therefore, was not only present in material wealth but also in a socioeconomic realm
wholly influenced by a technocratic and Confucian-hierarchal past.35
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However, ghosts never die, and to show the resilience of early Korean
nationalism, minjok appeared once again in 2016. Remnants of Sin and Choe’s teachings
were needed when Park’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, became president in 2012.36 Like
Park and Chun, the younger Park’s presidency was mired in political corruption and
cronyism. Her offenses were so apparent that protests by the millions of Koreans –
dubbed the “2016 Candlelight Protests” – from all socioeconomic classes erupted
overnight.37 This time, however, things were very different. Minjung ascended from its
volatile past and became a brand-new entity. It became one with minjok once again, and
now the whole world was watching. Simply put, Sin and Choe’s minjok engulfed not only
the peninsula but the world.
The days of mass beatings and destruction of government facilities were gone.
Minjung was now a peaceful, yet very effective, tool used to combat the ghosts of
bushido past.38 Just like the 1987 counterparts, minjung accomplished its goal again –
Park’s daughter was swiftly impeached in December 2016. Minjok nationalism, therefore,
transcended socioeconomics and “developmental mentalite” boundaries. Even though the
younger generations may have forgotten their minjok and minjung roots, one thing was
clear about the Candlelight Protests: minjok is in the blood of all Koreans, and thus, could
never be forgotten.39
In the end, Park Chung Hee not only left a permanent mark on the Korean cultural
and economic landscapes, but he also left a strong impression on global state-building
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agendas. From Singapore to China and to developing nations all over, remnants of Park’s
Neo-Confucian bushido nationalism can be seen by any leader wishing – in the pursuit of
societal affluency – to study the developmental dictator’s blueprints.40 Whether the costs
for state-building success is worth it in the end is, of course, up to the individual;
however, one thing is for sure, Park’s nationalist agendas will forever be a divisive issue
for future Korean generations, politicians, and scholars alike.
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